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Summary
The study of symbolic communication is a key research area in both the social and 
natural sciences. However, little has been done in order to bridge these scientific do­
mains, so an unfortunate gulf between them still persists. Even less has been done in 
the field of computational sociology, in which most research using agent-based mod­
els has disregarded the importance of symbolic communication. It is this lacuna that 
the thesis addresses.
In the thesis, it is claimed that the type of emergent properties that are inherent to 
social phenomena are likely to result from the unique fact that the participating en­
tities are symbolic agents. It is proposed that symbolic communication is a threshold 
phenomenon that emerges in the intersections among human cognition, social inter­
actions and human biology. A theoretical framework with which to clarify this con­
nection is also presented.
In order to test in silico some hypotheses derived from this theoretical framework, 
the analysis relies upon two agent-based models. Different simulation methods and 
techniques were used, such as reinforcement learning algorithms, genetic algorithms, 
graph theory and evolutionary game theory. To investigate the simulation results, 
multivariate analysis techniques, social network analysis and differential equations 
were used.
The first agent-based model was developed to study the properties of an emergent 
communication system, in which groups of 'speechless' agents create local lexicons 
and compete with each other to spread them throughout the whole population. The 
model results indicate that a common lexicon can emerge on the condition that a group 
of agents develops a communicative strategy that favours their mutual understand­
ing and allows them to reach more recipients for their utterances. An analysis of the 
agents' social networks reveals that strong mutual relations among agents from the 
same group, high 'immunity' to external influence and high capability of speaking 
to agents from different groups play a fundamental role in the process of spreading 
lexicons.
The second agent-based model was built to study the pre-linguistic stage of cooper­
ation among individuals required for the emergence of symbolic communication. In 
this model, agents reproduce sexually males and females differ in their reproductive 
costs and they play the iterated prisoner's dilemma. The model results show that, 
when male reproductive costs are less than female reproductive costs, males cooper­
ate with females even when females do not reciprocate. This non-reciprocal coopera­
tion, in turn, produces a sustained population growth, because females can reproduce 
faster despite their high reproductive costs.
Finally, a mathematical model of cumulative cultural evolution is used to investigate 
different patterns of population dynamics, and it is demonstrated that the artificial so­
cieties in which non-reciprocal cooperation emerges are able to sustain more complex 
cultural artefacts, such as communicative symbols.
Linking computational sociology to appropriate theories of language evolution, com­
munication, evolutionary biology and cognitive research, the thesis provides concept­
ually grounded mechanisms to explain the emergence and evolution of symbolic com­
munication. In so doing, the thesis contributes both substantively and methodologic­
ally to academic work on computational sociology, as well as agent-based models of 
symbolic communication.
Key words: Agent-Based Modelling, Computational Sociology, Game Theory Co­
operative Breeding, Cultural Evolution, Cultural Cognition, Emergence, Lexicons, 
Symbolic Communication
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Chapter
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Symbols are universal. Language is universal. We all communicate on a daily basis 
and communication is so ubiquitous that we usually overlook its importance. For 
many, it is the most significant difference that humans have with the rest of the anim­
als. Language is the house of being, as Heidegger established. No other animal has 
the ability of manipulating a finite system and using it to produce an infinite number 
of elements. It is a complex and, therefore, evolving system (for instance, see Deffuant 
and Gilbert, 2011). Perhaps this situation is the reason why the study of the main 
features of language and symbolic communication in general has been a difficult task.
The same year that Charles Darwin published his opus magnum, The Origin of Species, 
in 1859, there was already a great scientific interest in the emergence and evolution of 
language (for details, see Christiansen and Kirby, 2003a). A plethora of ideas and con­
jectures flourished, attracting the interest of philosophers and lay people. However, 
this early theorising became plagued by outlandish and contentious speculations. By 
1866 this situation had deteriorated to such a degree that the primary authority for 
the study of language at the time— La Société de Linguistique de Paris—felt compelled to 
impose a prohibition on all discussions of the origin and evolution of language. Para­
doxically, the prestigious society leading the scientific research on the area, imposed a 
silence on this important topic. The situation persisted for almost a century, until the
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seventies of the last century, when a new vanguard of researchers started to address 
the origins of language. All in all, the most important discoveries and theoretical ad­
vances have been made the last two decades or so, propelled by major advances in 
the cognitive and brain sciences, linguistics, and artificial intelligence. Philosophers, 
social and natural scientists have tried to elucidate the nature, origin and structure of 
symbolic communication. During the last three decades the research in this domain 
has reached significant achievements, but the picture that is emerging is highly com­
plex and the current state of the art presents major consensus as well as important con­
troversies. And an unfortunate gulf between naturalistic and sociological perspectives 
to the study of symbolic communication still persists.
In any case, major advances have been achieved during this short period of time. So 
far, the study of language dynamics has been addressed from at least three different 
perspectives (Knight et al., 2000; Pinker, 2003b; Sampson, 2005; Tomasello, 2008): lan­
guage evolution, or how the structure of language evolves; language cognition, or the 
way in which human cognition acquires, processes and produces language; and lan­
guage competition, or the dynamics of language usage in multilingual contexts. These 
perspectives address language stressing different dimensions.
Therefore, the study of symbolic communication is a key research area in both the 
social and natural sciences. However, little has been done in order to bridge these 
scientific domains, so a regrettable gulf between them still persists. Even less has been 
done in the field of computational sociology, in which most research using ABMs has 
disregarded the importance of symbolic communication, albeit only this phenomenon 
can be called social in its own right. It is this lacuna that the thesis addresses.
1.2 The Gap in Existing Knowledge
Computational sociology models social phenomena using the idea of emergent com­
plex systems (Miller and Page, 2007). However, the theoretical status of this frame­
work is ambiguous, because, on the one hand, there is no agreement about what emer­
gence means and, on the other, the concept of emergence is invoked by two opposed 
sociological interpretations of social phenomena, namely: the individualistic and hol­
istic (Gilbert, 1996; Goldspink and Kay, 2004; Sawyer, 2003; Squazzoni, 2008). In order
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to overcome these drawbacks, the theories about the emergence and evolution of sym­
bolic communication might be useful, since they give an account of the emergence of 
the social realm from the bottom-up as communication and describe the process by 
which society limits the possible selections of individuals in a downward direction. In 
this sense, an explicit theory of communicative process can be the general framework 
to understand the distinction and relation between individual and society, tackling the 
long-lasting problem in sociology about the micro and macro link.
Also, nowadays both social and cognitive scientists, for instance, agree that our fac­
ulty of language is a central concept to explain the emergence of social order. However, 
little has been done in order to connect both scientific domains. On the one hand, 
sociological research has a long-lasting theoretical and empirical tradition devoted to 
comprehend the dynamic of daily symbolic interactions and the way in which some 
expectations are stabilised and socialised over time. Major schools of thought in so­
ciology—like ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1984) and symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 
1992)—were predominantly cognitive, emphasising concepts such as indexicality of 
language, definitions of situation, gratifications, and attributions. However, most soci­
ologists following such traditions seldom refer to the research and theories within the 
brain and cognitive sciences. On the other hand, cognitive sciences have focused their 
attention on processes like symbolic and cultural cognition (Tomasello, 2000), cultural 
transmission (Henrich and Boyd, 2002), internalisation of norms and cooperative in­
teraction (Haidt, 2007), but in doing so they have ignored vast bodies of relevant social 
science literature. In this sense, interdisciplinary research is needed to bridge this gap 
between natural and social sciences.
1.3 Objectives
The objectives of this research are, firstly, to develop a theoretical framework about the 
emergence and evolution of symbolic communication and, secondly, to explore and 
integrate different extant computer simulations that analytically tackle this process. In 
doing so, I will underscore that symbolic communication—and especially language, as 
the most paradigmatic form of symbolic communication—is a threshold phenomenon 
that emerges from the structural intersection among cognition, society and organic
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systems. Consequently, from a dynamic and evolutionary perspective, I propose to 
tackle the triple roots of symbolic communication, namely: some important aspects of 
the evolutionary trajectory of our species, or phylogeny; the cognitive development 
made up of the different stages of our life history, or ontogeny; and finally, socio­
cultural evolution. For each dimension of analysis, this research will propose a set of 
hypotheses which will be then explored and tested using computational modelling.
Specifically, this research aims to answer the following questions:
• Why two (or more) initially independent and speechless agents would wish to 
embark on so improbable enterprise, that is, to communicate;
• How a set of symbols, initially without any intrinsic meaning, acquires a conven­
tional and socially shared meaning, so lexicons converge over time and asymp­
totic learning is facilitated;
• How this set of symbols can be stable, so that a whole population could learn 
and reproduce them over time;
• What the conditions of possibility are for the emergence and evolution of sym­
bolic communication, in particular, what kind of cooperative social structure 
should be present to act as a pre-linguistic level of mutual comprehension; and
• What kind of process, at the population level, can sustain the evolution of such 
a complex cultural artefact.
Therefore, the area of our research is the analysis of human communication and my 
topic is the emergence and evolution of symbolic communication, using the semantic 
dimension of language (the association between meanings and arbitrary signs) as a 
paradigmatic case. I am specifically interested in studying how symbolic communic­
ation emerges and evolves within a population of autonomous agents, which they 
can use to coordinate their actions. I am also interested in the characteristics of the 
pre-linguistic level of mutual understanding that allowed the emergence of symbolic 
communication. Finally, I am interested in the kind of population dynamics that sus­
tained a regime of cumulative cultural evolution in which symbols could stabilise and 
evolve.
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The objectives of this research are the followings:
• To advance a plausible and integrative theoretical framework on the emergence 
and evolution of symbolic communication. This theoretical framework describes 
symbolic communication as a threshold phenomenon that emerges from the 
structural intersection between cognition, society and organic body.
• To understand the processes by which an arbitrary sign (initially without any 
intrinsic meaning) acquires endogenously an informative value and, therefore, a 
socially shared meaning
• To explore the evolutionary conditions of possibility of symbolic communication 
(which I refer to as 'common ground'). In particular, to model the emergence of 
a social structure of cooperation brought about by some biological and unique 
features of human beings.
• To explore the potential regimes of adaptive or maladaptive cultural skills that 
different simulated population dynamics can sustain in order to develop com­
plex cultural artefacts such as symbols.
Of course, communication in general and language in particular are very wide topics 
to investigate. Narrowing the topic of research means that certain areas of language 
will not be covered, in particular:
• Confining the project to explain the emergence and evolution of language means 
that the other symbolic media that sociological theory recognises, namely, dif­
fusion media and symbolically generalized communication media will not be 
covered (Chemilo, 2002).
• Confining the project to understand language as a triple selection process means 
that issues such as phonology, morphology, syntax and semiotics will not be 
covered; nor the large literature that comes under the heading of communication 
studies (Fabbri, 2000).
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• Confining the project to investigate the dynamic processes through which some 
symbols acquire informative value for the agents means that other dynamic pro­
cesses like grammar acquisition will not be covered (Briscoe, 2000).
• Confining the project to construct a language game where agents face the solu­
tion of some problem means that more complex simulation topics such as col­
laborative agent societies will not be covered (Grosz and Kraus, 1996).
Overall, in this thesis I seek to develop computational based research on the intersec­
tion among symbolic communication, human cognition, biology and society. What 
motivates me is to synthesise theoretical approaches with which to understand these 
empirical associations; to critically evaluate different theories about our faculty for 
symbolic communication; and to integrate theoretical knowledge and computational 
tools in order to move towards a more theoretically-grounded empirical enquiry of 
symbolic communication.
1.4 The thesis
The thesis is divided into three main parts. The first corresponds to the analytical and 
methodological toolkit to be used; it comprises chapters 2 and 3. The second part is 
devoted to a thorough description of two ABM and their results, chapters 4 and 5, 
respectively, and a mathematical model of cumulative cultural evolution, in chapter
6. In the final part I present the main findings and relate them to previous research in 
the field, especially in relation to theories of symbolic communication, the evolution 
of cooperation and the evolution of parental care.
In Chapter 2 1 claim that computational sociology models social phenomena using the 
concepts of emergence and downward causation. However, the theoretical status of 
these concepts is ambiguous; they suppose too much ontology and are invoked by 
two opposed sociological stands: individualistic and holistic interpretations of social 
reality. This chapter aims to clarify those concepts and argue in favour of their heur­
istic value for social simulation. It does so by proposing a link between the concept of 
emergence and Luhmann's theory of communication. For Luhmann, society emerges 
from the bottom-up as communication and he describes the process by which society
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limits the possible selections of individuals as downward causation. In this chapter 
I argue that Luhmann's theory is well positioned to overcome some epistemological 
drawbacks in computational sociology.
Chapter 3 presents my theoretical framework. There, I claim that, although research 
on the emergence and evolution of symbolic communication can be characterised by 
the theoretical positions according to two distinctions—i.e., social /  biological evol­
ution and nature /  nurture—I propose to reinforce the former distinction and wipe 
out the latter. Language is a threshold phenomenon that emerges in the frontier among 
cognition, society and organic systems. Consequently, from a dynamic and evolution­
ary perspective, in order to tackle the triple roots of language it is needed to focus on 
three dimensions, namely: cognition, evolution and society. I establish and analyse the 
complex ways by which language emerges and constantly relates these three domains. 
Besides, I claim that this perspective to symbolic communication allows a fruitful dia­
logue between naturalistic and sociological perspectives of social behaviour.
I report the main results of an ABM designed to study the emergence and evolution of 
symbolic communication in Chapter 4. The novelty of this model is that it considers 
some interactional and spatial constraints to this process that have been disregarded 
by previous research. The model is used to give an account of the implications of 
differences in the agents' behaviour, which are embodied in a spatial environment. 
Two communicational dimensions are identified: the frequency with which agents 
refer to different topics over time and the spatial limitations on reaching recipients. 
The model points out some interesting emergent communicational properties when 
the agents' behaviour is altered by considering these two dimensions. The simulation 
results show that the group of agents able to reach more recipients and less prone to 
changing the topic have the highest likelihood of driving the emergence and evolution 
of symbolic communication. I explain why this is the case.
However, Luhmann's theory of communication leaves many unanswered questions. 
Two of them refer to how and why two speechless individuals, at the stage 'zero' of 
social evolution, managed to coordinate their behaviour in such a way that some ar­
bitrary but commonly available signs ended up conveying common meanings. For
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this reason, this thesis also focuses on what is not addressed by Luhmann's theory: 
the biological and cognitive conditions of possibility for the emergence of symbolic 
communication. Thus, I show that the increasing evidence found in the fossil records, 
together with recent conclusions from evolutionary and comparative analyses, sug­
gest that the faculty of symbolic communication might have evolved within highly 
contextualised and non-linguistic formats, such as hunting, feeding or child care. In 
Chapter 5 I relate some of these findings and describe a computational model of this 
phenomenon, by using a combination of theoretical biology, genetic computation and 
game theory. The reported n-person iterated prisoner's dilemma shows that when 
sexual differences and the energy costs involved in reproduction are considered, a 
particular form of cooperative breeding emerges. Specifically, when male reproduct­
ive costs are less than female reproductive costs, males cooperate with females even 
when females do not reciprocate. This male non-reciprocal behaviour, in turn, pro­
duces a sustained population growth, which has been identified as a prerequisite for 
the development of complex cultural artefacts. I speculate that a similar processes 
happened during human phylogeny, establishing the pre-linguistic level of mutual 
understanding in which language became possible.
Complex cultural artefacts, such as cultural signs and elaborated communication me­
diums, require big population sizes. As discussed in Chapter 5, the emergence of 
male non-reciprocal behaviour produced a sustained population growth, for mothers 
receiving help from others were able to reproduce faster, producing more and health­
ier offspring. In Chapter 6, it is claimed that faster reproductive rates increased the 
population size and, consequently, the overall social density, so the repertoire of skil­
ful individuals producing cultural innovations—or social models to imitate— also in­
creased. Since humans are much better at learning from conspecifics than any other 
animal, larger populations and higher density of social connections brought about a 
selective force in cultural transmission that generated cumulative adaptation, allowing 
the development of complex cultural artefacts, either symbolic or material. Finally, it 
is claimed in this chapter that the evolutionary origins of language are anchored in 
these collaborative activities. To formally analyse and test these claims, a mathem­
atical model of cumulative cultural evolution, which relates population growth and
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adaptive or maladaptive changes in cultural skills is employed. This mathematical 
model demonstrates that the artificial societies in which non-reciprocal cooperation 
emerges are able to sustain more complex cultural artefacts, such as communicative 
symbols.
The findings of this research are discussed along with potential directions of future 
work and conclusions in Chapter 7.
1.5 The Method: Agent-Based M odelling
Agent-based modelling is a computational method that enables researchers to create, 
analyse, and experiment with models composed of autonomous and heterogeneous 
agents that interact within an environment in order to identify the mechanisms that 
bring about some macroscopic phenomenon of interest.
There is an increasing interest in agent-based modelling (from here on ABM) as a mod­
elling approach in the social sciences because it enables researchers to build compu­
tational models where individual entities and their cognition and interactions are dir­
ectly represented. In comparison to alternative modelling techniques, such as variable- 
based approaches using structural equations or system-based approaches using differ­
ential equations, ABM allows modellers to simulate the emergence of macroscopic or 
system regularities over time, such as ants colonies, flock of birds, norms of coopera­
tion, traffic jams, or languages, from local interactions of autonomous and heterogen­
eous agents (Gilbert, 2007). The emergent properties of an agent-based model are then 
the result of 'bottom-up' processes, the outcome of agent interactions, rather than 'top- 
down' direction. In fact, the absence of any form of top-down control is the hallmark 
of ABM, since the cognitive processes, behaviours, and interactions at the agent-level 
bring about the observed regularities in the system- or macro-level. For this reason, 
ABM is most appropriate for studying processes that lack central coordination, includ­
ing the emergence of macroscopic patterns that, once established, impose order from 
the top down.
Agent-based models involve two main components. Firstly, these models entail the 
definition of a population of agents. The agents are the computational representa­
tion of some specific social actors—individual people or animals, organisations such
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as firms or bodies such nation-states—capable of interacting, that is, they can pass in­
formational messages to each other and act on the basis of what they learn from these 
messages. Thus, each agent in the model is an autonomous entity. The artificial pop­
ulation can include heterogeneous agents, which is useful when the researcher wants 
to build a model of a certain phenomenon with different agents' capabilities, roles, 
perspectives or stocks of knowledge. Secondly, ABM involves the definition of some 
environment. The environment is the virtual world in which the agents act. It may 
be an entirely neutral medium with little or no effect on the agents, as in some agent- 
based models based on game theory, where the environment has no meaning. In other 
models, the environment may be as carefully designed as the agents themselves, as in 
some ecological or anthropological agent-based models where the environment rep­
resents complex geographical space that affects the agents' behaviour.
1.6 Theoretical Background
One of the main objectives of ABM is to falsify, by experimental means, the hypo­
thesised mechanisms that bring about the macroscopic phenomenon the researcher 
is interested in explaining. Following the definition provided by Hedstrom (2005), a 
mechanism describes a constellation of entities (i.e., agents) and activities (i.e., actions) 
that are organised such that they regularly bring about a particular type of outcome. 
We explain an observed macroscopic phenomenon by referring to the mechanisms 
by which the phenomenon is regularly brought about. In ABM these mechanisms 
are translated as the model microspecifications, that is to say, the set of behavioural 
and simple rules that specify how the agents behave and react to their local environ­
ment (which includes, of course, other agents). Once the population of agents and the 
environment are defined, the researcher can implement the microspecifications and 
run the computer simulation in order to evaluate whether these rules bring about the 
macro phenomenon of interest, over the simulated time. When the model can gener­
ate the type of outcome to be explained, then the researcher has provided a compu­
tational demonstration that a given microspecification (or mechanism) is in fact suffi­
cient to generate the macrostructure of interest. This demonstration, called generative 
sufficiency (Epstein, 1999), provides a candidate mechanism-based explanation of the
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macro-phenomenon. The agent-based modeller can then use relevant data and stat­
istics to gauge the generative sufficiency of a given microspecification by testing the 
agreement between 'real-world' and the generated macrostructures in the computer 
simulation. On the other hand, when the model cannot generate the outcome to be ex­
plained, the microspecification is not a candidate explanation of the phenomenon and 
the researcher has demonstrated the hypothesised mechanism to be false. Therefore, 
agent-based models can be used to perform highly abstract thought experiments that 
explore plausible mechanisms that may underlie observed patterns.
Finally, it can be said that the interest in ABM reflects a growing interest in complex 
adaptive systems by social scientists, that is to say, the possibility that human societies 
may be described as highly complex, path-dependent, non-linear, and self-organising 
systems (Macy and Wilier, 2002). The emphasis on processes and on the relations 
between entities that bring about macroscopic regularities, both of which can be ex­
amined by ABM, accounts for the developing link between this theoretical perspective 
and ABM research.
1.7 Important Scientific Research and Open Questions
Agent-based models have become a standard tool in most branches of the social sci­
ences, ecology, biology, linguistics, anthropology, and economics. The scientific re­
searches that are briefly described in the rest of this section have been chosen to il­
lustrate the diversity of the problem areas where ABM has been used productively as 
well as issues where there is as yet not full agreement.
Thomas Schelling (1971) proposed one of the most famous ABM. His model aimed to 
explain observed racial segregation in American cities. Although this is an abstract 
model, it has influenced recent work on understanding the persistence of segregation 
in urban centres. The striking finding of this study, as explained by Schelling, is that 
even quite low degrees of racial prejudice could yield the strongly segregated patterns 
typical of US cities in the 1970s.
Another inspiring application of ABM is due to Epstein and Axelrod (1995). Their 
model, named "Sugarscape", replicates market behaviour. Agents are located on a 
grid and trade with neighbours. There are just two commodities: sugar and spice.
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All agents consume both these, but at different rates. Each agent has its own welfare 
function, relating its relative preference for sugar or spice to the amount it has 'in 
stock' and the amount it needs. The expected market-clearing price emerges from 
the many bilateral trades. The analysis of their model allowed them to state that the 
quantity of trade is less than that predicted by neo-classical theory, since agents are 
only able to trade with their neighbours.
There are a number of studies that apply agent-based models to investigate opinion 
dynamics and customer behaviour. These models are mostly concerned with under­
standing the influence of friends, families and other social factors on the development 
of political opinions and on shaping customers' taste; for instance, explaining the 
spread of extremist opinions within a population or identifying factors, not related 
to the quality of a product, that might affect consumer behaviours.
Several scholars have applied agent-based models to investigate cooperation, recipro­
city and long-term strategies. These authors understand cooperation as the emergence 
and maintenance of persistent relations among actors within a shared environment. 
Their aim is to design mechanisms that yield cooperative behaviours. One aspect of 
this work is the investigation of the role played by the creation and destruction of links 
between firms, such as supply chains and small firms clustered in industrial districts. 
ABM approaches have been successfully used to test the performance of different net­
work structures with respect to innovation, knowledge, financial links and others firm 
features.
Whether to conceive agent-based modelling as a mode of building theory or as an 
attempt for imitation is one of the current debates on ABM. Computer programs, 
like scientific theories, have semantic significance; each line of code stands for other 
things for the user of those programs and theories. However, theories do not posses 
the causal capability of computer programs, which act on machines where they are 
loaded, compiled and executed. Therefore, according to this perspective, computer 
programs allow a researcher to refine and adjust the theory by observing and measur­
ing the causal features that this brings about. Contrarily, several scholars understand 
ABM as tool for imitation. They maintain that the knowledge produced by means
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of ABM is valid only if it reproduces some feature known from experience. Hence, 
this line of thinking suggests that the adequacy of imitation rather than any deriva­
tion from theoretical principles is the only successful criterion to build a sound agent 
based model.
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Emergence and Communication in 
Computational Sociology
The system emerges etsi non daretur Dens.
Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems, 1995
2.1 Introduction
Over the past forty years, a new kind of method has increasingly been used in the 
social sciences: that of the computer simulation of social processes (Axelrod, 1997; 
Epstein and Axtell, 1995; Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Computational sociology (or social 
simulation) is an outstanding method for modelling and building explanations of social 
processes, based on ideas about the emergence of complex behaviour from simple 
activities. With this technique we can study properties of emergent orders that arise 
from local interactions among a multitude of independent components. And we can 
understand the ways in which such emergent orders can influence or constrain the 
individual actions of those components. This process is known as 'self-organisation7 
and is characterised by the concepts of 'bottom-up7 and 'downward causation'.
However, despite its possibilities, which exceed the limits of traditional methods in the 
social sciences, social simulation also has some epistemological and methodological
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drawbacks. First, although the method is widely used in the field, there is no agree­
ment about the idea of emergence and its value for theory and explanation. Second, as 
a consequence, there is a division between 'individualist' and 'collectivist' emergent- 
ists. Finally, most research using social simulation ignores the importance of symbolic 
communication in the social realm, even though only this process can be called social 
in its own right. Because social communication is not an important issue within the 
mainstream of computational sociology, it is not hard to understand the reason why 
the most important advances in computational models about the emergence and the 
evolution of symbolic communication are just restricted to computational linguistics 
(cf the review of Perfors, 2002).
In order to analyse how these drawbacks can be overcome, in Section 2.2 I begin by 
examining the notion of emergence in order to show the ambiguity of the concept and 
draw out some relations between that notion and the different positions in computa­
tional sociology (Section 2.3). Then, I assess the over-ontological sense of emergence 
that both holistic and individualistic accounts of social reality propose and I delineate 
a possible alternative based on the concept of 'medium downward causation' (Section 
2.4). I relate this alternative to the distinction between individual and communication 
as advanced by Niklas Luhmann's theory of communication, because this theoretical 
framework is well positioned to be a sociological support for developing social sim­
ulations (section 2.5). I present that theory and conclude with a general overview of 
our proposal (section 2.6).
2.2 The Two Souls Inhabiting Emergence
In all the discussions about emergent phenomena there are two constants (Schroder, 
1998). First, emergent properties are always the properties of complex systems. So, 
elementary particles do not have emergent properties. Second, a property of a com­
plex thing, in order to be emergent, must not be a property of a proper part of that 
thing. Thus, properties like mass, velocity and charge are not emergent properties. 
These two restrictions are uncontroversial, because they say nothing about the pos­
sible relation between the parts of a thing and its emergent properties except that they 
must be at different levels. The quarrels arise when we try to define that relationship
2.2. The Two Souls Inhabiting Emergence 17
by answering two questions: (a) if we accept that there are elementary properties, can 
there be authentic emergent properties endowed with causal power? (b) If we can 
recognise the micro and macro levels as independent, can the properties of the parts 
explain the emergent properties? These related ontological and epistemological topics 
are the focus of several debates.
In its strong sense, the concept of emergence means that nature and society articulates 
itself on different levels of organisation, and that each of these levels yields its own 
novel causal powers. These kinds of global organisations are called emergent because 
they cannot be reduced to the sum of the properties of their elements. In this way, for 
instance, consciousness is not deducible (therefore, it might be said, is not explainable) 
from neuronal properties alone and, similarly, society is not reducible to individual 
properties alone. In a more general way, no higher level is explainable from its con­
stituent units. Here, the motto is: zthe whole is more than the sum of its parts'. In 
order to explain that 'more than', the ontological claim about the existence of emergent 
properties is frequently followed by a kind of epistemological statement that asserts 
the non-reducibility of emergent (or macro) properties to properties of the parts in 
isolation.
This strong concept of emergence is often formulated in heavily metaphysical terms. 
Those who defend the concept of emergence want to know whether there truly exists 
such emergent large-scale properties and whether these properties are more than just 
epiphenomena; accordingly, they want to know whether they have or do not have the 
causal power of altering other (large-scale or micro-scale) properties.
This formulation of emergence is not surprising considering its historical origins (for 
a similar and more extended claim, see Bitbol, 2007). Alexander, Morgan and Broad, 
the classical emergentists (McLaughlin, 1992), invented and developed the concept 
during the early twentieth century in order to find a satisfactory compromise between 
two extreme ontologies: identity theories (or reductionist materialism) and dualism. The 
first of these two ontologies is monistic and materialist; it says that there exists, in the 
world, nothing else other than material elements and their properties. The second on­
tology is dualist; it says that there are two substances or two realms of being: mind and
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matter, life and inanimate matter, individuals and society. Classical emergentists tried 
to develop a middle stance between these two ontologies. Since then z/[e]mergence 
has been perceived as a third path between dualism and identity theory, and this third 
path is generally known as nonreductive materialism" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 554). But 
being a middle path does not preclude it showing a bend towards one or the other of 
the two extremes.
Emergentism comes very close to monist materialism if it takes the high 
level behavior as a superficial symptom, with no relevance whatsoever to 
the real physical processes taking place at the low level (...). Conversely, 
emergentism comes closer to dualism when it tries to endow the emer­
gent properties with some sort of ontological consistence, and with causal 
powers of their own. (Bitbol, 2007, p. 294)
These differences, related to the ontological and epistemological status of emergence, 
have been reinterpreted in sociology to link them with the longstanding debate over 
methodological individualism and methodological collectivism. The debate is based 
on the answer that social theorists give to the question: Where must social theory aim 
its attention in order to construct explanations about the social realm? There are two 
possible answers, namely, ^individual entities' (actors, individual action, desires, be­
liefs, etc.) or 'collectives entities' (institutions, norms, structures). This debate has been 
at the heart of social theory from its origins. For example, Emile Durkheim argued 
that social properties have causal force on the individual. His defining criterion of the 
social fact was its external constraint on the individual and, consequently, his meth­
odological recommendation was that sociologists must consider the nature of society, 
not the nature of individuals (Durkheim, 1982). However, some classical thinkers put 
forward the opposing claim. Max Weber proposed that social phenomena must be 
explained by showing how they result from individual actions, which in turn must 
be explained by reference to the intentional states that motivate the individual actors 
(Weber, 1978).
The concept of emergence was reinterpreted and handled according to this long-lasting 
division inside sociological theory, concerned with the relationship between agency
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and structure, micro and macro. Consequently, existing sociological uses of emer­
gence are contradictory. On the one hand, many accounts of the micro-to-macro link 
use the concept of emergence to argue that only individuals bring about the social reg­
ularities we observe (Coleman, 1964; Elster, 1989). On the other hand, methodological 
collectivists invoke the concept of emergence to indicate that, although individuals 
exist, collectives possess emergent properties that cannot be reduced to individual 
ones (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1982; Luhmann, 1996). Sawyer talks about the 'slip­
pery concept of emergence' in sociology and argues that "two opposed sociological 
paradigms both invoke the concept of emergence and draw opposed conclusions. The 
problem arises in part because sociologists have not developed an adequate account 
of emergence" (Sawyer, 2002, p. 552).
2.3 Emergence and Computational Sociology
In this context, what happens with computational sociology? As we shall explain, 
the uses of emergence in computational sociology are also ambiguous and unstable. 
Although the concept has become widely used, it continues to be vaguely defined and 
to stand in for different propositions about social generative mechanisms.
Social simulation is an excellent technique for modelling and understanding social 
processes, based on theories about the emergence of complex behaviour. The main­
stream definition within the field establishes that a phenomenon is emergent when it 
can only be described using terms and measurements that are inappropriate or im­
possible to apply to the component units (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005). Despite the 
fact this definition refers to a epistemological notion of emergence, most researchers 
recognise the affinity between the concept and social simulation. Gilbert and Troitz­
sch (2005, p. 12) indicate that "the emphasis on processes and on relations between 
components, both of which can be examined by means of simulation, accounts for 
the developing link between this theoretical perspective and simulation research". 
Computational sociology provides experimental methods in order to investigate the 
emergence of social patterns from individual interactions and the possibility of using 
computer coding as a way of formalising dynamic social theories. Hence, for these 
authors, there is a strong link between the theoretical concept of emergence and social
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simulation.
Nevertheless, not everyone in computational sociology shares this opinion about the 
concept of emergence and its value as a theoretical support for computer modelling. 
Epstein, another leader in the field of simulation, seems to look at it with suspicion. He 
doubts its practical usefulness: "I have always been uncomfortable with the vagueness 
and occasional mysticism surrounding this word" (Epstein, 2007, p. 31). For him, the 
problem with emergentism resides in emergent phenomena being unexplainable in 
principle, because the parts cannot explain the whole. But Epstein indicates that
Obviously, "wholes" may have attributes or capabilities that their constitu­
ent parts cannot have (...) Equally obvious, the parts have to be hooked 
up right—or interact in specific, and perhaps complicated, ways—for the 
whole to exhibit those attributes. We at present may be able to explain why 
these specific relationships among parts eventuate in the stated attributes 
of wholes, and we may not. But, unlike classical emergentists, we do not 
preclude such explanation in principle. (Epstein, 2007, p. 31; italics in ori­
ginal)
Epstein puts forward the idea that it "is precisely the generative sufficiency of the parts 
that constitutes the whole's explanation" (Epstein, 2007, p. 36). This claim goes against 
emergentism (or, at least, it goes against classical emergentism). Consequently, for Ep­
stein, ABM is reductionist par excellence. By attempting to generate social phenomena 
on computers or in mathematical models, "we are denying that they are unexplainable 
or undeducible in principle—we are trying to explain them precisely by figuring out 
microrules that will generate them" (Epstein, 2007, p. 36; italics in original). ABM is 
defined here in reductionist terms: because only agents and their local interactions are 
modelled, higher-level patterns must be epiphenomenal. The term 'emergent' is still 
employed by Epstein, but in his perspective it has very restricted sense, meaning just 
"arising from decentralized bilateral agent interactions" (Epstein, 1999, p. 49).
Although less radical in his methodological individualism, Hedstrom (2005) shares 
with Epstein similar epistemological grounds. He highlights the importance of con­
structing mechanism-based explanations, which implies describing how the social realm
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is brought about by individuals' actions and interactions. For him, because only in­
dividuals exist, any modelling attempt must consider their characteristics to explain 
the emergence of social structures. However, Hedstrom does not rule out the condi­
tioning power of social structures over individuals. For him, "[s]ocial phenomena, as 
here defined, refer to properties of groups of individuals (...) These social phenom­
ena are the result of individuals' actions, but they also causally influence individuals' 
actions" (Hedstrom, 2005, p. 70). In a more recent work, Hedstrom and Ylikoski ex­
plicitly reject the association between mechanism-based explanations and methodolo­
gical individualism. According to them, mechanism-based explanations require some 
form of 'structural individualism', which suggests that although in principle all social 
facts might be explained in terms of individuals, relations and relational structures 
are important. Thus, "[fjacts about topologies of social networks; about distributions 
of beliefs, resources, or opportunities; and about institutional or informal rules and 
norms can have a significant role in mechanism-based explanations" (Hedstrom and 
Ylikoski, 2010, p. 60). Consequently, computational sociology (specifically ABM) is 
a "formalism designed for analysing the relationship between individual-level and 
social-level phenomena, whatever these phenomena may be" (Hedstrom, 2005, p. 76).
The path followed by those who argue in favour of mechanism-based explanations in 
sociology in general and computational sociology in particular seems to be the most 
fruitful option. The relatively new school of thought dubbed 'analytical sociology', 
which seeks to explain complex social phenomena by dissecting them and then bring­
ing into focus their most important constituent components or mechanisms—always 
about actors and the causes and consequences of their actions—employing computa­
tional methods is a good instance of this research program (Hedstrom, 2005; Hedstrom 
and Bearman, 2011; Hedstrom and Ylikoski, 2010). The result is that the previous line 
separating methodological individualism and holism in computational sociology be­
comes blurred and the two paradigms no longer appear as clear-cut opposites. As 
Squazzoni claims (2008, p. 2), "advocates of methodological and ontological individu­
alism now seem more inclined to take into account institutions and social structures 
as macro constraints upon individual action". Thus, some emergent social structures 
are seen as the 'social situations' that at the same time constrain and make individual
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action possible. This account avoids the problematic commitments of dualism and 
reductionism. Macro properties are emergent in the sense that they are produced by 
individuals interactions at the micro-level but, at the same time, those macro proper­
ties are not derivable from a single micro-level entity.
Consequently, to explain a social phenomenon means to identify a social mechanism: 
to make explicit a constellation of entities and activities that are organised such that 
they regularly bring about a specific type of outcome (Hedstrom and Bearman, 2011). 
Social simulation provides a method to falsify those proposed mechanisms. Using this 
modelling approach, the researcher builds an artificial society in which the mechan­
isms are translated as the model microspecifications, that is to say, the set of behavioural 
and simple rules that specify how the agents behave and react to their environments 
(which includes other agents). Since agents' actions are not independent, feedback 
enters the system and a continuous interplay between the emergent structures and 
the agents' actions takes place, altering the dynamics of the system and moving it to­
wards unpredictable states. When the simulation can generate the type of outcome to 
be explained, the researcher has provided a computational demonstration that a given 
microspecification is in fact sufficient to generate the macrostructure of interest (Ep­
stein, 1999). This demonstration, called generative sufficiency, provides a candidate 
mechanism-based explanation of the macro-phenomenon. The researcher can then 
use relevant data and statistics to test the agreement between the real-world and the 
generated macrostructures in the computer. Once the mechanism has proven to be suf­
ficient to generate the phenomenon of interest in silico and it has been tested against 
real-world data, the researcher has established a valid explanation of the social pro­
cess. On the other hand, if the model cannot generate the outcome to be explained, 
the microspecification is not a candidate explanation of the phenomenon and the re­
searcher has demonstrated the hypothesised mechanism to be false (I have addressed 
computational models in general and ABM in particular, applied to social research, in 
Chapter 1, see Section 1.5).
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2.4 Emergence and Downward Causation
Individualist emergentism leads to understanding emergent properties as epiphenom­
enal because only individuals' actions create those properties; this is the main differ­
ence from those who assert that social properties are not deducible from the isolated 
individual. However, this ontological individualism, that is, the idea that only individu­
als exist, does not imply the inevitability of methodological individualism, that is, the 
idea that all explanations in the social sciences must run in terms of actions and in­
teractions of individuals. Even the economist Arrow argued that, contrary to what is 
usually claimed, 'social categories' are not only used in economics all the time, but 
they are also absolutely necessary for the analysis of economic phenomena (Arrow, 
1994). The logical error of making ontological arguments when supporting method­
ological claims is common in the philosophy of the social sciences. As Sawyer (2002) 
notes, the fact that social properties are nothing more than their individual emergent 
base does not entail that an explanation must be provided in the language used to 
describe individuals. Moreover, consistent with epistemological empiricism, micro­
sociology asserts that valid sociological explanations cannot be structural, but must 
always refer to situational micro-dynamics such as actors' desires, beliefs or oppor­
tunities because only individuals, not structures, exist and are endowed with causal 
powers. However, we could just as plausibly say that because the notion of 'individu­
ality' is a theoretical—and by no means well-clarified—abstraction, individuals do 
not 'act' in any more realistic or empirical sense than do structures. As Fuchs (1989, p. 
178) wonders, "[cjausal explanations are attempts at making sense, making sense re­
quires languages appropriate for particular analytical purposes, but why should there 
be only one language (that of microsociology) into which all our accounts must be 
translated to make them 'more empirical' and 'causally stronger'?"
Those who believe in the causal power of emergent properties fail in a similar way. 
Most affirm the ontological status of emergent properties by referring to the non- 
linearity of the equations ruling elementary processes. The key point is that the com­
plex behaviour of non-linear systems cannot be predicted from the initial state of the 
components, experimentally measured with limited accuracy. This is taken by some
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to mean that there is really more in the global behaviour than in the individual pro­
cesses. But, if we want to prove the real existence of emergent properties, endowed 
with causal power, we cannot be satisfied with showing that complex systems are un­
predictable in practice because of restricted knowledge of the initial conditions and 
the underlying deterministic laws. This only yields epistemological emergence, not on­
tological emergence (Bitbol, 2007; Schroder, 1998). In turn, to construct emergence as 
an epistemological category is problematic. To do so involves the zepistemic fallacy' 
(Wan, 2011) in as mach as it confounds our knowledge (or lack of it) of being (i.e., the 
explanation or prediction of novel qualities) with being itself (i.e., the novel qualities 
under investigation). Furthermore, the very concept of 'downward causation'—the idea 
that the behaviour of the elements at the lower level are some how influenced by the 
properties or states at the higher level—seems to take for granted the definition of 
'causation' and what is to be 'caused' (where to cause could be to restrain, to influence, 
to structure, to determine, to govern, or to delimit future events). The underlying 
problem is that nobody really knows what is meant by 'causation', 'cause' or 'causing' 
(Hulswit, 2005).
Therefore, we have one concept and at the same time, one quandary. The main ques­
tion is whether we can define the concept of emergence in a productive way for so­
ciological research. Emmeche and colleagues (2000) argued that an emergent prop­
erty can be framed in a materialist and evolutionary perspective. To do so, the re­
lation between levels must be inclusive, permitting the existence of different ontolo­
gies, all within the physical level and without violating the physical laws of the lower 
levels. Thus, a property of a complex system is said "to be emergent just in case, 
although it arises out of the properties and relations characterising simpler constitu­
ents, it is neither predictable from, nor reducible to, these lower-level characteristics" 
(Emmeche et al., 2000, p. 14). As a kind of immediate extrapolation of this idea, down­
ward causation is usually employed in the philosophy of science as a designation for 
an alleged top-down effect, which emanates from the emergent properties onto their 
constituents in the lower level.
According to Emmeche and colleagues, in the scientific and philosophical literature 
there are three different conceptions about downward causation, based on different
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ontological theses about inter-level relations and types of causation. They call these 
three conceptions, respectively. Strong, Medium and Weak downward causation (Em­
meche et al., 2000). Whereas strong downward causation is presented as some kind of 
downward efficient causation, medium and weak downward causation are two differ­
ent versions of downward formal causation.
They characterise strong downward causation by (1) a sharp distinction between the 
higher and the lower level of phenomena, each of which is constituted by qualitat­
ively different kinds of substances, and (2) the fact that higher-level substances exert an 
efficient causal influence on substances at a lower level. Even though the higher-level 
entities consist of lower level entities, they "possess a substantial existence qualitat­
ively different from lower level entities" (Emmeche et al., 2000, p. 19). Moreover, 
strong downward causation implies a 'substance dualism'. Thus, for instance, to em­
phasise the specifically biological character of a living cell emerging from its physico­
chemical basis, one often describes the cell, more or less implicitly, as a living sub­
stance that efficiently causes changes in the interactions between its physico-chemical 
components. But this position is, according to these authors, irrational. The mistake 
consists in presupposing that the cell and biochemical processes can exist independ­
ently of one another and that there can be a causal relationship between them, for the 
biochemical processes do not cause but constitute the cell. For this reason Emmeche 
and colleagues reject this strong version of downward causation, and argue that it in­
volves a revival of the vitalist fallacy: "the identification between this temporal chain 
and the constitutive relation" (2000, p. 19). As a scientific concept, strong downward 
causation should be rejected.
The concept of medium downward causation, as proposed by Emmeche and colleagues 
(2000) might be a good first step in order to overcome the many problems posed by 
strong downward causation. The specific characteristic of medium downward caus­
ation is that downward formal causation is understood in terms of constraining con­
ditions and part-whole relationships. They define medium downward causation as 
follows: "an entity on a higher level comes into being through a realization of one 
amongst several possible states on the lower level with the previous states of the 
higher level as the factor of selection" (Emmeche et al., 2000, p. 24). They main­
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tain that "higher level entities are constraining conditions for the emergent activity of 
lower levels. And (...) in a process, the already realized higher level states are con­
straining conditions for the coming states." (2000, p. 25; italics in original). Contrary 
to strong downward causation, "it does not allow higher level phenomena to have a 
direct influence on lower level laws". This definition entails not only that the higher 
level constrains the activity on the lower level, but that it also constrains "which higher 
level phenomenon will result from a given lower level state." Moreover, according to 
medium downward causation "the same lower level constituents may correspond to 
a series of different higher level phenomena" (2000, p. 25).
Finally, weak downward causation is the third sense that downward causation can ac­
quire. Emmeche and colleagues define this weak version as follows: "the higher level 
is conceived as an organizational level, characterized by the organization, the whole, 
the pattern, the structure, in short the form into which the constituents are arranged." 
(Emmeche et al., 2000, p. 26). This weak version differs in at least four important 
aspects from medium downward causation: (1) the higher level is not seen as a sub­
stance, but as an organisational level—the structure or form according to which the 
lower level entities are organised; (2) the formal cause in weak downward causation 
may be understood by analogy to the concept of 'stable attractor/ A stable attractor is 
a kind of steady state—a bounded set of points in phase space—in a dynamical sys­
tem. Depending on the initial conditions of the system, the dynamical system may 
evolve in the direction of one attractor or the other; (3) the 'downward causal influ­
ence' is not understood in terms of constraining conditions, but static and timeless 
conditions which are not the result of the very process of emergence (as in medium 
downward causation); (4) the same lower level phenomenon does not correspond to 
several higher level phenomena: depending on the initial state, a dynamic system 
evolves in the direction of one specific attractor, which itself does not evolve (Em­
meche et al., 2000, p. 26).
Although Emmeche and colleagues admit that both medium and weak downward 
causation are the only two viable candidates for a 'rational account' of causation, 
the latter implies a more structural approach that does not consider the attractors of 
any product of creation or contingent historical process. Instead, in medium down­
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ward causation the attractors are created only in the process in which the higher-level 
properties emerge (Emmeche et al., 2000; Hulswit, 2005). Attractors, either chaotic or 
stable, were developed to analyse dynamical systems formalised by differential or dif­
ference equations, so they are mainly used in mathematical modelling (Brown, 1995; 
Gleick, 1988). Since social simulation, and specially agent-based modelling, aims to 
uncover the underlying generative mechanisms that bring about the observed regu­
larities at the macro level, in principle any steady state that the system reaches can 
be explained by these mechanisms and the contingent and temporal dynamics they 
produce (Manzo, 2007; Squazzoni, 2008). Additionally, medium downward causation 
establishes causality as constraining conditions, which is an appealing idea in soci­
ology, as different sociologists have understood the micro-macro link (e.g.. Archer, 
1995; Coleman, 1964; Elder-Vass, 2005; Luhmann, 1996). I shall return to this point 
later.
However, despite being a fruitful concept for social simulation and sociology, medium 
downward causation, as defined by Emmeche and colleagues, still poses some im­
portant problems. Firstly, the authors are ambiguous regarding the type of causality 
that this concept entails. According to them, "the entities at various levels may enter 
part-whole relations (e.g., mental phenomena control their component neural and bio­
physical sub-elements), in which the control of the part by the whole can be seen as a 
kind of functional (teleological) causation, which is based on efficient, material as well 
as formal causation in a multinested system of constraints" (Emmeche et al., 2000, p. 
25). However, the authors never clarify in what sense this is teleological rather than 
efficient causation, nor do they tell us how this kind of teleological causation is related 
to formal, efficient or material causation. Secondly, the authors reject "any untenable 
metaphysical idea of a temporal causal process from a higher level to a lower one (or 
vice versa, for that matter)" (Emmeche et al., 2000, p. 32). But this is a questionable 
conception of causality. As the authors claim, medium downward causation implies 
that an emergent property of a higher-level entity is not caused by its parts or by their 
powers, as the concept of efficient causality implies. As I shall explain latter, it is true 
that in my account symbolic communication does not cause but constitutes the social 
realm. However, when one wants to describe the causal power of any higher-level
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property onto its components, the temporal dimension cannot be ruled out. The sci­
entific idea of causation connotes transitivity (Hulswit, 2005; Kim, 2001), that is, the 
cause precedes the effect.
Borrowing a distinction proposed by Elder-Vass (2005), we can explain the relation­
ship between emergence and downward causation, which avoids the ambiguities of 
Emmeche and colleagues proposal. We shall understand emergence as a synchronic 
relationship between a whole and its parts, whereas downward causation should be 
understood as a diachronic relation in which the powers of a group of entities, at one 
moment, causally determine the events that follow at the next. As Elder-Vass claims, 
"emergence, then, is a synchronic relation amongst the parts of an entity that gives the 
entity as a whole the ability to have a particular (diachronic) [and top-down] causal 
impact." (2005, p. 321). Consequently, we can modify the definition of medium down­
ward causation by adding the requirement, common in complex systems, of ^efficient 
causality restriction' (Brodu, 2009), which includes a temporal restriction. The higher- 
level entities cannot modify lower system laws, but can only constrain (although not 
rule out completely) future possibilities. Thus, higher properties restrict the multiple 
possibilities that lower entities have, and by doing so, also constrain which higher- 
level phenomena will result from that given lower level. In this scheme, downward 
and upward causation are the co-limitation of possibilities over time between the mi­
cro and the macro levels.
In contemporary sociological theory critical realism has thematised the concept of 
emergence in a similar way. Like Emmeche and colleagues. Archer stresses the auto­
nomy of both individual actions and the social structure, and the continuous cycle of 
interaction between them. Archer's morphogenetic approach is based on two proposi­
tions: "that structure necessarily pre-dates the action(s) which transform it; and that 
structural elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions" (Archer, 1995, p. 76). The 
methodological consequence of this separability between the micro and the macro, 
similarly to the idea of medium downward causation discussed above, is that it en­
ables social researchers to analyse the ongoing interplay between them while still in­
sisting on the ways the two levels are related and co-evolve over time.
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However, as many other authors have noticed (among them, Elder-Vass, 2007a; Hed- 
strom, 2005; Sawyer, 2002), Archer's morphogenetic approach has internal ambigu­
ities and inconsistencies, especially in relation to the concept of emergence, which 
oscillates between 'analytical dualism', on the one hand, and the insistence that emer­
gent structures have real 'causal powers' (although mediated through 'social agency'), 
on the other. Furthermore, Archer (1995, p. 183) claims that it is emergence over time 
that endows social structures with causal powers and, consequently, makes them real. 
In her perspective, current social structures emerged from the past actions of indi­
viduals, such that they cannot be explanatorily reduced to the actions of current in­
dividuals. But this position is problematic. Emergence over time does not provide 
an ontological argument for social causation, since although social structures require 
past actions to be stabilised, they also need—if they come about—to be instantiated 
by contemporary actions or agents. As Sawyer (2002, p. 570) observes, "[i]n an arti­
ficial society simulation, structure emerges over time, but can only continue to exist 
through persisting interactions among elements".
The problem with this approach is whether emergent properties can constitute their 
own substances. The ontological claim that a higher entity "is a real substantial phe­
nomenon in its own right" (Emmeche et al., 2000, p. 23) and that it can bear "causal 
powers" (Archer, 1995, p. 195) becomes ambiguous because medium downward caus­
ation entails a shift from a description in terms of substances to a description in terms of 
interactions. But from a sociological standpoint, the main issue is whether sociological 
observers can distinguish the social realm as different from and not conflated with 
the individual one. In the following section, we introduce a sociological alternative to 
the individualistic and holistic interpretations of social phenomena. This alternative 
is based on the structural coupling of individual consciousness and social communic­
ation as advanced by Luhmann's theory of self-referential social systems.
2.5 Social Communication and Social Emergence
As Luhmann (1990, p. 6) says, "[c]onfronted with the question of elementary units, 
most sociologists would come up with the answer: action. Sometimes 'roles' or even 
human individuals are preferred". These traditional options overlook both the im-
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portance of communication and its relation with the concept of emergence. Sawyer 
has described the issue in the following terms:
A theory of social emergence requires an explicit theorization of symbolic 
communication and dynamic processes. Yet for the most part, sociological 
theorists who focus on the micro-macro link have not theorized commu­
nication, nor the role that communication plays in micro-macro relations. 
(Sawyer, 2005, p. 187)
In order to explain the emergence of society from individuals. Sawyer makes a basic 
assertion: the emergence of language is the emergence of society. By analysing three 
broad classes of artificial societies, namely reactive, cognitive and collaborative agent 
societies. Sawyer suggests that differences in communication result in different emer­
gent processes and outcomes. Emergence occurs only when there is an interaction 
among agents, but what is more important, "different collective properties emerge 
and the processes of their emergence are different when the agent communication lan­
guage is changed" (Sawyer, 2005, p. 188). Thus, Sawyer concludes that (a) the model 
of communication that is used in a society has causal consequences for the type of 
emergent regularities under study and (b) a theory of symbolic communication must 
be a core component in any explanation of social phenomena.
Nevertheless, Sawyer's theory of social emergence, which is based both on collabor­
ative activities among agents and the distinction between ephemeral and stable emer­
gence (Sawyer, 2005), is insufficient to explain the evolutionary stabilisation of so­
cial structures and the emergence of generalised symbolic media such as money and 
power. This does not mean that language is not important or that it does not play 
any role in social analysis. Quite the opposite, language allows the structural coupling 
between the social realm and individual thinking (Baraldi, 1993). According to Matur- 
ana and Varela (1979), who defined the concept, structural coupling refers to situations 
in which there is a history of recurrent interactions leading to congruence between two 
or more systems. Language, as a communication medium, is at individuals' disposal to 
transform thoughts, or any psychic state, into words that may be understood or mis­
understood by other individuals. But although important, language does not exhaust
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social reality. Language is not enough to stabilise complex social orders because it 
gives no motivation for co-ordinated selection among individuals—other individuals 
can always disagree. As Mascareno (2008, p. 203) argues, "language can limit se­
lection possibilities but motivation itself derives from the structured expectations of 
meaningful constellations allowed by the evolution of symbolically generalized com­
munication media". The mistake is then to deposit into language more than language 
can actually hold. We need to use another theory about the emergence and evolution 
of social communication.
In the Parsonian tradition, ego and alter are each objects of orientation for the other. 
Every social interaction constitutes a situation of double contingency, since both ego 
and alter know that both know that one could also act differently (Vanderstraeten, 
2002). The concept of double contingency implies that ego's gratifications are con­
tingent on alter's selection of action and, in turn, alter's reaction will be contingent 
on ego's selection resulting from a complementary selection on alter's part and so on 
(Parsons and Shils, 2001). And for both alter and ego there are unlimited possible se­
lections. Luhmann follows this conceptualisation and agrees with Parsons that social 
order is impossible unless the problem of double contingency is solved. In Luhmann's 
words: "We would emphasize that the problem of double contingency belongs to the 
conditions of possibility for action and that (...) actions can be constituted only in 
these systems and only by solving the problem of double contingency" (Luhmann, 
1996, p. 104). Luhmann explains the connection with the emergence of social order in 
the following terms:
The basic situation of double contingency is then simple: two black boxes, 
by whatever accident [sic], come to have dealings with one another. (...)
For the few aspects through which they deal with one another, their capa­
city for processing information can suffice. They remain separate; they do 
not merge (...) They concentrate on what they can observe as input and 
output in the other as a system in an environment (...) They can try to in­
fluence what they observe by their own action and can learn further from 
the feedback. In this way, an emergent order can arise that is conditioned
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by the complexity of the systems that make possible but that does not depend 
on this complexity being calculated or controlled. We call this emergent order 
a social system. (Luhmann, 1996, p. 110; italics in original)
However, Luhmann rejects the idea that this problem can be taken care of by reference 
to the concept of culture, as Parsons believed. Culture appeals to norms and values 
to explain motivation and selection, but nobody elucidates how norms and values 
become stabilised and how they change. Moreover, explaining social order using the 
concepts of culture, norms or values forces us to think tautologically that society was 
already grown before it grew itself. Culture is therefore an insufficient concept to 
explain social phenomena.
To overcome the problem of double contingency is to produce an emergent order, 'in­
dependent' of both alter and ego. But, if social theory cannot explain the stability 
of social order on the basis of norms or values, what is to take their place? Because 
double contingency is a pre-eminently social problem, the solution requires the use of 
a pre-eminently social operation, namely: communication. Social order can only be 
produced by means of communication, although it is this order that also enables com­
munication (Vanderstraeten, 2002). This is a counterintuitive proposition. A common- 
sense perspective would maintain not only that communication must necessarily be 
among individuals, but also that only individuals are able to communicate. Contrary 
to this view, Luhmann argues that, fundamentally speaking, individuals cannot com­
municate at all, not even in their capacity as psychic systems. In Luhmann's theory, 
individuals (or psychic systems) operate in terms of meaning in the form of a closed 
connection of consciousness. Similarly, social systems operate in terms of meaning in 
the form of a closed connection of communication. Therefore, the strong axiom of the 
theory is: communication alone is able to communicate (Andersen, 2003; Luhmann, 
1990). Society is autopoietic from this perspective, because it is understood as an emer­
gent and self-referential phenomenon that cannot be reduced to something other than 
itself, neither to consciousness nor to a sum of individuals' actions. Here we see the 
phenomenological insistence on observing society as it appears without reference to 
conditions external to society. And individuals, as psychic systems, are external to
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society.
But, what is communication? Communication is a shared actualisation of meaning 
that happens when alter utters and ego understands, and this is performed only by the 
unity of these two different selections. It is necessary both that something be said by 
someone (alter) and that someone (ego) understands what is said and that someone 
says it. Alter's utterance and ego's understanding form a 'unity' because they give 
reality to communication only together: communication exists only if alter utters and 
ego understands. As explained by Baraldi (1993), if alter says, 'It is too late, I must 
go', communication is produced by ego's understanding of both alter's motives (e.g., 
she is in a hurry, is bored, has an important appointment, wants ego to say 'stay') and 
the information, 'It is too late, I must go'. The relevance of understanding motives 
comes from the necessity to attribute responsibility for the utterance. This is a neces­
sary condition for communication. Without such an attribution, ego cannot refer to 
alter's utterance, and then communication is not realised. There is only perception: 
information attributed to something that has no motives or responsibility for it (e.g., a 
watch displaying the time or an engine roaring in an unusual way).
Communication is an emergent order, a state sui generis. It emerges through a syn­
thesis of three selections, namely: alter selects information from a horizon of mean­
ingful possibilities; she or he instantiates it through language or actions (utterances); 
ego observes alter's conduct and understands or misunderstands this utterance and 
its information (Luhmann, 1990). Of course, ego can accept or reject the offer, but 
anyway it might be said that ego understands alter's proposal—misunderstanding is 
always a form of understanding. "[T]he acceptance or rejection of an expected and 
understood selection are not part of the communicative event; they are connected acts 
(...) Viewed dynamically, the unity of an individual communication is merely its con­
nectivity" (Luhmann, 1996, p. 148). For this reason, for Luhmann, "understanding 
always includes misunderstanding, and if one does not add on presuppositions, the 
component of misunderstanding becomes so great that the continuation of communic­
ation becomes improbable" (Luhmann, 1996, p. 158). Thus, the communication theory 
Luhmann is trying to formulate starts from the premise that it is implausible. And be­
cause the basic element of society is communication (and not individuals), social order
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also appears as a highly improbable event.
This improbability of which we have become unaware must first be under­
stood, and to do so requires what might be described as a contra-pheno- 
menological effort, viewing communication not as a phenomenon but as 
a problem; thus, instead of looking for the most appropriate concept to 
cover the facts, we must first ask how communication is possible at all. 
(Luhmann, 1990, p. 87)
Luhmann (1990; 1996) argues that communication—if it comes about—must overcome 
three obstacles or improbabilities: (1) the individuality of human consciousness, (2) 
the extension of communication beyond direct participants and (3) the improbabil­
ity of success. The first improbability is related with understanding; given that their 
bodies and minds are separate and individual, it is unlikely that one person can un­
derstand what another person means. Meaning can be understood only in context, 
and for each individual consists primarily of what their own memory supplies. The 
second improbability is related with the spatial and temporary limitations of commu­
nication in reaching recipients. That is, it is improbable that a communication can 
get to more people than are present in a given situation. Even if the communication 
finds a means of conveyance that is constant over time, it is still unlikely that it might 
attract attention: in other situations people have other things to do. The third improb­
ability is that the communication, even if it is understood, is accepted and followed; 
that is, it succeeds. By communicative success Luhmann means "that the recipient of 
the communication accepts the selective content of the communication (the informa­
tion) as a premise of his own behaviour, thus joining further selections to the primary 
selection and reinforcing its selectivity in the processes" (Luhmann, 1990, p. 88). Com­
municative success is the coupling between alter's expectations and ego's selections. 
Regarding all these three improbabilities, Luhmann (Luhmann, 1996, p. 159) argues 
"no social system can be formed without communication. (...) The immanent im­
probabilities of the communicative process and the way in which they are overcome 
and transformed into probabilities regulate the construction of social systems". Com­
municative success is, therefore, the successful coupling of selections between alter
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and ego. Regarding all these three improbabilities, Luhmann argues:
no social system can be formed without communication. One must ex­
pect entropy, even if the opposite is the case. This does not contradict the 
theorem of improbability; it indicates more precisely where the problems 
lie whose solutions enable communication in the course of evolution, get 
system formation going, and transform improbabilities into probabilities.
The immanent improbabilities of the communicative process and the way 
in which they are overcome and transformed into probabilities regulate the 
construction of social systems. (Luhmann, 1996, p. 159)
Despite these improbabilities, social order exists and we communicate daily. This is 
because social evolution has solved these improbabilities with three consequent mech­
anisms, which Luhmann identifies with the concept of media. The first evolutionary 
achievement, to overcome the first improbability mentioned above, is language. Lan­
guage is a medium, which, via acoustical and optical signs, makes it more probable 
that ego understands alter. It can, through the use of equivalent signs, reinforce the 
impression that ego and alter hold equivalent opinions (Luhmann, 1990). Dissemina­
tion media, such as writing, printing and electronic broadcasting, contribute to expand­
ing communication themes beyond the restrictive boundaries of interaction systems. 
These media immensely increase the scope of communication and result in a social 
order decoupled from local contexts and from idiosyncratic interpretations. However, 
according to Luhmann, both language and dissemination media make it even more 
doubtful which communications will succeed: by understanding, ego has more reas­
ons to reject alter's communicative proposal; dissemination media do not allow direct 
questioning or instantaneous requests for clarification.
Language and dissemination media are preconditions to other media that make suc­
cess probable, namely, symbolically generalised communication media. Only the later me­
dia achieve the ultimate aim of communication: to motivate heterogeneous individu­
als to act and experience in a relatively coordinated way. They make possible, at the 
individual level, what Luhmann calls "the nexus between selection and motivation" 
(Luhmann, 1996, p. 161). And at the macro level, they make possible the emergence
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of meaningful constellations of co-ordinated selectivity that provide common signific­
ance, identifiable themes and complementary expectations—what Luhmann calls 'so­
cial systems'. Motivation is implied in the selection of symbolic media as they gener­
ate their own conditions of acceptability and diffusion. Thus, the multiple possibilities 
of selection that individuals have can be restricted, making social order more likely. 
The complexity of the social realm emerges through the reduction of these multiple 
possibilities and through the selective conditioning of this reduction. Symbolically 
generalised communication media achieve this by defining the limits of what is struc­
turally possible in each case, that is, in each social constellation of meaning. Luhmann 
analysed multiple examples of such media: scientific truth within the scientific system 
(Luhmann, 1994a), power within politics (Luhmann, 1994b), validity within the legal 
system (Luhmann, 2004), love within intimacy (Luhmann, 1999) and beauty within art 
(Luhmann, 2000).
The social dynamic or micro-macro link thus produced can be explained in the fol­
lowing terms: In an upward direction, the process of mutual references from one in­
dividual (alter) to another (ego) continuously recreates the social order as stabilised 
constellations of meaning. Conversely, in a downward direction, these relatively sta­
bilised structures of communication exert a conditioning effect on the progression of 
communicative events, which can be seen as a (medium) downward causation process 
expanding from the social, down to the psychic system. Alter's and ego's experiences 
and actions are modulated and coupled with stabilised expectations in social evolu­
tion. But society does not cover the whole spectrum of individual selectivity. The 
structural coupling between individual and society does not mean that latter determ­
ines the former, because this would break the operational closure of both individual 
and society. Rather,
[symbolic media only] motivates to follow the orientation given by sta­
bilised systemic structures Otherwise individuals would lose their accept­
ance capability for selections, even though their counterfactual behaviour 
can trigger variations in the constellations of meaning that move society in 
unpredictable and contingent directions. (Mascareno, 2008, p. 205)
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Symbolic media allow the emergence of structures of expectations that alter and ego 
use to reduce the uncertainty of their own double contingency; only with those media 
can individuals accept the selective content of the communication as a premise of their 
own behaviour. Symbolic media promote some selections and exclude others depend­
ing on the context of their instantiation: they motivate awareness of the other in intim­
ate relations (love); payment operations in economic transactions (money); evaluation 
of the electoral consequences of political decisions (power); and the validity of argu­
ments in science (scientific truth). Conversely, in each constellation of expectations, 
other selections are excluded: consumers generally do not buy in the supermarket us­
ing love; politicians who make decisions because they have been paid are considered 
to be corrupt; and even the Prime Minister must prove the validity of his arguments 
if he wants to submit a paper to a scientific journal. Therefore, different meaningful 
constellations bring about different expected selections, which might be confirmed or 
disappointed by the speakers at any time and at any place.
2.6 Summary
In this chapter we have considered some epistemological drawbacks to the concepts of 
emergence and downward causation. Many of them are based on the heavily ontolo­
gical definition of emergent properties, which tends to split sociologists between those 
holding to an individualistic approach and those affirming a holistic one. In order to 
overcome these drawbacks, we have discussed some current trends in the philosophy 
of science, in which the concept of emergence is reconstructed with an understand­
ing of causation in terms of constraining conditions and micro-macro relationships. 
We have argued that Luhmann's theory of self-referential social systems is consistent 
with such a stance on emergence and can deliver new insights. His theory defines so­
cial communication as an emergent phenomenon that makes possible the restriction 
of the unlimited possibilities of selection that individuals have. We have also paid at­
tention to symbolically generalised communication media, which, at the lower level, 
make probable that individuals accept the selective content of the communication as a 
premise of their own behaviour and, at the higher-level, bring about constellations of 
common significance. We described those constellations as structures of expectations
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that alter and ego use to reduce the uncertainty of their own contingency.
Chapter
More than Words
To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953
3.1 Introduction
The evolution of symbolic communication is a complex although stimulating research 
domain. This is especially true for the study of language. Just a trivial and very gen­
eral observation allows us to conclude that, because only human beings possess the 
ability to produce and understand cultural signs in creative ways, our faculty of lan­
guage must be the most significant trait that underpins our uniqueness as cultural 
beings. This statement is all too easy. However, in spite of this effortless observa­
tion, the scientific treatment to explain that peculiarity has been anything but easy. 
Philosophers as well as social and natural scientists have tried to elucidate the nature, 
origin and structure of symbolic communication. During the last three decades the 
research in this domain has reached significant achievements, but the picture that is 
emerging is highly complex and the current state of the art presents important contro­
versies as well as some consensus. And an unfortunate gulf between naturalistic and 
sociological positions to the study of symbolic communication still persists.
In this chapter, I propose an integrative perspective to establish new connections be­
tween the social and the cognitive sciences of the study of symbolic communication.
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My assumption is that the study of the emergence and evolution of symbolic commu­
nication, and especially linguistic communication, could become the most important 
span of a substantial bridge for these two research domains. I begin drawing a dis­
tinction between social and biological evolution as a heuristic rule to understand the 
specificities of the social compared to the organic realm (Section 3.2). Then, I claim 
that both society and biology, even though they are different domains, are also inter­
woven in complex ways and I underscore the role of language as the medium that 
makes possible the emergence of society (Section 3.3). In order to clarify the nature of 
language, I review the debate between 'm tivists' and 'socio-cognitivists', and I reject the 
first stance according to the existing experimental and observational evidence (Section 
3.4). Then, I go one step further and propose that language is a threshold phenomenon, 
that is, something between society, organic body, and cognition. I present a dynamic 
overview of those realms and I explain in detail the ways in which they co-evolve (Sec­
tion 3.5). I present some conclusions at the end of this chapter (Section 3.6). In this 
chapter I want to demonstrate the enterprise of complementing sociological research 
and cognitive sciences. By considering both scientific fields together we can appreciate 
that the study of language involves more (much more!) than words.
3.2 One Puzzle, One Distinction
As Tomasello points out (Tomasello, 2000), considering the evolutionary drift of life, 
human beings put forward a difficult puzzle. The problem is simple: there is not 
enough time, after the hominid line split off from that of Pan, to explain the huge vari­
ety and complexity of symbolic and material artefacts in the midst of which we are 
living. Our problem is thus one of time, because the triple mechanism that rules the 
evolutionary drift of living systems, that of the random genetic variation, natural se­
lection of organisms and population stabilisation, cannot explain, one by one, each 
of the cognitive skills necessary for moderns humans to invent and maintain complex 
tools-use industries and technologies, complex forms of symbolic communication and 
semantics, and the stabilisation of social structures. And this puzzle is magnified if we 
take seriously research suggesting that, firstly, for all but the last 2 million years the 
human linage showed no signs of anything other than typical great ape cognitive skills
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and, secondly, the first signs of species-unique cognitive skills emerged only in the last 
one-quarter of a million years with modern Homo sapiens. So, how can we solve this 
puzzle?
One possibility is to recognise the distinctiveness of social evolution and distinguish it 
from biological evolution. After all, society is not an organism nor a system governed 
by the 'survival of the fittest' rule, as Herbert Spencer or Francis Galton suggested 
during the Nineteenth Century. The contemporary revival of this idea advanced by 
so-called sociobiologists seems to be equally wrong. Sociobiology explains the origin 
and maintenance of adaptive behaviours by natural selection. So, in accordance with 
this heuristic rule (which is rarely backed by any evidence beyond the inference of 
adaptation), those behaviours are presented as having a genetic basis, because natural 
selection cannot operate in the absence of genetic variation (Alcock, 2003; Nielsen, 
1994; Wilson, 2000). In both perspectives (the Nineteenth Century organicism and 
the modern sociobiology), there is no ontological difference between social and bio­
logical evolution, because one side of the distinction is expanded and conflated in its 
explanatory power, giving to the social realm the category of 'side effect' of biological 
evolution.
Those 'biological explanations' of social behaviour have been intensely criticised be­
cause they do not recognise (if they do, they overtly reject) the importance of social 
structures as an explanatory factor for human behaviour (Boyd, 2006; Dietz et al., 1990; 
Freese, 1994; Richerson and Boyd, 2005; Ruse, 1987). These ideas disregard that indi­
viduals live in the midst of symbolic artefacts and semantics from which they acquire 
their complex sets of beliefs and values. And they disregard as well that these sym­
bolic structures and semantics persist because the structures of expectations of one gen­
eration are learned (and modified) by the next one1. To some extent social structures
1 Since I am repeatedly using the concept of 'expectation' throughout this thesis, I should define it. 
In my use of the term, expectations are associated with individuals' selections; expectations help indi­
viduals to orientate their selections. However, selections are based on uncerta in ty, as they refer to an 
unpredictable and undeterminable external reality. For this reason, individuals have stabilised over time 
constellations of coordinated selectivity known as structu res o f  expectations (e.g., roles, social norms, val­
ues) (Luhmann, 1996; Parsons and Shils, 2001; Tannen, 1993). These structures give them (the illusion of) 
predictability  and certa in ty  in the social realm. By way of expectations, individuals bring the world (the
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evolve, since they are based on a social transmission process that combine faithful re­
production and creative extension; a process that, as Tomasello named it, describes a 
'ratchet effect'", that is, all the symbolic and material artefacts accumulate the modifica­
tions made by different individuals over time so that they become more complex, and 
accordingly "a wider range of adaptive functions is encompassed" (Tomasello, 2000, 
p. 37). Social structures matter in their own right, because they exist and describe a 
different evolutionary process that cannot be reduced to biological evolution.
Social structures, rather than being of 'side effects' are emergent phenomena since they 
have an effect on individuals and, in turn, individuals, in the interactional frame in 
which they live, affect those structures with their actions. To put it in other words, 
social structures and semantics can be transformed (or revolutionised) by individuals' 
action, but, at the same time, those structures constrain the multiple possibilities for 
action that individuals have, something that must be taken into account in order to 
explain social behaviour (more details about this individual and society relation in 
Chapter 2). To paraphrase Marx, individuals make their own history, but they do not 
make it just as they please; they make it under circumstances directly encountered, 
given and transmitted from the past symbolic structures2.
As Gould stated, "[hjuman societies change by cultural evolution, not as a result 
of biological alteration" (Gould, 1999, p. 324), making clear that such a distinction 
between biological and social evolution is not only possible but analytically and em­
pirically correct as well. In fact, for this author, all that we have done since the ap­
pearance of Homo sapiens —"the greatest transformation in the shortest time that our 
planet has experienced since its crust solidified nearly four billion years ago" (Gould, 
1999, p. 324)—is the product of social evolution.
What seems to be characteristic of social evolution is that it proceeds in a Lamarckian
mode (although the concept seems to be contentious, see for instance Hodgson, 2001),
social and natural world) into a form that can be used operatively on a psychic level. That is to say, pos­
sibilities are temporally projected, and they can be confirmed or disconfirmed, fulfilled or disappointed. 
Finally, I define 'social structures' as stabilised constellations of expectations, which allow individuals to
coordinate their social actions.
2Within contemporary social theory, this stance has been developed by Archer and her "morphogen­
etic approach"; see Archer, 1995.
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that is to say, by the inheritance of acquired characteristics. Whatever one genera­
tion learns, it can pass to the next by writing, teaching, ritual or any mechanism that 
humans have invented to assure the continuity of society. On the other hand, the 
Darwinian process works slowly, because it is an indirect process: it requires genetic 
variation, which must first be available to construct an advantageous feature for some 
organisms, and natural selection must then preserve it and stabilise it within a popu­
lation over time. This is the reason why social evolution works on time scales many 
orders of magnitude faster than those of biological evolution3.
3.3 Symbiotic Mechanisms and Symbolic Communication
However, the distinction between social and biological evolution does not mean that 
both processes are running in parallel but unrelated ways. Social evolution is inter­
woven with the individuals' biology; specifically, it is interwoven with their organic 
bodies and their cognitive processes. As Luhmann (1996, see also Chapter 2 in this 
thesis) claimed, human beings are not part of society; but society requires this biolo­
gical and psychological substrate to exist. Of course, this conception is not restricted to 
him. The social sciences have been aware of this distinction from a long time. A good 
illustration of this understanding is the importance of human's corporealness (i.e., the 
biological body) and its relation to social evolution. Thus, since the sixteenth century, 
the underlying presupposition of all politics is the threat of (lawful) physical violence 
over the individual bodies—the extrema ratio—that has been well known in the so­
cial sciences since the classical analyses carried out by Max Weber (1978). Scientific 
research is another good example. Science became socially organised during the sev­
enteenth century when its relation with the truth was regulated in a new way: to con­
duct proofs by perceiving the perception of others and thus establish itself on empirical 
foundations (about the importance of the gaze as the empirical substratum in the birth 
of medicine, see for instance Foucault, 2003). Finally, most economic activity rests on
3Of course, natural selection is not the only mechanism ruling the biological evolution; genetic drift, 
mutation, gene flow or even extrinsic events like wayward asteroids count as (or have an impact over) 
the evolutionary process. Nevertheless, the change in gene frequencies and the subsequent stabilisation 
of genetic variants of those processes are, all of them, slower than the stabilisation of 'cultural variants' 
within social systems.
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(initially) bodily-based needs that can be satisfied adequately (about the thematisation 
of these bodily-based needs within economic thought since Malthus, see for example 
Gallagher, 2006). Hence, the experience and use of the human body correlates with 
the changes of form in social evolution.
The biological body plays an important role in social evolution, either as source of 
disturbance or as the foundation of social differentiation. In fact, society has 'trans­
formed' this physical, organic relation into symbols called, since Parsons, symbiotic 
mechanism (Luhmann, 1999, pp. 26-27), which couple the physical body to social com­
plexity. Examples of these mechanisms are bodily necessities, perception, violence, sexu­
ality, etc. Through these symbiotic mechanisms society regulates its relation with the 
biological body according to different logics or social spheres. However, though im­
portant, this is just one part of the story.
The relation between social and biological evolution is even deeper and it goes not 
only in the biology-to-society direction. There is extensive evidence about genetic 
modifications triggered by changes in social evolution (a kind of 'downward causa­
tion' from society to the physical body, as discussed in Chapter 2). Genetic analyses of 
our genome has suggested that thousands of genes (perhaps as much as ten percent) 
have been under strong recent selection, and the selection may even have accelerated 
during the past several thousand years (Nielsen et al., 2007). One of the best-reported 
findings in this area is the genetic mutation associated with the ability to digest milk 
in adults. Tishkoff and collaborators (2007) estimated when and where these genetic 
mutations occurred in human history. The mutation for lactose tolerance began to 
show up in Northern Europeans at about the same time they began to raise milk cattle, 
around 9,000 years ago. A distinct mutation for lactose tolerance became common in 
East Africa beginning around 7,000 years ago. These dates correlate with archaeolo­
gical evidence for the origins of cattle domestication in these regions. Thus, the ability 
to digest milk as adults, called lactase persistence, appears to be an example of the so 
called 'gene-culture co-evolution'.
Besides the relationship between society and biological body, human cognition is an­
other realm structurally coupled with society. In a similar way as the human body
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and society are coupled by symbiotic mechanisms, there is a symbolic medium that 
couples psychic systems and society, namely: the symbolic medium of language. Lan­
guage makes possible the mutual re-cognition of comprehensible sentences; it trans­
forms thoughts in perceptible symbols and phrases (with informative content) that 
different psychic systems (i.e., individuals) are able to process and understand. Only 
language makes possible the emergence and self-production of the social realm (some­
thing that we will call zsociopoiesisz) which—under minimal restrictions of perceptib­
ility and therefore with the participation of psychic systems—"organises itself into 
what constitutes, for it, a medium, but what for consciousness, is already form" (Luh­
mann, 1994c, p. 29).
As Tomasello holds, "[sjocially shared symbols provide for a very special kind of cul­
tural mediation and cognitive representation" (Tomasello, 1996, p. 314), because the 
use of linguistic symbols can be used to regulate interpersonal interactions and also 
can be used by an individual to regulate his or her relation to the social realm. Lan­
guage transfers social complexity into psychic complexity and vice versa. It is the most 
powerful means (though not the only one) by which whatever one individual learns 
can be passed to others (by imitation, instruction or collaboration), making possible 
social learning. In short, language makes possible the co-evolution of psychic and social 
systems.
It is accepted nowadays that the feature of humanity that leads to the strange prop­
erty of producing society is our unique faculty of language (the faculty to produce and 
understand an infinite set of meaningful symbols from a finite and rather stable set of 
elements). The general consensus both within and among the different perspectives 
that tackle the emergence and evolution of language states that only by considering 
this symbolic means of communication can the evolution of our complex social realm 
seem plausible. There is no doubt of the importance of this faculty as the uniquely hu­
man trait likely to have been a prerequisite for the evolutionary stabilisation of social 
structures and semantics over time, because this capacity is the only ability known 
that can bring about these kinds of changes in behaviour and cognition in so short 
time span, ranging from our evolutionary divergence from our Ape-like ancestors to 
the emergence of complex social and material arrangements we have created.
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3.4 Language and the 'Nature/Nurture Distinction'
But, what do we mean when we use the expression 'faculty of language'? The use 
of this concept can be understood as underscoring the belief that language is distinct 
from other human cognitive abilities, and furthermore distinct from the abilities of 
species that share those abilities but lack the ability to develop language (see for in­
stance Hauser et al., 2002). In this sense, language could be understood as based on 
a specific cognitive module, unique in human beings. However, this stance would 
overlook the extensive debate about the nature of language. Broadly speaking, we can 
recognise two different stances or hypotheses regarding the evolution of language: on 
the one hand, the 'nativist hypothesis', which holds the symbolic capacity is an in­
nate faculty pre-specified by our biology, whether it be the structure of our brain (a 
language module) or the structure of our DNA (Chomsky, 1981; Hauser et al., 2002; 
Pinker, 2003b; Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005); on the other hand, the 'socio-cognitive hy­
pothesis', which maintains that our symbolic capacity was a co-evolutionary achieve­
ment between individual psychology and the social realm (Kirby et al., 2008; Knight 
and Power, 2008; Sampson, 2005; Tomasello, 1995).
This intense debate just reproduces the division between biological and sociological 
(or cultural) explanations of human behaviour: the old-fashion distinction between 
nature and nurture4. Nowadays, this distinction has become problematic. It poses 
a difficult problem because it does not consider the complex ways in which those 
two dimensions, nature and nurture, relate to each other, particularly in the explan­
ation about the evolution of language. As Deacon stated, "[ajlthough most linguists 
agree there are universals, there is considerable disagreement concerning their origin: 
whether they are innate and biologically evolved or else culturally constructed con­
ventions that must be learned. These two sources have been treated as though they are 
exhaustive alternatives" (Deacon, 2005, p. 112). Thus, the usual account of this debate 
suggests that, while nativists hold language has its roots in some innate morphosyn- 
tactic module, socio-cognitivists maintain that language is a social construction and 
there is nothing innate because the mind is a 'blank slate', as it was put forth by Pinker
4Richard Mulcaster put the distinction forth in 1581.
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(2003a). However, those who describe the debate in these terms are erecting a straw 
man argument.
The problem is that the distinction between nature and nurture, when it is used to ex­
plain the origin of humans' faculty of language, overstates the difference between nat­
ivists and socio-cognitivists, since no one really maintains that the mind has no innate 
structures at all. It is widely recognised that there has to be something different about 
humans and, for instance, chimpanzees (our closest living relatives) that accounts for 
the fact that human beings, but not chimpanzees, learn to speak natural languages, 
(and do arithmetic, develop complex-tools, and maintain complex social structures). 
Any reasonable account of language (and the mind) has to consider such platitudes 
as a fact of the matter and, accordingly, is committed to some innate structure. The 
substantive question concerns the character of the innate structure; not whether there 
is one. It is about this more specific point where the main difference between the 
nativistis and the socio-cognitivists appear.
In order to understand those two stances about language, let's begin with two gen­
eral, intuitive and opposing observations. The first observation that can be made is 
that every human group has a language and no group of nonhuman animals has one. 
This is the first general observation in support of the nativist hypothesis, that is to 
say, the observation that human beings have a special and specific linguistic module, 
that is to say, some morphosyntactic module given in advance by nature and probably 
coded in our DNA. Of course, thinkers endorsing this observation recognise that some 
nonhuman animals have developed natural communicative interactions (from social 
insects like ants or bees to mammalians as whales or dolphins). Apes, chimpanzees, 
dogs and some birds can learn and understand symbols (even linguistic symbols), but 
they can do that only under extensive human training or in conditions by far different 
to the life in the wild. And even taking into account their innate communicative and 
linguistic abilities, the level of understanding and 'openness' of the system of symbols 
they innately have or learn barely resembles the symbolic abilities of normal human 
infants. Thus, although some nonhuman animals share similar abilities of speech pro­
duction, speech perception, conceptual structure, vocal imitation and communicative 
coordination, all of them are qualitative different to the humans' faculty of language.
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However, all these facts, by themselves, do not mean that the basic linguistic structures 
are innate or coded in our DNA. As Tomasello (1995, pp. 137-138) said, we are the only 
animals that cook their food, but that is presumably not the consequence of a 'cooking 
gene'. This is the second general observation: the socio-cognitive observation, which 
maintains the importance of the language learning process and the social context in 
which that process takes place. The fact that no other nonhuman animal has evolved a 
fully human language, and do not seem to be able to acquire one even with extensive 
human tutelage, does not entail that there is a human-specific genetic basis for our 
faculty of language.
So, we must solve an ontological question: is language a 'social product'? Despite our 
second observation, which prima facie would answer affirmatively that question, the 
response is no. Let's problematise further our two general distinctions with empirical 
information from observational and experimental procedures.
Cooking food is a social product and a universal feature of human beings. How­
ever, as Pinker (2003b, p. 22) suggested, one can still ask whether mastery of lan­
guage in the human species resembles all the abilities that are unambiguously cultur­
ally acquired, like agricultural techniques, chess skill and mathematical expertise, or 
whether it looks more like a part of the standard human phenotype, like fear, humour, 
or sexual desire. By understanding some very general properties of the natural history 
of language, some authors holding the nativist hypothesis infer that the latter is more 
accurate (and thus, they give credence to our first general observation). Let's see some 
of the evidence presented by these authors.
First, language is a universal feature across societies and within societies, unlike far 
simpler skills like cooking, farming techniques, mathematical expertise or chess. As 
we saw above, this is a general observation from which we cannot account for the 
innateness of humans' faculty of language. However, this general observation is fol­
lowed by a complementary one, which gives it analytical and empirical support. The 
second evidence for the nativist hypothesis states that the different languages around 
the world conform to some universal design (about the characteristics of this univer­
sal design, see Pinker, 2003b). In this sense, basic language structures are not learned.
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but they are present innately and are only triggered by linguistic input during early 
infancy.
Third, the ontogenetic development of language shows that children can fully master 
the mother tongue in a short period of time from a surprisingly scanty sample of sen­
tences (speech from parents, basically), very limited negative evidence (i.e., children 
are rarely corrected) and some grammatical mistakes that children do not ever make 
(Crain, 1991), a phenomenon that Chomsky (1980) named the 'poverty of the stimulus' 
argument (Marcus, 1993). The idea behind this argument is quite clear: the ontogen­
etic development of language (particularly, the language acquisition process during 
early infancy) far outstrips the information that is available in the environment; or, as 
philosophers sometimes put it (Laurence and Margolis, 2001), the output of the language 
acquisition process is radically undetermined by the input.
A  fourth proof put forth by the nativists is the evidence about children developing 
their own languages. Bickerton (1984) documented the language creation process or 
'créolisation' by children who were bom in the midst of a pidgin language—which, 
by definition, lacks many of the syntactic features of natural languages. The chil­
dren in those contexts did not passively reproduce the pidgin, but quickly developed 
creole languages, which were based on the pidgin although with many of the syntactic 
structures that were missing added. Another example comes from deaf communities 
studied by Senhas and her colleges in Nicaragua (2004). Those authors reported that 
complex features of language have evolved spontaneously among different cohorts 
of deaf children. In both instances, the suggestion is that those children must have 
supplemented their improvised or limited linguistic 'input' with syntactic structures 
from their 'innate' language.
Finally, a fifth kind of evidence tends to confirm that language is a domain-specific 
module, independent of other cognitive functions or 'general intelligence', because 
there are instances of individuals with normal intelligence but extremely poor gram­
matical skills, and vice versa. For example, individuals diagnosed with Specific Lan­
guage Impairment (SLI) have normal intelligence but seem to have difficulty speaking 
and understanding (Leonard, 2000; Pinker, 2005). Conversely, in a number of retard­
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ation syndromes, such as Williams syndrome (WS), children may speak fluently and 
grammatically and do well on tests of grammatical comprehension and judgment (Bel- 
lugi et al., 1993; Pinker, 2003b), in spite of their cognitive handicap.
Because of the apparent independence of the faculty of language and other cognitive 
functions, the genetic basis of those diseases (such as SLI) might shed light on our 
faculty of language. In fact, proofs about the genetic basis of these diseases emerged 
during the last two decades. In 1990, researchers described a large multi-generational 
British family known as 'the KEs', in which half the members suffered from a SLI dis­
order, distributed within the family with an autosomal dominant pattern of inheritance 
(i.e., chromosomes that are not sex chromosomes) (Hurst et al., 1990). In 2001, geneti­
cists identified a point of genetic mutation affecting this family on Chromosome 7, called 
FOXP2 (Lai et al., 2001). Since then, FOXP2 has been identified as the best candidate 
for a language gene', an idea that was reinforced by further research showing that, 
although this gene is a heavily conserved transcription factor present in mammals and 
some birds, the human variant of this gene is slightly different, with two amino-acid 
differences in comparison to chimpanzees, our closest relatives (Enard et al., 2002). 
Geneticists argued that these differences were the result of natural selection during 
recent human evolution. Enard and his colleagues calculated that the selection prob­
ably occurred during the last 200,000 years, the period in which modern Homo sapiens 
evolved. All these data are cited as proofs of the independence and possibly specific 
gene dependence of the individuals' faculty of language.
However, there is extensive empirical research that rejects, one by one, the evidence 
presented by those who support the nativist hypothesis; and on the contrary, this 
evidence tends to confirm the observation made by 'socio-cognitivists'. For instance, 
some researchers have shown that the previously credited independence and domain- 
specific faculty of language has no empirical confirmation. Research into SLI indicates 
that it arises from an inability to correctly perceive the underlying phonological struc­
ture of language, which plays important roles in learning linguistic generalisations 
and in working memory (Joanisse and Seidenberg, 1998). As Perfors (2002) argued, 
this fact definitely suggests that some aspects of language are innate—e.g., phonolo­
gical perception—but this idea is well "accepted by both nativists and non-nativists
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alike. It is a big leap from the idea that phonological perception is innate to the notion 
that syntax is".
Similarly, some researchers have posed serious doubts about the previous conclusion 
that children with WS present 'intact linguistic abilities'. Karmiloff-Smith and her col­
leges (1997) analysed the receptive language abilities of a group of English-speaking 
WS individuals on a standardised morphosyntactic test. They discovered clear-cut de­
ficits in aspects that normal children acquire effortlessly very early (e.g., dissociations 
regarding the use of grammatical gender assignment across several sentence elements 
and difficulties in understanding embedded sentences). Thus, in opposition to the 
nativists' claims, the language of WS individuals is far from normal.
The genetic evidence relating FOXP2 to the faculty of language is still highly speculat­
ive, and it is by no means conclusive about its position as a 'language gene'. Carroll 
(2003, p. 855) stated, "[t]he typical genetic architecture that underlies complex traits 
[like language—MS] makes it extremely unlikely that FOXP2 was the only gene un­
der selection in the evolution of our language capabilities." Our faculty of language 
is a really complex and integrated trait, interwoven with multiple sensorio-motor and 
conceptual-intentional systems—even Chomsky and his colleagues recognise the hy­
pothetical status of the human specific language module (see Fitch et al., 2005; Hauser 
et al., 2002). In fact, given the characteristics of FOXP2, which belongs to the fork- 
head box proteins, it must play a key role in regulating the expression of other genes 
and, therefore, its effect is expressed in different tissues. This implies that this gene 
is not responsible for language itself, but rather it influences other genes that affect 
development of crucial neural pathways in functions that can be located even beyond 
the language domain. As genetic research has shown, FOXP2 seems to be associated 
with orofacial control (Tomasello, 2008)—something, of course, strongly related with 
speech ability—but also with tissues and functions beyond the scope of language, such 
as gut, lung and heart functions (Shu et al., 2001).
Besides, recent research has undermined two important arguments which supported 
the idea that FOXP2 was the language gene. Firstly, most people with SLI do not have 
the characteristic mutation found in the KE family (information discussed in Bishop,
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2002). Secondly, by using new experimental procedures, Krause and his colleagues 
(2007) established that the genetic mutation of the human version of FOXP2 is much 
older than previously estimated: they estimated it in 300,000-400,000 years ago. Actu­
ally they found that the same FOXP2 protein was shared with Neanderthals, refuting 
the idea that this gene is only a modern human trait.
Similarly, researchers have questioned the evidence collected from children who sup­
posedly developed complex language on their own. As Tomasello (1995) stated, the 
commentaries to Bickerton's description of the créolisation process make it clear that 
the language-learning situations of those children are not well known, because they 
all occurred in the past (70 or 100 years ago), so what the children heard and who they 
interacted with is uncertain. Different authors have shown, on the other hand, that 
the children in question had much more exposure to natural languages than Bicker­
ton had supposed (Samarin, 1984; Seuren, 1984). Equivalent doubts have been posed 
about the research on deaf communities in Nicaragua. Russo and Volterra (2005) have 
raised methodological problems in that research because there is no detailed inform­
ation about the exposure of the signers to other communicative inputs and the report 
did not discuss the use of mouthing by deaf people performing the task. Hence, "the 
case for children supplementing impoverished 'input' cannot be made until we know 
what the 'input' was" (Tomasello, 1995, p. 147).
Regarding the 'poverty of the stimulus' argument, there is increasing evidence that 
this theory does not adequately describe the situation confronted by children's lan­
guage acquisition. Infants as young as eight months old are very well adjusted to the 
statistical properties of their parent's speech (Goodsitt et al., 1993). They also display 
a powerful mechanism for the computation of the statistical properties of language in­
put (Saffran et al., 1996) in order to identify word candidates in running speech, even 
before they know the meaning of the word.
Moreover, infants' ability to detect patterns is not restricted to phonetic units but also 
to more global prosodic patterns. Jusczyk and his colleges (1993) studied the potential 
role that sensitivity to predominant stress patterns of words play in lexical develop­
ment. They discovered that infants at the age of nine months old can recognise the
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stress patterns of words belonging to their mother tongue and they manifest special 
interest in these words, in sharp contrast to the lack of interest they manifest when they 
are exposed to words of foreign languages with different stress patterns. This, again, 
implies that some aspects of language are innate—for instance, the capacity to per­
ceive and conceptualise objects, actions and properties, acquire symbols from experi­
ence and generalise them—but this is not a proof about the existence of some innate, 
pre-wired morphosyntactic module. In fact, the ontogenetic development of language 
seems to be extremely conservative, because the language acquisition strategy chil­
dren follow is zpiece-by-piecez rather than generalising rules from a few bits of data. 
Ninio (1999) analysed the learning process of intransitive verbs in children ranged 
from 12 to 32 months old, considering the input received from their parents' speech. 
This research shows that the first verbs learnt by children are the most frequent in 
the input, which also tend to be relatively nonspecific, general or generic intransitive 
verbs with light semantics. Non-nativists (Tomasello, 1992, 2000) suggest that only 
after children have generalised those verbs to a variety of contexts and forms do they 
begin to acquire verbs massively.
Besides this corpus of evidence, the infant language acquisition process seems to be 
less complex (and less enigmatic) than believed before, when language input was seen 
as a trigger for selecting among innately specified options according to the 'poverty 
of stimulus' argument. Children's caregivers typically adjust their language level and 
make use of an easier speech when they interact with infants. This speech, called 
'motherese', 'parentese' or 'infant-directed speech', has simpler grammatical forms, 
higher amplitude, greater range of prosody, and incorporation of basic vocabulary 
(Cooper et al., 1997). It is not surprising that Femanld (1985; 1989) discovered that four 
months old infants showed a significant listening preference for this kind of speech 
register, in comparison with adult-directed speech. These data suggest, as Kuhl (2000) 
has pointed out, the modifications made by adults when they speak to infants play a 
role in helping infants map native-language input.
What about the argument of 'universal design'? There are ample disagreements among 
the linguistic community concerning the universal design of human language, a key 
aspect claimed by nativists based on the Universal Grammar theory. We do not have the
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space here to discuss the extensive empirical and analytical evidence either in favour 
or against this theory (see for instance Chomsky, 2006; Harris, 1995; Pinker, 2003b; 
Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005; Tomasello, 1995). However, we agree with the point put 
forth by Deacon, who claimed that
It has become an unquestioned dictum in modern linguistics that all hu­
man languages share a core set of common grammatical principles: a Uni­
versal Grammar. What is to be included among these universals is not uni­
versally agreed upon, nor are the elements all of the same type (e.g., some 
candidate universals are rule-like, some are constraint-like, and some are 
structural), nor is there agreement on the source of these universals (e.g., 
nature/nurture). (Deacon, 2005, p. I l l )
However, from the previous discussion, it seems that language is a much poorer can­
didate for the status of innate module (or instinct) than are several other domains of 
cognition.
3.5 The Triple Roots of Language
As we saw, there are important aspects of language that are innate, although the dis­
agreements are related to whether there is a morphosyntactic module pre-wired in 
our DNA or not. As previously discussed, the most plausible hypothesis, suppor­
ted by an extensive corpus of data, suggests that language structures are specified by 
cognitive abilities that are human-specific features, and consequently universal. But 
the question is: Can we give an account of the emergence and evolution of language 
that overcomes the drawbacks of the 'nature and nurture stances'? Can we outline 
an account about the emergence and evolution of language that is consistent with the 
empirical research previously described, although not subject to the distinction 'innate 
versus learned'?
In Luhmann's theory of social systems (Luhmann, 1996), the organic, the psychic and 
the social realms are to be treated as fully self-referential and self-producing systemic 
levels. These systems are operationally closed with respect to one another, for their
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autopoiesis operates with different media or materials: organic processes in the case 
of biological systems, consciousness or mental states in the case of psychic systems, 
and communication in the case of social systems. The problem of the mutual refer­
ence between distinct operative levels is cast in the biological terminology of structural 
coupling (Maturana and Varela, 1992). Reference by structural coupling is necessarily 
indirect, since each operative level functions only as environment to the others. Nev­
ertheless, consciousness, for instance, can irritate or otherwise indirectly stimulate the 
system of symbolic communication that is its environment. Likewise organic activ­
ity can irritate consciousness. Such irritations are constantly occurring at the invisible 
thresholds between discrete operative levels, and serve to mutually structure these 
levels through incessant provocation. By following Stenner and his thematisation of 
the structural coupling between organic, psychological and social realms, it can be 
argued that:
In any given act of communication, consciousness is already fully present, 
and so are the organic operations of neurophysiology. Yet, to put it some­
what poetically, they pass each other by like ships in the night, silently al­
tering their mutual courses by way of the waves their movements cause in 
the shared medium of the ocean. Each operative level is distinct (only con­
sciousness is conscious, only communication communicates), but without 
consciousness, there can be no communication, and without brain bio­
chemistry there can be no consciousness. (Stenner, 2004, pp. 166-167)
However, because I am assuming an evolutionary perspective, my research interest is 
ruled by considering the temporal dimension. So, because my perspective is temporal, 
I need to consider the trajectory of the important events that produced the emergence 
and evolution of language and the mechanisms involved in that succession of events. 
Therefore, instead of describing the biology of the brain biochemistry present when we 
utter some words, I want to describe the specific evolutionary achievement that, in 
the temporal trajectory of our species (or biological evolution), yields the emergence 
of language. Similarly instead of describing the phenomenology of the consciousness 
involved in the human communicational activity I opt to tackle the implications of
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the human-specific cognitive abilities that structure our symbolic learning over time. 
Finally, instead of just taking into account the importance of the social conventions and 
structures, I want to explain the ways in which the social self-production is interwoven 
with the emergence of language. Thus, I am changing the focus but not the premises. 
I still consider language as a threshold phenomenon.
By convention, and here we are following the conceptualisation put forth by Tomasello 
(2000; 2008) and Christiansen and Kirby (2003b), human language is unique in arising 
from three distinct but interacting adaptive systems: social systems, biological evolu­
tion, and individual cognition. These are all adaptive systems in that they involve the 
transformation of information in such a way that it fits some objective function. Thus, 
in biological evolution, natural selection is the mechanism of adaptation par excellence. 
Variations in the transmitted genotype are selected for in such a way that the resulting 
phenotype best fits the function of survival and reproduction. Similarly, individual 
cognition can be thought of as a process of adaptation of the individual's knowledge, 
which is built upon the human-specific ability to understand the world and other in­
dividuals as driven by mediating forces such as causal relations and intentions. Finally, 
in society, cultural variants (i.e., innovations) are brought about by individuals as com­
municative divergences, which are then selected and stabilised by social structures of 
expectations and institutions. Hence, the triple roots of language can be thought of as 
the following three dimensions of analysis: (1) the social dimension or social evolution, 
in which cultural variants produced by individuals yields to cumulative (adaptive or 
maladaptive) cultural evolution; (2) the cognitive development made up of the dif­
ferent stages of our life history, or cognitive dimension; (3) and finally the evolutionary 
trajectory of our species, or biological dimension.
As Christiansen and Kirby (2003b) claim, when we refer to language evolution in the 
broad sense, we are referring to evolution in three different timescales: the lifetime 
of an individual, or ontogeny, the lifetime of a species, or phylogeny, and the lifetime 
of society, or sociopoiesis. What is particularly interesting about language, and why its 
emergence on earth can be seen as a major transition in evolution (Smith and Szathmry, 
1998), is that there are interactions between all three of these systems. These ideas are 
schematically drawn in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Dimensions and mechanisms involved in the emergence and evolution o f language.
M y p rop osa l is that, as sh o w n  in  F igure 3.1, in  order to u n d erstan d  the sym b olic  m e ­
d iu m  of lan gu age , w e  h ave  to tackle the triple roots o f the h u m an  facu lty  o f lan gu age . 
T hese three roots are (Cfr., T om asello , 2000): (1) C ognition, b ecau se  m o d ern  h u m an  b e ­
in g s e v o lv ed  the ab ility  to id en tify  w ith  con sp ecifics, w h ich  led  to an  u n d erstan d in g  
o f them  as in ten tion a l and m en ta l b e in g s lik e the self, m ak in g  p o ssib le  the ev o lu tio n  
o f m ore com p lex  form s of collaborative activities; (2) Society, b ecau se  the p rev io u s  
ability  en ab les the em ergen ce o f a soc ia l sy stem  m a d e u p  o f m ea n in g fu l co m m u n ica ­
tions, w h ich  led  to cu ltural artefacts, b eh av iou ra l trad itions and  structures o f exp ect­
ations that accum u late m od ifica tion s over h istorical tim e; and fin ally  (3) biology, b e ­
cau se im portant m orp h o log ica l and b io log ica l m od ifica tion s ex p erien ced  d u rin g  the  
h o m in id  lin eage b rou ght ab out a p re-lingu istic  stage o f coop eration  am o n g  in d iv id u ­
als in  w h ich  sym b olic  com m u n ication  and la n g u a g e  in particular ev o lv ed .
T h ese three d om ain s are related b y  so m e con seq u en t m echanism s that m ake p o ss ib le  
the structural cou p le , b y  m ean s o f lan gu age , b e tw e en  b io log ica l b od ies , co g n itiv e  p ro ­
cesses  and the socia l realm . Thus, b o d y  ch an ges p rod u ced  d u r in g  our p h y logen y , su ch  
as a redu ction  in  sexu al b o d y  s ize  d im orp h ism , lon ger p er iod s o f in fan t d ep en d e n c e
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and faster female reproductive rates—which greatly increased female reproductive 
costs—promoted pro-social behaviours and produced the biological basis of human 
attachment, empathy, and love (i.e., cooperation). As a consequence of this evolved 
emotional attachment, humans began to understand each other as intentional beings 
whose attention and other mental states could be influenced and shared (i.e., social 
cognition). And given our high sociability, this ability was demonstrated to be use­
ful for sharing informational content and direct others' attention and it brought about 
new and extremely complex ways of coordination and cooperation based on symbolic 
interactions (i.e., language). A  new level of complexity emerged as an evolutionary 
realm of symbolic artefacts (self)produced and (self)stabilised over time (i.e. society), 
in the midst of which children are born. Finally, the evolution of a long period of child­
hood and hard-wired social cognition allowed an extensive time of cultural learning 
in which children can internalise social expectations and acquire language (i.e., so­
cialisation). In the following subsections we will describe and analyse each of these 
dimensions and consequent mechanisms in detail.
3.5.1 Society: The Micro-Macro Relation
I have already explained the social domain and the specific conditions for its emer­
gence in Chapter 2 (see especially Section 2.5 in that Chapter), so I will not repeat here 
all the ideas and mechanisms presented there. It is important to stress, however, that 
the type of emergent properties that are inherent to the social realm are likely to res­
ult from the unique fact that the participating entities are symbolic agents. Therefore, 
computer models of social properties have to take into account the properties of sym­
bolic communication that sociological theories have addressed and explained, such as 
Luhmann's communicative theory (1996).
Following this theory, we claim that the social order might be described in the fol­
lowing terms: in an ascendant direction, the agent-based bottom-up process of mutual 
references from one individual (alter) to another (ego) continuously recreates the so­
cial order as stabilised constellations of meaning. Conversely, in a descendant direc­
tion, these relatively stabilised structures of communication—organised in social sys­
tems—exert a conditioning effect on the progression of communicative events, which
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can be seen—in terms of complexity theories (see Fuchs and Hofkirchner, 2008)—as 
a downward causation process expanding from the social down to the psychic sys­
tem. This iterative process between the micro and the macro levels (Coleman, 1990), 
that is to say, between individuals and society, produces the self-referential and self- 
organising dynamic of the social realm that I refer to as sociopoiesis. Only by explicitly 
considering the micro-level actions and interactions that bring about society as com­
munication can macro-level social outcomes be explained.
However, this thematisation confronts a difficult problem, because we have to con­
sider the hypothetical (although logical) evolutionary situation in which neither alter 
or ego share any common sign. Language could only have been useful once it was 
completely in place: a language is useless if you are the only one to have evolved the 
ability to speak it. Symbolic communication in general and language in particular is 
a relational phenomenon. Therefore, the abilities to produce and understand arbit­
rary and conventional symbols (that is, the distinction between utterances and mean­
ingful content) are equally important. Furthermore, following Quine's (1960) famous 
'Gavagail' situation, when we try to tackle the origins of language (especially when 
we try to construct an analytical model to understand this origin), we face up the 
problem of the 'indeterminacy of meaning'.
In Word and Object, Quine (1960) raises the question how a linguist might acquire a 
language of a foreign tribe. He points out that if a native says Gavagail, while pointing 
to a rabbit scurrying by, it is in no way possible to uniquely determine its meaning. 
Gavagail could mean 'rabbit', 'animal', 'white', as well as hundreds of other things. 
As Quine explicitly formulated this situation, "even in the complex and obscure parts 
of language learning, the learner has no data to work with but the overt behavior of 
other speakers" (Quine, 1968, p. 187). That is, the indeterminacy of meaning states 
that when learning the meaning of a novel sign (in the Saussurean definition of the 
term, see De Saussure, 1995), this sign may have an infinite number of possible mean­
ings5. So, if we consider this almost impossible-to-be-solved problem as the point in
5Note the resemblance of this description with the one made by Parsons and Luhmann and described 
in "theorem of double contingency" that I discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.5. Similar to Quine's already 
quoted passage, Luhmann claims that communication is not a fact but a problem to be solved, since
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which symbolic communication emerges, how then could individuals in social inter­
action deal with it? Luhmann provides no answer to this important question, perhaps 
because such an answer would require to focus on what seems to be external to the so­
ciety: the evolution of cooperation in biological systems, human social cognition and 
emotions. In synthesis, to solve that evolutionary question means to consider what in 
Luhmann's communication theory seems to be excluded or, at least, disregarded.
The question of the extent to which Luhmanns general systems theory is 'blind' to 
the importance of cooperation, emotions and social cognition and their effects on the 
social system has been explored by different authors (i.e., Stenner, 2004; Winthrop- 
Young, 2003). If these authors' account is correct, Luhmann's alleged blind spot re­
garding the role of cooperation, cognition and emotions in the autopoiesis of con­
sciousness and communication is also his 'Achilles' heel'. These traits cannot, in other 
words, be dismissed as those logically inevitable 'unmarked spaces' which are the 
condition of possibility for any point of observation (Spencer-Brown, 1994), since to 
fail to observe a phenomenon whose logic (always-already multiply combined with 
cognition, social behaviour and so forth) purportedly organises, integrates and mo­
tivates psychic and social systems, is, according to Stenner, "to miss the very motor 
of those systems whose operational medium is meaning" (2004, p. 160). So, how did 
our speechless ancestors manage to overcome the problem of double contingency or 
the 'Gavagail' situation? For many authors, the way in which children learn their 
mother tongue can clarify this evolutionary puzzle. According to Tomasello and his 
colleagues
a child in Quine's famous 'Gavagail' situation has no way of figuring out
for itself the referent of a novel linguistic item. But in the real world young
children learn new pieces of language almost always in highly contextual-
ized, often routinized, mutually understood (i.e., intersubjective), nonlin-
guistic formats such as the feeding situation, diaper changing, book read-
"two black boxes" have to deal with the problem of double contingency, which means that "[f]or the 
few aspects through which they deal with one another, their capacity for processing information can 
suffice. They remain separate; they do not merge (...) They concentrate on what they can observe (... )" 
(Luhmann, 1996, p. 110).
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ing, taking a walk, or playing a game of peek-a-boo. (Tomasello et al., 1993, 
p. 498)
Similarly, as child language acquisition shows, it can be thought that the first primates 
able to develop the rudiments of communication learnt the new pieces of language 
(whether they were in acoustical or visual forms) in non-linguistic but highly cooper­
ative formats such as feeding, child care, gathering or hunting. These contexts could 
have acted as socio-ecological pressures—a kind of pre-linguistic stage of mutual under­
standing—for the emergence of relevant and conventional signs that were stabilised 
over time. Many authors have proposed that this pre-linguistic level of mutual under­
standing was necessary for the emergence of language. There are a number of evolu­
tionary hypotheses about the context in which humans became more socially tolerant 
and less competitive with each other, but what seems to be obvious is that, before 
language could exist, there had to be some kind of 'social ties' based on mutual com­
prehension, however primitive, among our speechless ancestors. Pre-humans at some 
stage had to start trying to figure out one another's intentions, which finally made pos­
sible mutual comprehension by using arbitrary symbols (Bickerton, 2005; Tomasello, 
2008). Ultimately, the impetus for language has to do with wanting to 'tell' someone 
else what is on our minds and learn what is on theirs. Therefore, the desire to psycho­
logically connect with others had to evolve before language. This eagerness to share 
our mental states might solve the Quine's Gavagail situation or the so-called 'magic 
moment' problem, as Hurford (2005) named it: how did the first hearer of a meaning­
ful signal know that it was a meaningful signal (as opposed to a cough or a grunt of 
pain)? The logical answer is that, before language was already in place, human an­
cestors were already engaging in collaborative activities in which they were already 
trying to interpret the behaviour of their conspecifics. As Hurford (2005) claims, "no 
such complex communication system could have evolved without reliable cooperat­
iveness between users" (p. 46).
The same rationale applies for the development of material tools and technologies, 
which describe similarities with language, such as productivity, arbitrariness, dual­
ity of patterning and cultural transmission (Klein, 2000; Noble and Davidson, 1991).
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Actually, all our complex social institutions are based on the same grounds. Searle 
(1996) has shown that the sense of acting together can scale up to the kinds of collective 
intentionality involved in doing something as institutionally complex as shopping, 
publishing a book or getting married, which exist on the basis of rights and obliga­
tions that, in turn, exist because 'we' all believe and act as if they do. But what was 
the initial payoff? How could a cooperative and hypersocial primate evolve in the 
first place? Which kind of selective pressure transformed our ancestors in 'obligate 
collaborators'?
3.5.2 Phylogeny: Different Reproductive Costs
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that there has been a co-evolution in the prim­
ate order of extended life histories, cognitive abilities, and social complexity. As Kay 
(2000) claims, "humans are the most extreme primates in all three of these spheres" 
(p. 329). Whenever a species exhibits multiple unique traits, it might be helpful to 
begin asking if these are causally connected. Humans do not start to reproduce until 
around 16 to 20 years old; mothers have long gestation lengths; we have very long life 
spans, including a long female post-reproductive period, and our lifecycles include 
two stages not seen in other primates: childhood and adolescence (Bogin, 1997). We 
are not only born with large brains for our body size, but our brain continues to grow 
for the first five years of life, making humans the most encephalised primate by a 
large margin (Carroll, 2003; Penin et al., 2002). In addition, humans also posses sev­
eral special intellectual capabilities that are either absent or poorly developed in other 
primates, such as language, tool use and theory of mind (Call and Tomasello, 1999, 
2008; Tomasello and Rakoczy, 2003). Although these cognitive abilities are certainly 
related at least in part to our large brain size, there is little doubt that normal devel­
opment of those skills is also dependent on an appropriate social context (Dunn et al., 
2011; Lupyan and Dale, 2010). In the social arena humans are also, and evidently, 
more complex than any other primate: our social realm includes relationship between 
relatives and non-relatives, individuals of different ages, sex and status, grandmoth­
ers and grandchildren, husbands and wives and fathers and offspring. While none of 
these individual relationships is unique to humans, there is no other single primate 
species that includes such diversity—let alone the complex social institutions humans
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have created over time. One way of explaining this human-specific feature is by ana­
lysing the congruency in the fossil records between the appearance of new hominin 
species and the emergence of new artefacts and technologies.
Current research in paleoanthropology suggests that the first signs of species-unique 
cognitive skills emerged gradually over perhaps a couple of hundred thousands years 
until full behavioural modernity was reached, around 50,000 years ago (Holden, 1998). 
By that time, humans had not only expanded out of Africa, but were also creating 
art and burying their dead, complex symbolic behaviours that point unequivocally to 
fluent language. Therefore, all we know for certain is that the required cognitive ma­
chinery to produce complex cultural artefacts and sustain fully developed language 
was already in place by that time.
But this account poses an intriguing puzzle. Even though human beings were anatom­
ically and—likely—cognitively ready to speak and produce cultural artefacts more 
than 150,000 years ago, clear evidence that they were doing so does not appear for
100,000 years afterwards. All we know from the fossil records reinforces this puzzle. 
Thus, for instance, although the appearance of the first kind of stone tools, the Oldowan, 
coincides with the appearance of early Homo, the second major change in stone-tool 
technology, the Acheulean, occurs around half a million years after the appearance of 
Homo erectus (Stringer and Andrews, 2005). This suggests that, while the first Homo 
erectus individuals may have had the cognitive potential to produce Acheulean tools, 
this potential was not realised for a hundred thousand of years (Key, 2000). Similarly, 
the first appearance of anatomically modem Homo sapiens occurs around 200,000 years 
ago, but Upper Palaeolithic artefacts (including artistic objects such as cave painting) 
do not appear in any great number for another 150,000 years. Unsurprisingly, accord­
ing to Klein (2000), the stone tool kit of archaic hominins is difficult to categorise since 
almost everywhere, whether Asia, Africa or Europe, before 50,000 years ago, they are 
all much alike; similarly crude products created with rather unsophisticated methods. 
In short, the above mentioned puzzle indicates that changes in brain size and ana­
tomy alone are not enough to stimulate changes in technology and culture. Therefore, 
social and behavioural factors are likely to be more important determinants for the 
production of complex artefacts.
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Evidence supporting this idea has been established during the last three decades or 
so. Researchers in life history theory have paid close attention to this lack of congru­
ence in the fossil record and have related the evolutionary origins of humans' unique 
life histories with a set of different aspects, such as intelligence, longevity, changes in 
human ontogeny and social behaviours such as diet and childcare (Aiello and Key, 
2002; Hill and Kaplan, 1999; Kaplan et al., 2000; Organ et al., 2011). To explore in 
detail all these findings is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, current evid­
ence suggests a major role of the reproductive effort (or reproductive costs) that human 
males and females have for the emergence of complex cooperative behaviours, such 
as social childcare. Reproductive effort or parental investment measures the cost of 
reproduction as the extent to which a single reproductive event detracts from an indi­
vidual's ability to invest in future offspring. It consists of two components, parental 
investment and mating costs (Smith, 1977; Trivers, 1972). This chapter will focus on 
three important issues related to the evolution of human life histories, in particular 
the high differences in the reproductive costs that female humans have compared to 
those of males, and its probable impact on the emergence of species-unique forms of 
cooperation and pro-social behaviours. The three factors that explain to a considerable 
extent the increasing differences in reproductive costs of females compared with that 
of males are (1) the progressive reduction of sexual dimorphism experienced during 
hominin phylogeny; (2) the production of bigger and slow maturing offspring; and, fi­
nally (3) the comparatively shorter human inter-birth intervals—mainly explained by 
a shorter lactation period. After describing these three factors in some detail, we will 
relate them to the evolutionary advantage that cooperative breeding represents for 
human mothers, so this behavioural trait is likely to have been selected by evolution.
1) Human low body-size dimorphism. Key and Ross (1999), among others, have 
claimed that the primary determinant of sex differences in energetic costs is body-size 
dimorphism -i.e., the difference in male and female body size. According to this view, 
in species in which male body mass is greater than female body mass, such as gorillas, 
male and female energetic costs per reproductive event are similar. Thus, although 
lactation and gestation implies higher costs for females, these costs are matched by 
the energetic costs to males of maintaining a larger body size (something necessary
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for competing with other males, attracting females and defending females from the 
advances of other males). In contrast, when males and females are similar in body 
size, female energetic costs exceed those of males, since females are devoting the same 
amount of energy to body maintenance as males, and are having to meet the addi­
tional energetic costs associated with gestation, lactation and offspring care. Humans 
are a paradigmatic instance of the latter situation, since their sexual dimorphism is 
very low. According to Aiello and her colleagues (Aiello and Key, 2002; Aiello and 
Wells, 2002), this low body size-dimorphism has been shaped through human phylo­
geny. By analysing the fossil records of each species, these authors compared the 
body mass and inferred the daily energy requirements for different hominins. With 
this information they determined the amount of energy that mothers of each species 
required during gestation and lactation. Table 3.1 reproduces their main findings.
As can be seen there, it is clear that Homo ergaster, the first known species of the 
genus Homo (Wood and Collard, 1999), is considerably heavier than any of the aus- 
tralopithecines. Also, it can be seen that females have increased in mass more than 
males. This means that Homo ergaster is not only characterised by a significant size 
increase but also by a marked reduction in sexual dimorphism. Thus, for instance, 
the ratio male/female body mass of Australopithecus afarensis is 1.52, while the same 
indicator for Homo ergaster is 1.21 (and 1.23 for Homo sapiens). The evolutionary con­
ditions that favoured such increases in body sizes are not clear, and several different 
reasons have been proposed (Aiello and Wells, 2002; Stringer and Andrews, 2005). In 
any case, a major disadvantage of larger body size is the increased energetic burden 
it produces and the correspondingly increased dietary requirements necessary to fuel 
these higher energy demands.
In order to see how these energy demands evolved. Table 3.1 also reproduces for 
each selected hominin the resting metabolic requirement (RMR) and the daily energy 
requirements (DEE)—which considers RMR in conjunction with other daily energy 
expenditures such as locomotion. The analysis established that RMR and the DEE 
of Homo ergaster would have been 39 percent higher than for A. afarensis, 30 percent 
higher for males and 54 percent higher for females. This indicates that human females 
over evolutionary time have augmented their body mass at a higher rate than males
66 Chapter 3. More than Words
Table 3.1: Inferred body mass and daily energy requirements for different hominins (Reproduced from 
Aiello and Wells 2002)
Sex Body Mass 
(Kg.)
RMR* DEEt DEE + 
Gestation*
DEE + 
Lactation^
Hominins
A. afarensis
female
male
29.3
44.6
881.6
1,208.1
1,175.3 
1,610.6
1,469.1 1,633.7
A. africanus
female
male
30.2
40.8
901.8 
1,130.0
1,202.3
1,506.6
1,502.8 1,671.2
A. robustus
female
male
31.9
40.2
939.6
1,117.6
1,252.7
1,489.9
1,565.9 1,741.2
A. boisei
female
male
34.0
48.6
985.6 
1,288.5
1,314.0
1,717.8
1,642.5 1,826.5
H. ergaster
female
male
52.0
63.0
1,355.5
1,565.3
1,807.2 
2,086.9
2,259.0 2,475.8
H  sapiens
female
male
56.8
70.0
1,448.3
1,694.0
1,930.9 
2,258.5
2,413.6 2,664.6
* RMR = Resting metabolic rate;
t DEE = Daily energy requirements (kcal d -1);
* Daily energy requirements during gestation = DEE x 1.25;
§ Daily energy requirements during lactation = DEE x 1.39 for the australopithecines 
and paranthropines, = DEE x 1.37 for Homo ergaster, and = DEE x 1.38 for Homo sapi­
ens.
and, consequent, their energy requirements at ratios much high than those for males. 
Finally assuming that gestation increases female DEE by 25 percent and lactation by 
37 to -39 percent for different hominin species. Table 3.1 shows that the DEE for a preg­
nant Homo ergaster female is about 54 percent higher than for a pregnant paranthropus 
or robust australopithecine female (and 38 percent higher than for a pregnant Australo­
pithecus boisei female). Besides, the DEE for a lactating Homo ergaster female is about 45 
percent higher than for a lactating paranthropus and almost 100 percent higher than for 
a non-lactating and non-gestating smaller-bodied hominid. Therefore, through evolu­
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tion, humans have reduced their sexual dimorphism and, consequently, females have 
increased their reproductive costs at a much higher rate.
2) Humans' bigger and slow maturing offspring. Intuitively the bigger the off­
spring's body size relative to their mothers is, and the longer the period of parental 
care newborns require, the higher the cost of raising an offspring for mothers will 
be. Humans are the extreme case in this dimension: among all the apes, humans 
produce the largest and slowest-maturing babies (Smith and Tompkins, 1995). Con­
sequently, rising human offspring is unusually costly for their mothers. De Silva (2011) 
recently established that there is a strong ollometric relationship—the relationship of 
body size to shape—between the mass of the mother and the mass of an infant in 
ccitcirrhine primates—the group of primates including the Old World monkeys, apes, 
and humans, characterised by nostrils that are close together and directed frontward 
or downward. According to his regression model, it is expected that humans should 
give birth to infants that are 2 to 2.2 kgs. However, humans are exceptional, and 
have newborns weighting 50 percent more than expected, averaging more than 3 kgs. 
Birthing larger infants not only causes obstetric difficulties, but also introduces the 
energetic and bio-mechanical challenge of transporting a relative large, helpless new­
born. This is particularly the case for pre-technological, upright walking hominids, 
some of which had reduced pedal grasping abilities. Thus, it has generally been ar­
gued that many of the uniquely human life history features, such as birthing large and 
helpless infants, with an extended juvenile period, may have emerged with the more 
technologically adept Homo erectus (Bogin, 1997).
In any case, human children's development is characterised by slow body growth 
rates between weaning and the eruption of permanent molars and completed brain 
growth (at the age of seven in modern populations). Thus, childhood—defined as the 
post-weaning period during which an individual is still reliant on others for food—is 
also peculiar in humans. Human children are similar to other mammalian infants 
because they are unable to procure food for themselves. However, human children 
are also different since they require specially prepared foods due to the immaturity of 
their dentition and their small digestive system. In fact, unlike other ape youngsters, 
human children depend on nutritional subsides from caregivers long after they are
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w ea n ed . M oreover, ch ild ren  require food  that is rich in  en ergy  and  p rotein  in  order to 
su p p ort a brain that is b oth  relatively  large and  g ro w in g  rap id ly  (B ogin , 1999). T hese  
s lo w  m atu rin g  and d ep en d en t ch ild ren  p o se  ad d ition a l d em a n d s for m oth ers in  term s  
of p rotection  and feed in g , in creasing  their energetic  rep rod u ction  burden.
3000
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Figure 3.2: Comparison o f gestation length, lactation length and cycling phase of humans, apes and 
two Old World monkeys (i.e., baboon and langur). The figure is ordered by increasing female body 
weight, shown in kg at the head o f each bar. (Reproduced from Key 2000).
3) Humans' faster reproductive rates. O ne w id e ly  accep ted  tenet o f life  h istory  theory  
is that, across sp ec ies, th ose  an im als w ith  b igger  b abies relative to the m o th er 's  b o d y  
s ize  a lso  ten d  to exh ib it lon ger in tervals b etw een  births, sin ce the m ore b ab ies cost 
the m oth er to p rod uce, the lon ger sh e w ill n eed  to recoup  before rep rod u cin g  again . 
But h u m an s, d esp ite  p rod u cin g  the largest, s lo w  m atu rin g  and m o st co stly  babies, 
breed  the fastest. To h ave  a clearer p icture o f this issu e , w e  h ave to stu d y  the en ergetic  
costs to fem ales o f p rod u cin g  a sin g le  offsp ring, w h ich  break d o w n  in to  three m ain  
com p onents: gestation , lactation  and  the tim e b e tw e en  w ea n in g  and the co n cep tio n  o f  
the next o ffsp ring  (cyclin g  p hase). Figure (3.2) com p ares the average len g th s o f th ese
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three phases for humans, a group of apes made up of Hylobcites lar (gibbons). Pan 
troglodytes chimpanzees. Gorilla gorilla (gorillas) and Pongo pygmaeus (Orang-utans) 
and, finally, two Old World monkeys, Papio cynocephalus (baboon) and Hanuman langur 
(langur). The figure is ordered by female body size, from smallest (the gibbon) to the 
largest (gorilla). If life history varied as a global heterochronic process—i.e., different 
rates of growth among different species—we would expect a simple progression in the 
lengths of each phase with an increase in body size. That is, gorillas would have the 
longest gestation, lactation and cycling phase, followed by humans and so on down 
to gibbons. This is clearly not the case. Actually, the life-history profile of humans is 
comparable to those of the langur or gibbon, even though human females are three 
and ten times heavier, respectively. Thus, whereas interbirth intervals are estimated 
at around 4 years in gorillas, 5.5 years in wild chimpanzees, and 8 years in orang­
utans, in most contemporary foraging societies the interbirth intervals average 3.5 
years. Chimpanzees and orang-utans have long inter-birth intervals, due primarily 
to very long lactation periods. As it can be seen in Figure (3.2), humans, in contrast, 
have very short inter-birth intervals and very short lactation lengths (Key, 2000).
Further insights are provided when we compare the offspring' weight at weaning, 
which occurs at around 4 times neonatal weight in primates. However, the apes are a 
notable exception to this rule: chimpanzees wean at 4.9 times neonatal weight; orang­
utans at 6.4 times neonatal weight; and gorillas at 9.4 times neonatal weight. Viewed 
from this perspective, even gorillas invest considerable more in lactation than most 
other primates. Humans describe the smallest ratio: human mothers wean their in­
fants at just 3.6 times neonatal weight. From an evolutionary viewpoint, this shorter 
interbirth intervals—due to a reduced lactation period—of human mothers can be 
seen as a biological adaptation in the life history realm to reduce the energy burden 
that breeding large, helpless and slow-maturing infants represents for mothers. Ai­
ello and Wells (2002) claim that in humans "a faster reproductive schedule reduces 
the most expensive part of reproduction, lactation, although the benefit would be 
countered by a smaller increase in the energy required to support dependent off­
spring" (p. 333). All in all, the shorter interbirth intervals, plus the long period of 
child dependency, means that a human mother will give birth to an additional off­
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spring long before the previous child is mature enough to take care of herself. That 
is, a reduced lactation period leads to a reduction in female reproductive costs, but 
at the same time decreases the interbirth interval, which in turn increases the num­
ber of dependent offspring per mother. This produces additional problems for human 
mothers. As Kramer (2005) describes it, since mothers often have multiple depend­
ents, they have an allocation problem: how to provide high-quality child care without 
sacrificing economic activities that feed younger and older children.
To sum up, when we consider the relative smaller size at weaning, the long period of 
body maturity that follows human weaning (i.e., childhood); the consequent extended 
period of dependency for food and protection that children require in order to survive; 
the comparatively faster reproductive rates that human females have; and the evolu­
tionary tendency towards reduced sexual dimorphism, we can appreciate the high 
energy burden of reproduction that mothers have. The three dimensions considered 
here demonstrate that female reproductive effort—the energetic investment in breed­
ing a human child—is considerably higher in a threefold sense; it is higher compared 
to early hominids, compared to species from similar taxa and compared to the repro­
ductive effort of human males. It is highly improbable that mothers with such a high 
energy burden could breed two or more children by themselves. How could early 
human mothers cope with this situation?
In order to explain the emergence of our faculty for language, we could argue for the 
importance of the human trait for cooperation and collaborative activities, in particu­
lar, as many other authors have claimed, we could argue for the importance of so- 
called cooperative breeding. Knight (2008), for instance, has speculated that the socio- 
ecological pressure that made possible the emergence of language was the result of 
the dramatic physiological changes that the genus Homo experienced in comparison 
to earlier ancestors (e.g., Australopithecus). The body changes that we discussed above 
—such as larger relative brain sizes, larger bodies, slower rates of maturation and 
growth, bipedalism—caused greater energetic requirements for mothers during gest­
ation, lactation and during the offspring's extended period of maternal dependency 
(see Aiello and Wells, 2002). Knight speculates that because of these body changes and 
the increasing energetic requirements of mothers, females began, on the one hand, to
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cooperate preferentially with males willing to hunt at a distance and bring meat to 
camp and, on the other, developing alliances with other females to collectively pun­
ish uncooperative males (by not giving them access to fertile females, for instance). 
This could be, according to Knight, the first evolutionary structure of human cooper­
ation that made possible the emergence of shared symbols. Similarly, Hrdy (2009) 
related the origins of our unique pro-social motivations to our tendency for cooper­
ative breeding, that is, the social behaviour in which helpers—all those who are not 
the mother—often engage in a variety of pro-social behaviours such as active provi­
sioning and basic childcare. We shall return to this point, which will be developed in 
detail, in Chapter 5, but what we want to stress here is that, given the morphological 
and biological changes experienced during phylogeny by our ancestors, cooperative 
breeding was a behavioural solution to deal with the big differences in the reproduct­
ive costs between human males and females. This evolutionary behavioural achieve­
ment could have provided the pre-linguistic stage of mutual understanding in which 
the emergence of language was possible.
It is important to mention that the emergence of new discursive patterns and the sta­
bilisation of symbolic artefacts, structures of expectations, and semantics (all of them 
built over the faculty of language) not only amplified the complexity of the social 
realm over historical time; this emergent social order acted as a functional pressure (in 
a downward direction) for further biological adaptations. Thus, the biological body 
was modified by the evolution of symbolic communication. Although we have shown 
that arbitrary linguistic properties (such as grammar) cannot be genetically encoded 
through adaptation, this does not preclude genetic adaptation to aspects of language 
held stable by functional pressures. For instance, since our divergence from the genus 
Pan, further adaptations of the vocal-auditory apparatus were necessary in order to 
enable the ever-faster processing of real-time speech. Thus, changes in the vocal ap­
paratus may have arisen from functional pressures to produce more intelligible vo­
calisation (Chater et al., 2009), which radically transformed the physiology of human 
beings in comparison with our extinct and living primate relatives. In addition, com­
pared to extant apes and pre-sapiens hominids, modem humans have an enlarged 
region of the spinal cord responsible for the voluntary control over breathing required
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by speech production (MacLamon and Hewitt, 1999). Humans also display greater 
cortical control over articulation and breathing, compared with the largely subcor- 
tical control found in other primates (Deacon, 1998). These physiological adaptations, 
probably with our ability of 'mind-reading', are good examples of gene-society co­
evolution; the process that shaped our biological and cognitive faculty of language.
3.5.3 Cognition: Social Learning and Socialisation
From an evolutionary point of view, the question to solve is why human beings de­
veloped their astonishing symbolic ability and why it is not present in other mammals. 
Of course we are facing, as we said before, a human specific feature. The question 
is how we can understand this symbolic faculty. One way to solve this question is 
looking at language itself and trying to infer the evolutionary process that shaped 
it. This implies a focus on symbols (i.e., words) and grammar, the two main compon­
ents of linguistic communication. Although there are enormous theoretical differences 
between the two authors, both Pinker and Tomasello have developed theories that, at 
the bottom line, share the same supposition, namely: the emergence of linguistic com­
munication is linked to our social life. Therefore, this human faculty must have a 
social origin.
In order to understand the evolutionary emergence of language. Pinker claims that 
we have first to answer the following question: "What is the machinery of language 
trying to accomplish?" (Pinker, 2003a, p. 27). For him, the whole linguistic system 
(i.e., grammar, words, phonology, etc.) appears to have been put together to encode 
propositioml information into a signal that can be conveyed from one person to another. 
Specifically, he argues that the structures of grammar are well suited to express in­
formation about technology (e.g., which two things can be put together to produce a third 
thing), local environment (e.g., where the things are), social environment (e.g., who did 
what to whom, when, where and why) and about one's own intentions (e.g., i f  you do 
this, I will do that), allowing people to convey the promises and threats that undergird 
relations of exchange and dominance.
Pinker (2005) associates this linguistic feature (given by the 'engineering design' of 
language) with the high sociability and collective life expressed by human beings. He
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puts forward the deep connection between what Tooby and DeVore's (1987) named 
the 'cognitive niche' and the human faculty of language. The basic idea of the cog­
nitive niche is that modem human beings, unlike the rest of hominids, have woven 
for themselves a 'second environment', different from the material world in which 
the rest of animals live, where gathering, processing and exchanging information is of 
paramount importance. Tooby and DeVore proposed that the human lifestyle is a con­
sequence of a specialisation for overcoming the evolutionary fixed defences of plants 
and animals (e.g., poisons, coverings, stealth, speed, and so on) by cause-and-effect 
reasoning. Such reasoning enables human beings to invent and use new technologies 
(such as weapons, traps, coordinated driving of game, and ways of detoxifying plants) 
that exploit other living things. According to Pinker, "this cause-and-effect reasoning 
depends on intuitive theories about various domains of the world, such as objects, 
forces, paths, places, manners, states, substances, hidden biochemical essences, and 
other people's beliefs and desires" (Pinker, 2003a, p. 27). Pinker concludes that the 
information captured in these intuitive theories is evocative of the information that 
the machinery of grammar is designed to convert into strings of sounds. For this au­
thor, "it cannot be a coincidence that humans are special in their ability to outsmart 
other animals and plants by cause-and-effect reasoning, and that language is a way 
of converting information about cause-and-effect and action into perceptible signals" 
(Pinker, 2003a, p. 28).
However, Pinker is not completely accurate in his claim, probably because he does not 
consider sufficiently the implications of his proposal. There is one major pitfall in his 
position. Contrary to Tinker's idea, primates actually are able to manage difference 
between causes and effects, so the cognitive trait that Pinker supposes is a human- 
specific one is rather present in different primates. Empirical research has shown that 
human's closest primate relatives, like chimpanzees and orang-utans, have very sim­
ilar cognitive skills for dealing with the physical world and for understanding external 
relational categories, compared with 2.5-year-old children (see Herrmann et al., 2007). 
So, how can we explain the huge cognitive and behavioural difference between prim­
ates and human beings?
Tomasello's (2008) proposal of the human-specific feature of social cognition can explain
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that difference. This author claims that most of primates have a cognitive adaptation 
for dealing with their physical environment and, in order to do so, they are in fact able 
to create relational categories. So, what is identified by Pinker as properly human, To­
masello argues it is actually a primate ability. Consequently, the cognitive infrastruc­
ture that supports our faculty of language was built directly on this unique primate 
cognitive adaptation. Over time, human beings just added a small but important twist 
in terms of, according to Tomasello, mediating forces such as causes and intentions. Hu­
man beings started not only to understand causal relations to explain phenomena in 
the physical world, but they also began to attribute intentions to explain behaviours 
in the social world; thus they began to understand others as selective and intentional 
beings.
Tomasello (2005, pp. 676-677) explains his theory of intentional action by using a 
sequential model from cybernetics, so, in his view, intentional actions resemble the 
three elements of "intelligent machines': (1) a reference value or goal toward which 
the system acts, (2) the ability to act in order to change the environment, and (3) the 
ability to perceive the environment so as to know when the state of the environment 
matches the reference value. For Tomasello, intentional actions describe the same basic 
organisation; goals are mental states that guide action (the state of the world that the 
agent seeks to bring about), intentions are plans of action the organism chooses and 
commit itself to in pursuit of a goal (thus, intentions include both the goal as well as 
the action plan chosen to make that happens) and, finally, the organism's perceptual 
monitoring (attention) throughout the whole process, until the action is finally fulfilled 
and the state of the world is transformed in one way or another (including no change), 
something that Tomasello named 'the result of the action'.
One of the core points of the 'social cognition hypothesis' is that, just as human be­
ings automatically understand certain perceptual sequences as causal in the inanimate 
world, we automatically understand certain actions performed by animate agents as 
goal directed or intentional; in short, we have the ability of intentional understanding. 
So, in this perspective, the evolutionary achievement during our phylogeny consists 
in this human specific social cognition that allows us to understand the others as in­
tentional beings like the self.
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This ability for intentional understanding presents some evolutionary advantages (To­
masello, 2000). Firstly, this kind of cognition enables humans to solve problems in 
especially creative and flexible ways, because it allows an individual to predict and 
control events even when their usual antecedent is not present—that is, if there is 
some other event that may serve to bring about the mediating force. For example, an 
individual might develop a novel way to deceive or distract a competitor away from 
something over which they are competing (e.g., by posing some dangerous element in 
the same place or by placing food in the opposite direction) or a novel tool to generate 
the force needed to move an obstacle. Therefore, this kind of human causal and in­
tentional understanding has immediate consequences for effective action, as it opens 
up the possibility of finding novel ways to either manipulate or suppress mediating 
forces. The second advantage of intentional understanding derives from its powerful 
transforming role in processes of social learning. That is, understanding the behaviour 
of other persons as intentional agents directly enables certain very powerful forms of 
social learning, which are directly responsible for the special forms of cultural social­
isation characteristic of human beings.
What is the relation of this socio-cognitive ability with our faculty of language? The 
relation is quite clear. For Tomasello, symbolic communication is the process by which 
one individual attempts to manipulate the attention of, or to share attention with, an­
other individual. In specifically linguistic communication, as one form of symbolic 
communication, this attempt quite often involves both (a) reference, or inviting the 
other to share attention to some physical, subjective or social entity, and (b) predica­
tion, or directing the other's attention to some currently unshared features or aspect 
of that entity (in the hopes of sharing attention to the new aspect as well). As To­
masello argues, "comprehension of an act of symbolic communication thus consists in 
understanding that 'She is attempting to direct my attention to X' or 'She is attempt­
ing to direct my attention to Y with respect to X'" (Tomasello et al., 2005). Within this 
perspective, the human faculty of language (or at least some specific aspects of lan­
guage) is a kind of spandrel (Gould, 1997) of social cognition, that is, a by-product of 
preexisting constraints rather than end products of a history of natural selection.
The reason why, after our divergence from other great apes, the individuals of one
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population began to understand one another as intentional agents whose attention 
and other psychological states could be actively followed, manipulated, and shared, 
is not clear. But it is clear that this evolutionary achievement enabled the conven­
tionalisation of a set of communicative behaviours premised on this intersubjective 
understanding. For Tomasello, one obvious implication of this scenario is that there 
is no specific adaptation Tor' symbolic communication. The adaptation was Tor' a 
particular kind of social cognition (i.e., understanding others as intentional beings) 
and symbols then developed as a kind of natural consequence. "When you know 
that some one else has psychological experiences like your own, it is just natural for 
an intelligent primate to want to manipulate those states for various cooperative and 
competitive purposes" (Tomasello et al., 2005, p. 109).
This co-evolutionary dynamics and its effect on cultural evolution is expressed in dif­
ferent aspects. For instance, the evolution of a long period of childhood allows an 
extensive time of cultural learning in which the children can be socialised and acquire 
language (Hurford, 1991; Locke and Bogin, 2006; Tomasello, 1996). Therefore, during 
human phylogeny, children began to grow up in the midst of socially and historically 
constituted technologies, traditions and expectations, which enabled them to (1) bene­
fit from the accumulated knowledge and skills of their social groups; (2) acquire and 
use perspectively based cognitive representations in the form of linguistic symbols 
(and analogies and metaphors constructed from these symbols); and (3) internalise 
certain types of discourse interactions into skills of metacognition, representational 
re-description, and dialogic thinking (see Tomasello, 1996,2000; Tomasello et al., 2005, 
1993).
Human beings engage with conspecifics in activities that require high levels of co­
ordination and cooperation. Those activities range from simple tasks such as prepar­
ing a meal together to really complex ones, such as collaborating scientifically. These 
collective practices are often structured by shared expectations that have been socially 
stabilised over time in conventional and normative structures. Individuals must learn 
and internalise these structures of expectations in order to be competent in the social 
realm. Norms and values are incorporated into individual preferences through the 
social mechanism known as socialisation. Parsons defined the concept in the following
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terms:
The maintenance of a normative order requires that it be implemented in 
a variety of respects: there must be very considerable —even if often quite 
incomplete— compliance with the behavioural expectations established by 
the values and norms. The most basic condition of such compliance is the 
internalization of a society's values and norms by its members, for such 
socialisation underlies the consensual basis of a societal community (Par­
sons, 1966, p. 14).
In a more recent definition, Gintis claims that socialisation is the process by which 
"initiates are supplied with moral values that induce them to conform to the duties 
and obligations of the role-positions they expect to occupy" (Gintis, 2007, p. 7) in 
each of the diverse spheres of social realm. In any case, socialisation is the process 
that, steered by communication, aims to create adaptive individual behaviour that 
conforms to expectations.
Evidently, socialisation only works by means of symbolic communication. Language 
is the medium that makes possible this process, by coupling the complexity of psychic 
and social systems. Following Toomela, we can understand socialisation as "a process 
whereby two different mechanisms of information processing, non verbal ('sensory') 
thinking and conventional language, that have been differentiated from the 'natural' 
process in the course of development become united within a new mental structure" 
(Toomela, 1996a, p. 286). Thus, the result of socialisation is the development of se- 
miotically mediated mental operations6. The world's social complexity becomes a 
meaningful element of the psychic world's operations, because linguistic symbols are 
addressed to the individual directly, and so their social meaning is immediately evid­
ent in the basic process of comprehension.
6lbomela does not restrict language to verbal forms, so socialisation does not involve only words of 
natural languages. For him, socialisation is possible by means of symbols with the following character­
istics: they must be perceptible, shared, referential (or indexical), and it must be possible to use them 
differently from their referents (see Toomela, 1996b)
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Socialisation begins from early childhood and it extends to adulthood (something that 
sociologists call 'secondary socialisation', see Berger and Luckmann, 1967). For that 
reason, socialisation is strongly tied to the individuals' cognitive development. In fact, 
it is possible to relate socialisation with the different cognitive stages the individual 
goes through during ontogeny. Tomasello and his colleagues (Tomasello, 1996, 2000; 
Tomasello et al., 2005, 1993) have developed a theoretical framework to understand 
cognitive development, which can be related to the process of socialisation. They have 
framed this theory with the concept of cultural learning. These authors argue that in 
cultural learning,
[LJearners do not just direct their attention to the location of another in­
dividual's activity; rather, they actually attempt to see a situation the way 
the other sees it—from inside the other's perspective, as it were. (...) It is 
learning in which the learner is attempting to learn not from another, but 
through another. (Tomasello et al., 1993, p. 496; italics in original)
This qualitative difference is possible because human beings are able to understand 
the others as intentional beings like the self, which allows the perspective-taking by the 
individuals in interaction (as it was discussed in Subsection 3.5.2). In cultural learn­
ing, circumstances and outcome are two equally important focus of attention. The 
learner is attempting to see the whole situation from another person's point of view, 
comparing and contrasting that perspective with his or her own knowledge. Thus, the 
distinctive feature of cultural learning is that the cognitive representation resulting in­
cludes something of the perspective of the interactional partner and something of the 
social interaction itself—the demonstration or instructions given by an adult, for ex­
ample. And these representations continue to guide the learner activity even after the 
original experience is over.
It is important to emphasise that socialisation is not a unilateral process in the top- 
down direction, from society to individual, although since Durkheim this has been 
the way to understand it in the social sciences. Gintis understood socialisation as 
"the most powerful form of epigenetic transmission found in nature" (Gintis, 2007, p. 
8), because, for him, human preferences are 'programmable' in the same sense that a
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computer is programmed to perform a task. This is a bold and unlikely claim though; 
anyone in contact with infants and children knows how difficult and frustrating it is 
for them to internalise social norms (let alone adolescents!). As it is a social (com­
municative) event, socialisation brings about a continuous processing of options for 
individuals: of conformance versus deviance; of commitment versus not-commitment; of 
attraction versus aversion (Vanderstraeten, 2000). In this sense, socialisation is a para­
doxical process, since it presupposes the possibility of deviance. And this tendency is 
amplified in contemporary societies by the process of individualisation, which gives 
way to increasing deviance simply because non-conformance (i.e., originality) offers 
the best opportunities to display one's individual uniqueness (Luhmann, 1996). As 
we discussed in Chapter 2, social action is contingent and individuals have capabil­
ity for selective activities and counterfactual behaviour, which trigger variations and 
novelties for social evolution. I cannot consider these topics further here, but only 
propose that individuals' capability for creativity is based, or at least increased, by the 
social-cognitive developments that occurs during ontogeny, where our cultural learn­
ing was shaped and the ways in which we deal with the contingent nature of symbolic 
communication.
Cultural learning manifests itself in three forms during human ontogeny: imitative 
learning, instructed learning, and collaborative learning—in that order. Tomasello and 
colleagues (1993) claim that this progression arises from the developmental ordering 
of specific social-cognitive underpinnings, where of paramount importance is the de­
velopment of specific concepts of person.
The first type of cultural learning, imitative learning, relies on a concept of intentional 
agent and involves simple perspective-taking. In this type of cultural learning, which 
emerges at around 9 months of age, infants focus their attention on the adults' inten­
tions for the actions they perform because, at this early age, they begin to understand 
that human actions have meaning—and, therefore, they properly embark on 'social ac­
tions' in a Weberian sense7. Since they identify persons as intentional agents like the
7According to Weber, "[w]e shall speak of 'action' insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective 
meaning to his behaviour—be it overt or covert, omission or acquiescence. Action is 'social' insofar as 
its subjective meaning takes account of the behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its course"
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self, they recognise that human behaviour is selective, deliberate, and purposive. Con­
sequently, infants embark on a number of new behaviours that are indicative of their 
emerging ability to coordinate their attention with people and objects. For instance, 
infants begin to establish joint attention or engagement with objects with adults: they 
look at objects the adult is looking at; they start to look at adults for their emotional 
reaction to novel people, actions or objects; and they also begin trying to get others 
to tune into their focus of attention by means of different expressive gestures (Car­
penter et al., 1998). Thus, infants do not show any attempt to look where their doll is 
looking and they do not demand actions from their baby bottle. They perform these 
behaviours only when they are interacting with another person, and this is because 
they understand the actions of other persons in terms of underlying perceptions and 
intentions.
Frequently, these activities of joint engagement are established in highly ritualised 
situations (e.g., feeding, games) which create a shared referential framework within 
which the child may experimentally anchor the language used by adults. It is within 
these situations of joint attention where the child can both grasp the (communicat­
ive) intentions behind the funny noises that adults utter and learn how to use those 
linguistic expressions appropriately, especially when she has the same communic­
ative intention. As Tomasello and his colleagues explained it, "the appropriate use 
of a conventional symbol can only be learned imitatively; it is unlikely to the point 
of impossible that infants will discover for themselves the same arbitrary connection 
between sound and referent that adults have conventionalised" (Tomasello et al., 1993, 
p. 498). The learning process in these contexts can be described as follows: (1) the child 
understands that the adult's (communicative) intention is for her to focus in some as­
pect of the world (e.g., A  clown!) and (2) she also realises that when she wishes to focus 
someone else's attention on that object she may use the same expression (e.g.. Clown!). 
Through this dialectic process of imitative learning infants begin to internalize the 
linguistic world within which they live8.
(Weber, 1978, p. 4). This definition of social action it is complementary to that of 'intentional action', and
logically the first requires the second.
8Of course, children do not acquire the whole repertoire of linguistic elements and rules that consti­
tute natural languages just by imitation. As we explained before (see Section 3.4, specially the review of
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Around 3 to 4 years of age, children begin a new form of cultural learning, namely in­
structed learning, which relies on a concept of mental agent who orients his selections 
and actions according to beliefs, that is, according to propositions about the world held 
to be true. At this stage children properly acquire a 'theory of mind' (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1985; Call and Tomasello, 1999; Doherty, 2008; Mitchell, 2000). Children start to 
be aware of the role played by beliefs in social action and they conceive people not 
only as perceptual, selective and intentional agents but also as agents who have indi­
vidual thoughts that guide their behaviours and which, in some circumstances, may 
be compared with the child's own thoughts and beliefs. These cognitive changes are 
illustrated by the increasing ability of children at this age to deceive others, something 
that, despite of adults' qualms, is positively associated with their cognitive abilities to 
understand others' minds (Talwar et al., 2007). In addition, children successfully pre­
dict what another individual will do when given information the subject child knows 
to be false, something that younger children can not predict. This new ontogenetic 
ability has been corroborated by psychological research regarding the false-belief task. 
In the 'standard version' of this experiment, the child is presented with a character, 
Alice, who leaves a desirable object such as a chocolate in her basket, before departing 
the scene. In her absence, another character, Sally, removes the object and places it in 
a box. Children are asked to predict, on Alice's return to the room, where Alice will 
look for the object (or, sometimes, where she thinks the object is). Four-year-olds tend 
to succeed at this ask—correctly attributing a false belief to Alice, saying that she will 
look for the object in the basket—while younger children tend to fail (for a review, 
see Wellman et al., 2001). As Tomasello and colleagues claim (1993, p. 500), "[tjhis 
demonstrates even more clearly children's newly emerging ability to understand that 
others have mental states differing from their own and, possibly, diverging from the 
real situations as well" (however, for an adverse opinion of this false-belief task, see 
Bloom and German, 2000).
the 'poverty of the stimulus' hypothesis), children perform generalisations and uncover the underlying 
grammatical patterns by themselves. However, as we said, this process seems to be much more conser­
vative than thought before; children do not begin to generalise until they have acquired (by imitative 
learning) a set of linguistic forms that they frequently hear.
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In instructive learning "children learn about the adult specifically, about the adult's 
understanding of the task and how that compares with their own understanding" (To­
masello et ah, 1993, p. 499). The paradigmatic case of instructive learning is teaching. 
In situations like that, the adult instructs or regulates the child's performance usually 
through intentional speech acts and, in turn, the child tries to understand this regula­
tion from the adult's point of view in an intersubjective comprehension of the task, by 
alternating or coordinating her and the adult's perspective-taking. Therefore, at this 
stage, children begin to internalize the adult's understanding to their own task under­
standing and this comprehension is later re-enacted in other situations in the form of 
performance monitoring, meta-cognitive strategies, and more overtly self-regulated 
speech. During this stage children also begin to internalize the structure of expecta­
tions that inform them what is socially expected (Rakoczy et al., 2008). They begin to 
understand what is structurally possible in this and that situation, what is right and 
wrong, and what is the way in which we normally proceed.
Regarding the development of language, children begin to make generalisations based 
on abstract models and grammatical patterns they discovered and acquired during 
earlier years. They show evidence of possessing an abstract transitive construction 
model (something specially documented for English-speaking children) to which they 
can freely assimilate newly learned verbs (Tomasello, 1992, 2000). Furthermore, as an 
outstanding linguistic characteristic associated with this cognitive level, by 4 years 
of age children are producing communicative expressions that clearly refer to mental 
states. The use of mental state verbs (e.g., think, know, want, believe, perceive, regret), 
which impose not only syntactic complexity but also semantic and cognitive com­
plexity (Nixon, 2005) is a good example. Thus, children can produce and understand 
statements using mental state verbs with complex sentential complements—where the 
embedded clause is an obligatory linguistic argument that may have an independent 
truth value—like I know that she loves candies or Mary thought that Fred went to the movies. 
Some researchers suggest that the syntactic, semantic and cognitive properties of sen­
tential complement facilitate the development of a representational theory of mind (Hale 
and Tager-Flusberg, 2003). In short, all these joint achievements of cognitive and lin­
guistic abilities are interwoven during ontogeny and they allow children to interact in
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complex ways and internalize the structures of expectations that constitute the social 
world.
The third stage of cultural learning comes around 6 or 7 years of age and it is known 
as collaborative learning. This new form of cultural learning relies on a concept of re­
flective agent, that is, children begin to understand that the intentional states of others 
may refer to their own intentional states. Children understand that other's mental 
states not only refer to objects in the world, but also to their own mental states. They 
inaugurate thus a "kind of thinking in which the partner's act toward me and mine 
toward the partner are simulated recursively at the same time in an integrated fash­
ion, not in alternating fashion as in instructed learning" (Tomasello et al., 1993, p. 501). 
This new social-cognitive ability is crucial to participate in collaborative interactions, 
where the children must be able to criticise another child's criticisms of their previous 
suggestions.
Collaborative learning involves integrated perspective-taking (also named reflective 
intersubjectivity) and it takes place when neither participant is an authority or expert; 
thus, collaborative; learning entails symmetrical intersubjectivity: all the participants 
in collaborative interactions are working collectively to solve a common problem and, 
in arriving jointly to some solution, they co-construct knowledge. Tomasello and col­
leagues hold that this form of cultural learning "is a process of cultural creation or co­
construction rather than transmission" (Tomasello et al., 1993, p. 501), because they 
learn from peers in the interactional frame in which they participate. To engage in 
collaborative learning "the child must understand the collaborator in terms of his re­
flective thoughts (...) in order to carry on the reflective dialogue necessary for true 
collaboration" (Tomasello et al., 1993, p. 503). Thus, children embark on collaborative 
learning not when they are working in groups although acting in parallel or dividing 
responsibilities, but rather when they share with their partners in the task by plan­
ning together, considering and responding to others' ideas, asking for further clarific­
ations when necessary and engaging in discussions regarding the effects of their joint 
activity. In this integrative process, children evaluate the different opinions and these 
opinions are incorporated into the final solution, co-creating the knowledge, in a way 
that resembles scientific collaboration. Another characteristic of collaborative learning
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is that the final outcome of the interaction is unknown and, consequently, the success 
of the task is unknown. This type of collaborative learning in school-age children 
is a well documented phenomenon (Azmitia, 1988; Barron, 2003; Tudge, 1992; Tudge 
et ah, 1996) and the interactive patterns described are also identified in this empirical 
research.
This more complex social-cognitive stage is consistent with the full mastery of lan­
guage that children are reaching. Around 6 to 8 years old children mastered the 
productive use of language because they can make generalisations based on abstract 
verb-general schema. Thus, they can understand and produce transitive utterances, 
which they can deduce even from verbs heard in a passive construction (e.g., from 
The book is being read by her to She's reading the book) (Tomasello, 2000). At this stage as 
well children begin to use reflective and recursive language spontaneously, being able 
to understand more complex, second-order mental states like, for example, the fact 
that He thinks that I think she is cute (Tomasello et ah, 1993). Finally, the full children's 
mastery of language produces a new form of cognitive representation based on the 
intersubjective and perspectival character of natural languages. As children learn to 
use words and linguistic constructions in the manner that adults do, "they come to see 
that the exact phenomenon may be constructed in many different ways for different 
communicative purposes depending on many factors in the communicative context" 
(Tomasello, 2000, p. 213). In short, at this early age, children begin to understand 
(and deal with) the contingent nature of the social systems. All these changes, in addi­
tion to the ontogenetic development of cognition, bring about the discursive openness 
and communicative creativity that characterises normal individuals from this cognit­
ive stage onwards. Thus, the child crosses the threshold towards an understanding 
of the social world as an emergent and contingent phenomenon and inaugurates her 
full entry into the realm of self-referential and second-order social interactions. At this 
stage, the child not only internalizes the symbolic world in which she lives, but begins 
to take distance from it in order to critically evaluate it.
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3.6 Summary
In this chapter it has been claimed that the study of the emergence and evolution of 
symbolic communication, and especially linguistic communication, is one of the most 
important spans of a substantial bridge for the social and natural sciences, specifically 
between sociology and cognitive sciences. In the account presented here, language 
is a natural and social phenomenon, the study of which requires the establishment 
of fruitful distinctions, like that of social and biological evolution, and the overcom­
ing of others, like that of nurture and nature. Language is a threshold phenomenon 
between cognition, organic body and social systems. I claimed that this perspective is 
not only is more plausible, but also allows a fruitful dialogue between cognitive and 
social sciences. Consequently, sociology may contribute to, as well as benefit from, the 
constructions and researches of cognitive sciences. For sociologists, this means that 
we must take an active role in helping to theorise, as well as empirically investigate 
the characteristics of social behaviour as is expressed by individuals in interaction and 
the relation between them and the structures of expectations that they generate and 
modify over time. In this dialogue, sociology has a lot to say.

Chapter
Emergent Lexicons in a Multi-Agent 
Spatial Configuration
The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of 
space (...) We are at a moment, I believe, when our experi­
ence of the world is less that of a long life developing through 
time than that of a network that connects points and inter­
sects with its own skein.
Michel Foucault, Of Other Spaces, 1967
4.1 Introduction
Human communication (or symbolic communication) is a key concept within sociolo­
gical research and, as explained in previous chapters, for many authors the scientific 
study of this process is of paramount importance to explain the emergence of social 
order. Most of the work done by prominent sociologists such as Blumer (1992), Haber­
mas (1991) and Luhmann (1996) has been devoted to comprehending the relationship 
between social order and the features of symbolic communication. Recently, Sawyer 
has claimed that a theory of social emergence needs an explicit understanding of sym­
bolic communication (Sawyer, 2002, 2005). I have made similar claims for the case of 
computational sociology (Salgado and Gilbert, 2008) and in this thesis (see Chapter 2).
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Computational sociology (Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005) models social phenomena by 
using the ideas of emergent complex systems, although the very notion of emergence 
is a contentious element within the field. As I claimed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, 
in order to overcome these quarrels, sociological theories of symbolic communication 
can be useful to computational sociology, since they give an account of the emergence 
of the social realm from the "bottom up ' as communication and describe the process 
by which society limits possible individual actions.
Nevertheless, the research devoted to this topic within computational sociology is dis­
appointing. Despite recent advances in computational power, modelling tools and sci­
entific knowledge, most of the literature has disregarded the importance of symbolic 
communication (even though only this process can be called social in its own right). 
Because symbolic communication is not an important issue within the mainstream of 
computational sociology, it is not hard to understand the reason why this process has 
been modelled outside this discipline, mainly by linguists (Cangelosi, 2007; Oliphant, 
1996; Steels, 1996). The latter line of research has offered important insights into how 
communication systems might emerge and how they evolve over time. However, 
there remains a wide gulf between sociological and linguistic theories and models. 
For instance, the structure of interaction among agents (e.g., the number of agents 
involved in one interaction), the spatial and physical constraints for communication 
(e.g., audibility of voice, visibility of the topic) or even the presence of agents with dif­
ferent behavioural characteristics, which are important for sociological research, are 
rarely explored. Therefore, one crucial issue is whether computational sociology can 
adapt these advances in linguistics and offer new insights to the study of symbolic 
communication.
This chapter describes an ABM with which to study these important issues. The ques­
tion it could answer is how stable communication systems or lexicons—sets of associ­
ations among meanings and cultural signs called words—might evolve from repeated 
pairwise interactions among agents that have no direct access to other agents' onto­
logies, and, crucially, whether such systems have the major design features of human 
language, such as bi-directionality, arbitrariness, and reinforcement and stabilisation 
by permanent usage. To begin, I present and operationalise the sociological frame­
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work I described in detail in Chapters 2 and 3, which, as discussed there, explains the 
emergence of symbolic communication by considering two evolutionary constraints 
(Section 4.2). In this explanation, the frequency with which agents refer to different 
topics over time and the spatial limitations on reaching recipients are of importance. 
Then, I describe an ABM that considers some spatial features and replicates the evol­
utionary pressures discussed before (Section 4.3). I present the simulation results and 
discuss the implications for understanding the emergence and evolution of a shared 
lexicon among independent agents (Section 4.4). Finally, I present a summary and 
some general conclusions (Section 4.5).
4.2 Understanding Communication
In this section, the main elements of the characterisation of symbolic communication 
and the emergence of the social order, as discussed in Chapter 2 are recalled. Sym­
bolic communication is defined as an evolutionary and, consequently, improbable 
event, whose explanation entails the analytical distinction of three different steps. I 
reinterpret this theoretical framework stressing the spatial feature of the discussed im­
probabilities (Subsection 4.2.1). Then, I propose an analytical device, a Cartesian dia­
gram, which facilitates the identification of different communicative strategies that 
individuals may adopt to spread and impose throughout a population arbitrary and 
local lexicons (Subsection 4.2.2). These analytical elements are of importance in order 
to construct and evaluate the proposed ABM, which will be explained in detail in the 
following section.
4.2.1 The Evolution of Communication
From a sociological point of view, symbolic communication is the basic element of so­
cial order (Habermas, 1991; Luhmann, 1990). Symbolic communication is an emergent 
order that involves at least two agents: a speaker and a hearer. Analytically it emerges 
through a synthesis of three selections: the speaker selects some information from a 
range of possibilities; she or he instantiates it through some signal or linguistic me­
dium (utterance); the hearer observes the speaker's conduct and understand or mis­
understands this utterance and its informational content (Luhmann, 1990). Of course, 
the hearer can accept or reject the information, but either way the hearer understands
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the speaker's proposal.
Regardless of how counter-intuitive this might be, the emergence of symbolic commu­
nication is improbable. As Luhmann (1996) argues, despite the fact that in everyday 
life communication is taken for granted, it must—if it comes about—overcome some 
obstacles. I will focus on two of them: (1) the individuality of consciousness and (2) 
the extension of communication beyond direct participants1. The first improbability 
is related with understanding; given that their bodies are separate (and consequently 
they do not have access to the other's mind), it is unlikely that one person can un­
derstand the informational content or topic that another person wants to communicate 
(i.e, what another person means). The second improbability is related with the spatial 
limitations of communication in reaching recipients; in other words, it is improbable 
that communication can get to more people than are present in a given situation.
These two improbabilities focus on the effect that space and 'social distance' have on 
the emergence of communication. The fact that ego does not have direct access to alter' 
semantics and lexicons is a result of the fact that they are two different bodies, with 
different experiences. Similarly, the fact that alter cannot reach more recipients than 
those present in the same place and the same time when she speaks derives from the 
fact that her voice has a very limited spatial reach. Although these two elements are 
plain facts, the powerful effect of them, as evolutionary pressures, on the emergence 
and evolution of symbolic communication had been totally overlooked by sociologists 
until Luhmann's communication theory.
However, regardless of these improbabilities, social order exists and we communicate 
daily. This is because social evolution has overcome these improbabilities with some 
mechanisms. The first improbability is solved by the emergence of cultural signs, like 
words, which make it more probable that individuals in interaction (and members of 
the same community) can understand each other. This is the case because both the in­
dividual using a cultural sign (the speaker) and the individual receiving it (the hearer) 
can identify the same topic. These cultural signs have three basic characteristics.
^As I discussed in Chapter 2, there is a third improbability related with the difficulty of ensuring 
that the hearer accepts and follows the communication's informative content put forth by the speaker's 
utterances, even though she understands it. In this chapter, I will not discuss this improbability.
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Firstly, cultural signs, whether they be acoustical or optical forms, are bi-directional 
(De Saussure, 1995), that is, each individual taking part in a communicative interaction 
can map some topic onto a sign and then map back from the sign to get the original 
topic. Secondly, these signs are arbitrary. They are 'conventional' associations between 
a signal and some specific topic. Words of natural languages are the most standard 
example of cultural signs. As Pinker says, "[t]he word duck does not look like a duck, 
walk like a duck or quack like a duck, but I can use it to convey the idea of a duck 
because we all have learned the same connection between the sound and the meaning" 
(Pinker, 2003b, p. 17).
But words are not the only cultural signs. Body gestures in interactive contexts, tat­
toos within certain social groups, or even the "manner of walking or style of clothes or 
hair" (Chomsky, 2002, p. 75) are also cultural signs and, therefore, they serve for com­
municative purposes. All of them make more probable that the 'hearer' understands 
the 'speaker', because they can, through equivalent signs, reinforce the impression 
that they are attending to equivalent topics (e.g., similar concepts, meanings, opinions 
or 'ways of life').
The previous two characteristics are the static dimensions of cultural signs (synchronic 
features). The third characteristic is related with the dynamic dimension of cultural 
signs (diachronic feature); the mechanism involved in their stabilisation over time. Cul­
tural signs are strongly dependent on the frequency with which individuals particip­
ate regularly in communicative interactions (as speakers or hearers) about the same 
topic by using the same sign. This is particularly true for the constitution of novel 
words in pre- or non-linguistic contexts, that is, the first signs with communicative 
content that our ancestors used. In that first language or communication system, each 
sign (or word) conveyed a single message (or meaning). For any word to survive in 
a community, it had to be used frequently enough to be heard and remembered by 
all the learners. As new words are added to the vocabularies of speakers, old words 
could be used less often, and they were liable to fade (Nowak et al., 2000). Thus, like 
memes (Blackmore and Dawkins, 2000), the survival and dissemination rate of a cul­
tural sign relies on the number of times they are employed. Thus, the more individuals 
communicate about a topic by using the same sign over time, the more stabilised and
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extended throughout the population that sign will be.
Cultural signs make more probable that the 'hearer' understands the 's p e a k e rb e ­
cause they think they are employing equivalent signs to refer to the same topics. But 
cultural signs per se are still strongly coupled with interactional contexts; they require 
that the individuals that use them are near to each other because the 'hearer' must 
see or hear the sign used by the 'speaker' in order to distinguish its informational 
content. Consequently, there are important spatial constraints for the use of cultural 
signs. Thus, the second improbability refers to the problem of the limited range of 
communications. Dissemination media (Luhmann, 1996), such as writing, printing and 
electronic broadcasting, contribute to expand communication beyond the restrictive 
boundaries of interactional contexts (i.e., face to face interaction). In more abstract 
(and metaphoric) terms, the extension of communication beyond direct participants 
is a question of magnitude: how loud the speaker can 'utter' some cultural sign and 
consequently reach more recipients. To be sure, 'voice loudness' had no impact on 
the evolution of cultural signs. Rather, I am proposing the idea of 'loudness' might be 
(as we will see in section 4.3.2) a good operationalisation to model the dissemination 
media's effect, that is, the capability of increasing the number of potential recipients 
one agent can reach in time and space.
4.2.2 Different Communicative Strategies
From the previous discussion we can state two general implications about the emer­
gence and evolution of some symbolic communicative system. Firstly in order to 
stabilise a cultural sign p  over time, the number of times that individuals communic­
ate about the same topic by using p  must be crucial. Analytically, we can imagine a 
population where there are individuals that participate for longer in communicative 
interactions about the same topic (i.e., they seldom change the topic) and individu­
als that participate in different communicative interactions about different topics (i.e., 
they often change the topic). Secondly, because cultural signs are so tied to the restric­
tions in space (and time) of interactional orders, which are by definition ephemeral 
(see Goffman, 1983), the agents' capability to reach more recipients must have import­
ant consequences for the generalisation and stabilisation of cultural signs over time.
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A nalytically , w e  can  im ag in e a p o p u la tio n  o f in d iv id u a ls  w h o se  u tterances are 'lou d ' 
(i.e., th ey  can  reach m an y  recip ients) and  in d iv id u a ls  w h o se  utterance are 'soft' (i.e., 
th ey  can  reach few  recipients). T h ese tw o  asp ects m ig h t act as ev o lu tio n a ry  pressures  
for the em ergen ce o f sym b olic  com m u n ication , d eterm in in g  ad d ition a lly  the w a y s  or 
strateg ies that in d iv id u a ls  p u rsu e to spread  their loca l sig n s in  order to com m u n ica te  
w ith  each  other, con trib utin g  thu s to the stab ilisation  o f com m u n ica tion  sy stem s m ad e  
of cu ltural sign s. Let u s d escribe th ese  strateg ies in  m ore detail.
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Figure 4.1: T h e fo u r  q u a d ra n ts  in  th is  C a r te s ia n  d ia g ra m  re p re se n t f o u r  c o m m u n ic a tiv e  s tr a te g ie s , 
w h ich  a re  id ea l ty p e s  o r  s ty l i s e d  fa c ts .
Four d ifferent com m u n ica tive  strateg ies can  be id en tified  b y  u s in g  a s im p le  C artesian  
d iagram . A s w e  can  see  in  F igure 4.1, the strateg ies that in d iv id u a ls  fo llo w  in  order 
to create a sym b olic  com m u n ica tion  sy stem  can  b e characterised  b y  th e com b in ation  
of tw o  d im en sio n s, nam ely: 1) th e  frequency o f changing the topic (FCT) an d  2) the cap­
ability o f reaching recipients (CRR). Both d im en sio n s  are features o f agen ts that h a v e  
con seq u en ces for the em ergen ce o f a sym b o lic  com m u n ication  sy stem  (i.e., lexicon ). 
T he first d im en sio n  is related  to the rate at w h ich  an agen t can ch a n g e the top ic o f  
her com m un ication ; agen ts in  interaction  can  q u ick ly  or s lo w ly  vary the top ic o f co m ­
m u n ication  over  tim e and, con sequ en tly , the n um ber o f tim es th ey  refer to the top ic
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by using some cultural sign. The second dimension is related to the loudness' of the 
agent's voice, that is, the capacity to reach more recipients beyond the direct parti­
cipants in the interaction. The combination of these two dimensions produces four 
types of communicative strategies, as shown in Figure 4.1.
This framework poses some interesting research questions. In this chapter, I study 
one of them. If the capability of reaching recipients and the frequency of changing the 
topic are as important for the emergence of symbolic communication as sociological 
theory argues, then those dimensions must have some impact on the agents' ability to 
produce and disseminate their own cultural signs across the population. Specifically, 
there might be one communicative strategy that is more advantageous for spreading 
cultural signs than others.
4.3 The Simulation
In order to study the previous theoretical framework an ABM has been developed tak­
ing into account some spatial characteristics. The aim of this simulation is to clarify 
to what extent the two dimensions affect the emergence and evolution of symbolic 
communication. I want to understand whether those dimensions, and specifically the 
communicative strategies that the combination of them produce, have some effect on 
the agents' ability to generalise their own cultural signs. This simulation is based on 
existing research about the emergence of lexicons (Oliphant, 1996; Steels, 1996, 2003; 
Steels and Belpaeme, 2005; Vogt and Coumans, 2003; Vogt and Haasdijk, 2008). Ac­
cording to Vogt and Coummans' (2003) categorisation, the communicative interac­
tions between agents in our simulation resemble the Observational Game, in which the 
agents establish joint attention over one single object and then communicate about it. 
However, I made here some important modifications to the observational game: (1) 
the agents are embodied in a spatial configuration, (2) they have different behaviours, 
and (3) communicative interactions can involve more than two agents.
By convention, in conformity with previous research in the area, the communicative 
system will be called a shared lexicon, a set of associations among meanings and cul­
tural signs called words. A  lexicon is shared by the whole population of agents at the 
end of the simulation. Our interest is in understanding which communicative strategy
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is best at allowing a group of agents to influence the shared lexicon. As a measure of 
success in disseminating words, I use the number of words that each communicative 
strategy, represented by a group of agents endowed with that strategy, inserts into the 
shared lexicon. Let us now define formally the main components of the model.
4.3.1 Agent Behaviour and Objects
Let there be a set of agents A  =  {ai,...,an} and a set of objects O = {oi,...,04} 
placed within the world. The agent population is split into four groups gi, where 
i G {1,2,3,4}. Vo, : a e  A, a is assumed to see objects o e  O ’, produce utterances 
ua consisting of a word w; hear the utterances un that other agents produce; and ran­
domly move across the world.
An agent's utterance ua has an audibility radius ra. An agent's speed of movement is 
measured by the number of steps it takes in each simulation tick, the step length sa. 
Vo : o E O, o is assumed to have a fixed visibility area v (i.e., all the objects have 
the same visibility area and the grid was built in such a way that the visibility areas 
do not overlap). Both r  and s can vary between the agents according to their group 
membership.
In this model, the audibility radius ra is our operationalisation of the communicational 
dimension Capability of Reaching Recipients (CRR), because the larger an agent's aud­
ibility radius, the more recipients it can reach with its utterances. The second opera­
tionalisation is less obvious. In this model, step length s is our operationalisation of the 
communicational dimension Frequency of Changing the Topic (FCT). Because the objects 
are placed at regular intervals within the world and the agents are randomly moving 
across the world, the shorter the step length, the longer the agents will be participat­
ing in communicative interactions about the same object (either 'speaking' or 'hearing' 
about it).
4.3.2 Communicative Interactions
A communicative interaction I  always involves one object o e  O and two or more 
agents, where one of them is a speaker sa E A (who utters a word w with a given r) and 
at least one is a hearer (or recipient) hai E A, where i is the group to which h belongs, 
and sa ^ hai. The hearer hai must both see the object and hear the speaker's voice.
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Therefore, I  = {o ,sa,h ai}. In each communicative interaction there is one and only 
one object visible to the agents and this object becomes the topic of communication2.
Therefore, the lexicon is implemented as an association between a word w and a topic 
o measured by a value k called the score. Each time a word w is heard by an agent hai, 
the score for this word w and the topic o is increased or decreased depending on the 
result of the communicative interaction, called in this simulation the zchatty game'3.
Four speakers—one from each group—are randomly selected every simulated time 
step or tick. A typical chatty game can be described as follows. The speaker searches 
its own lexicon for words that are associated with the topic and selects the word-topic 
association that has the highest score k. If the speaker fails to find a matching associ­
ation, it invents a new word and adds the word-topic association to the lexicon with 
an initial association score of k =  0.01. The word is communicated to the hearer(s). If 
the hearer(s) succeeds in finding an association between the heard word and the topic 
within its own lexicon, the chatty game is a success. Otherwise it fails. All the agents 
involved in the dialogue know the outcome. Depending on the outcome, the lexicon 
is adapted as follows:
• If the game is a failure, the hearer(s) adopts the word and adds the word-topic 
association to its lexicon with an initial association score of k =  0.01. The speaker 
lowers the used association score to kz =  ij-k, where 77 =  0.9 is a constant learning 
parameter.
• If the game is a success, all the agents increase the association score of the used 
association tOKf = rj-K, + l  —rj and they inhibit all competing word-topic asso­
ciations to kz = 77 • K.
Thus, although agents randomly couple words to meanings, they also can learn word- 
topics associations from context and observation. They record the success of a particu­
2In the rare case an agent, speaker or hearer, is located over the boundary of two visibility areas, it
selects one random object as the ch a tty  gam e's topic.
3Although previous research has named this kind of simulation a Language Gam e (and our model is
based on that research), I want to avoid the linguistic and even philosophical implications of that name.
A detailed explanation of this kind of game is given in (Vogt and Coumans, 2003, Section 3.4).
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lar word-topic pair and preferably use that in future communications. This establishes 
a positive feedback mechanism: a word that is used a lot will have a high communic­
ative success and will therefore be used even more.
4.3.3 The Lexicon
A cultural sign or word w is a sequence of four letters drawn from a shared alpha­
bet, where for convenience the first letter identifies the group origin of that word and 
the three remaining letters are randomly chosen following the rule Consonant - Vowel - 
Consonant. The shared lexicon is operationalised as the words which are related with 
the topics at the end of the simulation. Because this simulation allows me to identify 
the group origin of each word, I can count the number of words that one group dis­
seminates over the whole population.
It is important to stress, finally, that this model reproduces the conditions for the 
Gavagai! problem or the 'indeterminacy of meaning' (in Quine's classical conceptu­
alisation in philosophy), also referred to as the 'theorem of double contingency' (in 
the Parsonian tradition in sociology) and, finally, the 'improbability of mutual under­
standing' (in Luhmann's words). All these concepts state that, as discussed in Chapter 
3 (see Section 3.5), when learning the meaning of a novel sign, that sign may have an 
infinite number of possible meanings, so understanding becomes almost impossible 
when the speakers do not share a common linguistic ground (which is in fact the 
situation our ancestors experienced when they started to use the first cultural signs). 
The agents in this simulation are endowed with their own ontologies and they can­
not access other agents' ontologies. They are separated; their lexicon do not merge. 
They only get feedback on the communicative success of an interaction, not on what 
meanings were used. By this way, following Steels' methodological recommenda­
tion, the agents acquire "word-object and meaning-object relations which are compat­
ible with the word-object co-occurrences they overtly observe but without observing 
word-meaning relations directly." (Steels and Kaplan, 2002, p. 55)
4.3.4 Initialisation
The simulation allows us to explore the effects of varying the two parameters. Capab­
ility of Reaching Recipients (CRR) and Frequency of Changing the Topic (FCT), on the
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lik elih ood  that an  agen t is able to spread  its w ord -top ic  assoc ia tion s to other agen ts  
and esp ecia lly  to  other grou p s. To stu d y  the effect o f sp atia l location , the agen ts are 
g iv e n  the ability  to m o v e  on  a square grid , d iv id ed  in to  four quadrants co lou red  green, 
yellow , b lu e  and v io let. The reg ion  for each  grou p  o f agen ts is represented  b y  the cor­
resp on d in g  colour. G roups o f 10 agen ts are located  at ran d om  p o sitio n s on  each  o f the  
four quadrants at the start o f each  run. D u rin g  the sim u la tion , the agen ts can  m o v e  
freely  over the grid. A lso  located  in  each  quadrant is on e exam p le o f each  o f four ob ­
jects: a flow er, a leaf, a tree and a p lant (represented  b y  ap propriately  sh a p ed  icons). 
Figure 4.2 sh o w s a v ie w  o f the square grid.
Figure 4.2: S im u la tio n  v ie w . A g e n ts  (c irc les) a n d  th e ir  reg io n s  a re  re p re se n te d  b y  co rre sp o n d in g  
co lo u rs . T h e sa m e  f o u r  o b jec ts  are p la c e d  in  each reg ion . A g e n ts  p la y  th e  'c h a tty  g a m e ' to  label th em  
u s in g  a r b i tr a r y  s ig n s .
M easu rem ents on  this grid  are in  p ixel units. Each quadrant is 40 u n its w id e  (so  the  
grid  as a w h o le  is 8 0 x 8 0 ). A t each  tim e step , every  agen t m o v e s  on e step  length . A n  
agen t per grou p  is ran d om ly  se lected  to be a speaker and it attem p ts to carry ou t a 
C hatty G am e w ith  all the hearers w ith in  range, w ith  the nearest object as the topic. 
The sim u la tion  con tin u es u n til the em ergen t shared lex icon  con ta ins on e w ord  for
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each object (i.e., the shared lexicon contains four words). The model was built using 
NetLogo 4.1.3 (2011a).
4.4 Results and Analyses
In the following subsections I will explore the results brought about by the agents' 
interactions when they are allowed to move throughout all the environment, and I 
show that the system describes an information cascade that leads the agents towards 
asymptotic learning (Subsection 4.4.1). Then, I define an experimental setting in order 
to identify which, among the four communicative strategies I described in Figure 4.1, 
is the best to spread regional or local cultural signs to the agent population (Subsection 
4.4.2). Finally, I study the social network of the best strategy and define a simple rule 
to predict the likelihood that different groups spread their own local lexicons to the 
population (Subsection 4.4.3).
4.4.1 Spreading and Damping
This simple ABM allows us to analyse the dynamics by which dispersed and decent­
ralised lexicons held by autonomous agents aggregates and converge towards one 
single communicative system. As explained in the previous section, the lexicon form­
ation mechanism proposed in this ABM assumes that agents have the capability to 
create new words (by random combinations of letters from the alphabet) and asso­
ciate them with a set of objects. These associations can be detected and learned in 
'conversations' with other agents, when both the word is known and a possible mean­
ing (or topic) can be derived from the context, since, in this simulation, speaker and 
hearer establish joint attention. Evidently, when the audibility radius is greater than 
the visibility area, it is not possible for the agent or agents (i.e., the hearers) beyond 
the object's visibility area to establish joint attention with the speaker, so they do not 
take part in the chatty game. However, due to the generative capacity of each agent, 
this adoption of words does not guarantee coherence because different subgroups of 
agents (in the extreme case each agent) may create their own words and associations 
instead.
Figure 4.3 shows the lexicon formation over time. As it can be seen there, the pro­
cess describes an early stage of creativity and search, in which different agents acting
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Figure 4.3: E vo lu tio n  o f  sh a red  lex ico n  in  o n e  s im u la t io n  ru n  w ith  no b o u n d a r ie s  a m o n g  reg io n s , so  
a g e n ts  can  m o v e  a ll o v e r  th e  e n v ir o n m e n t. I t  is c lear th a t th e  m o d e l d e sc r ib e s  in fo rm a tio n  a g g re g a tio n  
o r (so c ia l) a s y m p to t ic  lea rn in g .
as sp eak ers in trodu ce n e w  s ig n s or w o rd s to n am e the d ifferent objects an d  try to co ­
ord inate their b eh av iou rs in  the 'chatty gam e'. S ince all the agen ts h a v e  em p ty  o n to ­
log ies, and  in  the absence o f an  ap propriated  s ig n  th ey  can  create an d  utter on e, m an y  
w o rd s are created (around 17 w o rd s per object). The m a x im u m  n um ber o f w o rd s cre­
ated at early  stages o f the sim u la tion  are a lw ays lo w er  than  the total n um ber o f agen ts  
in  the sim u lation , sin ce o n ly  4 agen ts are se lected  at each  sim u la tion  step  to  p la y  the  
role o f speaker, so  som e agen ts (i.e., hearers) can learn and in tern alise the w ord -top ic  
association  p o sed  b y  the speakers. A t th is stage o f the sim u la tion , a large n u m b er of 
agen ts receive n o isy  s ig n s ab out the state o f the w orld . B ecause o f th is n o ise , co m ­
m u n ication  is n ot su ccessfu l at th is stage. C ultural sig n s com p ete  a m on g  them  for the  
sam e topic, so  they can h ave  the h ig h est assoc ia tion  v a lu e  k in the agen ts' on to lo g ies . 
A t the en d , as sh o w n  in  Table 4.1, just on e s in g le  sign  per object cam e to d om in ate  to 
exp ress each  referent.
This p rocess d em onstrate the com p lex  ad ap tive  and se lf-organ isin g  structure (M iller
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and Page, 2007) of this simulated communicative system. If we understand self­
organisation as the spontaneous formation of dissipative structures by the amplifica­
tion and damping of random fluctuations, a mechanism to achieve coherence from the 
bottom-up, without central control, then the emergent lexicon presented here seems to 
be another instance of the same process. In this case, an array of independent agents 
with extremely simple learning capabilities are able to interact in nontrivial ways and 
constitute their own linguistic environment', one in which synonymy and ambigu­
ity is reduced, and robustness emerges. The initial incoherence, brought about by the 
expansion of local or individual lexicons, is rapidly mitigated and, as a result, many 
cultural signs start to fade. This similarity with natural languages is remarkable. Many 
authors have addressed the role of synonymy in natural languages. Steels and Kaplan 
(2002), for instance, claimed that there is a tendency in natural languages towards co­
herence and indeed a coherent language is 'better' for several reasons. I return to this 
point later.
Since the social learning is convergent towards one single word-topic association, 
this simulation is a good example of the process known as 'information cascades' 
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992,1998), in which large groups of individuals abandon what­
ever private information they have and follow the 'wisdom of crowds' (Surowiecki, 
2004). Actually, following Acemoglu and his colleagues, the results in Figure 4.1 
demonstrate that these information cascades can bring the system towards asymtotic 
learning, a phenomenon believed to occur only when individuals choose which in­
formation they hold according to payoff functions (Acemoglu et al., 2011). However, 
contrary to that view, the agents in this model do not make any rational decision; they
Table 4.1: An example of an emergent lexicon after asymptotic learning (for each label, first letter 
represents group-origin*)
Objects
Leaf Tree Plant Flower
Labels v-gex b-lor v-gut g-tik
*b = blue; g = green; v = violet; y = yellow.
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are just influenced by the feedback they receive from their environment. However, 
the result is the same: individuals converge in their information towards an optimal 
solution in which synonymy is damped and just one word-topic association per ob­
ject prevails. Finally, Table 4.1 presents another interesting phenomenon: the yellow 
group was not able to spread any sign in the population, while the violet group was 
able to spread two signs. Is there any reason to explain these differences? Since we 
can identify the group-origin of the different signs that have been stabilised as a shared 
communicative system, we can study whether the process of spreading signs in this 
artificial society is an stochastic one or whether there is some mechanism that under­
pins this phenomenon.
4.4.2 Communicative Strategies
In order to assess which kind of communicative strategy can facilitate and increase the 
likelihood that a single group will be able to spread its local lexicons to the population, 
experiments were carried out by setting the values of CRR and FCT of the agents 
in one quadrant, while leaving the values of these parameters for the agents in the 
other three quadrants at their arbitrarily chosen default settings (CRR = 13 and FCT = 
0.7). 121 such experiments were performed, by sweeping the first quadrants' agents 
through combinations of CRR and FCT values, varying CRR from 8 units to 18 units, 
and FCT from 0.2 increasing by 0.2 to 1.2. The number of words coming from each 
group, as well as the number of words in the final shared lexicon, were averaged over 
200 runs of each experiment. Statistical analysis of these results was then carried out 
using the statistical package, R (2011).
Figure 4.4 shows the number of words in the shared lexicon at the end of the runs 
contributed by the experimental group, plotted against CRR and FCT. Using OLS re­
gression, a best-fitting plane is also shown. Analysis of the data using simultaneous 
multiple linear regression revealed that the combined predictors explained around 
96 percent of the variance in the number of words the groups were able to spread, 
r2 =  0.96, F (2 ,118) =  1475, p < 0.001. The plane slopes negatively along the FCT 
dimension, showing that the greater the frequency of topic changing, the fewer words 
there are in the shared lexicon (/? — —0.44,p < 0.001). The positive slope along the
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Figure 4.4: R eg ress io n  p la n e  o b ta in e d  f r o m  th e  s im u la t io n s  r e s id ts  a fte r  e x p lo r in g  th e  p a ra m e te r  space . 
T he m u lt ip le  reg re ssio n  m o d e l w a s  d e f in ed  w ith  th e  'n u m b ers  o f iu o r d s '  th e  g r o u p s  w e re  ab le  to  sp re a d  
in  th e  p o p u la tio n  a s th e  o u tp u t  va r ia b le , a n d  F C T  a n d  C R R  as th e  e x p la n a to ry  va ria b les .
CRR d im en sio n  in d icates that the greater the cap ab ility  o f reach ing other agen ts, the  
larger the n um ber o f w ord s in  the shared  lex icon  (/3 =  0 .1 1 ,p  =  0.001). I con clu d e that 
a group  o f agen ts e n d o w e d  w ith  a h ig h  CRR and a lo w  FCT w o u ld  h a v e  the h ig h est  
lik e lih ood  o f sp read in g  part or all o f its w ord -top ic  a ssoc ia tion s to the other grou p s. 
So the b est com m u n ica tive  strategy  is g iv en  b y  quadrant n u m b er three in  F igure 4.1.
T hese correlations p o se  an  o b v io u s question: W hy w o u ld  'sp eak in g  lou d ly ' (h igh  
CRR) an d  'm o v in g  s lo w ly ' (low  FCT) h ave  the h ig h est lik e lih ood  o f affecting the  
shared  lexicon? I address th is q u estion  in  three co n secu tiv e  steps: (1 )1  h igh ligh t s e v ­
eral a sp ects that m igh t in flu en ce the lik elih ood  o f affectin g  the shared lexicon; (2) I 
p rop ose a w a y  to m easu re these asp ects and, finally, (3) I id en tify  the extent to w h ich  
each  o f th ose asp ects can alter the probability  o f sp read in g  a w ord  in  the shared lex ­
icon.
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4.4.3 Social N etw orks and C om m unicative Behaviours
B ecause I w a n t to look  in  great d eta il at the orig in  o f a s in g le  w ord , our an a lysis  is  
perform ed  o n  a sam p le ob ta in ed  b y  a sin g le  run  o f the sim u lation . For each  tim e- 
step  I recorded the speaker, the hearer(s), the top ic o f the con versation  and the u ttered  
w ord . S ince I am  interested  in  m on itorin g  the p rocess of creating a w ord  and the w a y  
this sp reads to the w h o le  p op u la tion , the data w a s  filtered, first to  focu s on  a s in g le  
object (e.g ., flow er), and th en  g ettin g  rid o f all data w h ere the u ttered  w o rd  d id  n ot 
su b seq u en tly  change: from  that p o in t on w ard s, the w ord  reached  prim acy am o n g  the  
rest o f the w ord s. That is, I con sid er all data u n til the step  w h ere the final w o rd  for 
that object em erges. This is the p o in t w h ere the w o rd  reaches the h ig h est score k  for 
that object in  the lexicon . Figure 4.5(a) sh o w s the num ber o f w o rd s created for each  
object over tim e. The d ot on  each  lin e  in d icates the p o in t after w h ich  the u ttered  w ord  
d o es n ot change. A t that p o in t, all the agen ts a lready share a com m on  w ord -top ic  
association . This filtering p erm its clearer ob serva tion  o f the m ech an ism s in v o lv ed  in  
creating and sp read in g  a certain  w ord-object association .
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(a) Filtering Process Simulation 1. (b) Network Simulation 1.
Figure 4.5: A n a ly s is  S im u la tio n  2, in w h ich  v io le t  g r o u p  h ad  th e  b est c o m m u n ic a tiv e  s t r a te g y  (i.e ., 
co m b in a tio n  o f  p a ra m e te rs  F C T  a n d  C R R ), a n d  the o th e r  th ree  g r o u p s  w e re  se t  a t  n o rm a l v a lu e s .
I sam p led  a sim u la tion  w ith  C R R  =  18 and F C T  =  0.2 for on e grou p — in  th is case.
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the 'violet' group—and C R R  = 8 and F C T  = 1.2 for the other groups. According 
to the OLS regression shown in Figure 4.4, I chose this particular settings because 
it guarantees the highest probability that the word, associated to the selected object, 
comes from the experimental group. As expected, most of the words in the shared 
lexicon come from the violet group (three of four words, in this case for the objects 
flower, plant, and tree).
I kept track of social connections in the model with the hypergraph, Q, for all the in­
teractions among the agents during the simulated time. Every connection or edge in G 
represents a 'chatty game' played between the speaker and the hearer. These relations 
are visualised as a directed network. Thus, for a speaker s g and a hearer hg, where the 
subscript g  G [1,4] represents the agent's group, Gs h defines the speaker-hearer con­
nection. Figure 4.5(b) shows the relations among agents who engaged in the process 
of creating and sharing the violet group's word for the object 'flower'. Circles rep­
resent agents, coloured according to their group. Lines represent interactions, shaded 
according to the number of times the speaker has uttered a word to the hearer; thus, 
the darker it is, the more times a speaker has uttered a word to the same hearer. The 
agents are positioned in Figure 4.5(b) according to the number of agents they have 
heard from (æ-axis) or spoken to (y-axis).
Several features of the 'violet' group can be observed in Figure 4.5(b). Firstly they are 
mostly on the left hand side of the plot; this means that they hear from fewer speak­
ers than agents in other groups. Secondly several agents from the 'violet' group are 
located at the top of the plot; this means that they speak to a greater number of agents 
compared to other groups. Thirdly, there is a high occurrence of reciprocal relations 
among agents of the 'violet' group because the links connecting them are darker. These 
observations allow us to highlight three characteristics that drive the evolution of the 
model: (1) the capability of hearing from other groups; (2) the capability of speaking 
to other groups; and (3) the mutual relations among agents within the same group. 
The relationship detected by the linear regression analysis allows us to clarify the cor­
relation, but it does not provide any information about the actual causal mechanism 
(on the notion of mechanism I am using here, see Chapter 1, Subsection 1.6). For this 
reason, I need to establish the behavioural rule that, at the individual level, allows
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agents to spread their locally created signs. I note the existence of such behavioural 
rules here, as a claim that I intend to prove in the rest of the Chapter.
Claim 4.1. There exists a behavioural rule that increases the probability P  of any group spread­
ing its own word-topic association.
My main focus is therefore whether there is an individual behaviour that will lead to 
information aggregation in the population. This is captured by the notion of asymp­
totic learning. In order to define the effect of the three characteristics on the groups' 
capability of spreading their words discussed in the previous paragraph, I will form­
alise each of them. The capability of hearing from other groups Hg and the capability 
of speaking to other groups Sg are measured as follow:
Definition 4.1. Hearing capability of group g
Let P  be the set of all groups. Let a be an agent of group g, and b be an agent of another 
group h. Let / a& be the occurrence of the relation between a speaker a and a hearer b.
Let H A a be the hearing count of agent a, H A a — I Iba\. Then:
\ V b e h c P - { g }  J
H g = Y .  H A « (4.1)
\fa€g
Definition 4.2. Speaking capability of group g
Let S A a be the speaking count of agent a, S A a = 1  ]T) Iab ]. Then:
\ V b e h c P - { g }  J
Sg = J 2  S A ,  (4.2)
'iaCg
These two measures give us an idea about the overall number of outgoing and in­
coming links from a group towards other groups, taking into account the occurrence 
of each 'chatty game'. The mutual relation between agents within the same group is 
measured using a definition of distance: the smaller the distance between two agents, 
the stronger is their mutual relation.
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Definition 4.3. Mutual relation between two agents a and bfrom the same group g
Definition 4.4. Distance between two agents a and bfrom the same group g:
Let m  be the maximum value of r^b between all the pairs of agents within all the 
groups. Then:
The scalar k scales the measurement. For simplicity I assume k = 100. Finally, I classify 
the mutual relations between agents within the same group; the overall value of the 
mutual relation for each group is a function of the number of dyads that engages in 
chatty games N  and their distance d9ab. I define this last element as follow:
Definition 4.5. Overall mutual relation value for a group g
The last step of the analysis is to find a relationship among the three characteristics 
Hg/ 01 g and Vg.
For each group, the greater the overall mutual relation value and the speaking capab­
ility and the smaller the hearing capability, the greater is the likelihood of affecting the 
shared lexicon. This relationship summarises our understanding of the mechanism 
involved in the evolution of the model. The next proposition provides a measure and 
the behavioural rule that preducts which group has the highest likelihood of affecting 
the shared lexicon.
C  =  [ ( ^  +  4 a )  -  l(4 b  -  4 a ) |]  ' (4.3)
(4.5)
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( V g  • S g )
Proposition 4.1. Let Lg = — —----be the likelihood of group g spreading its own word topic
Hg
association. Then, the probability P  of affecting the shared lexicon for a group g is given by
ps =  - f f - ■ 100 (4.6)
g=l
Measurements made on the example run using these definitions are shown in Table
4.2 as Simulation 1. The last row in this table indicates the probability p for every 
group of affecting the shared lexicon. The pg value for the Violet' group is by far the 
greatest in Simulation 1 (99 percent), which was expected since this group had the 
best parameter combination (i.e., communicative strategy). In order to test the valid­
ity of our analysis I performed another simulation where all the groups had the same 
value of CRR and FCT and I analysed the information for one word-topic association; 
in this simulation I choose to analyse the emergent words corresponding to the topic 
'flower'. Since the agents have the same behavioural attributes (set by similar values 
of CRR and FCT), in this scenario it is a matter of chance which group has the highest 
likelihood of spreading a word within the shared lexicon, because all the groups have 
the same parameters. However, performing the analysis presented above I can cal­
culate the probability that a group affects the shared lexicon. The word associated 
with the object 'flower' in the shared lexicon came from the yellow group. Figure 
4.6(a) shows the filtering process. Figure 4.6(b) shows the relations among agents in 
the second simulation and Table 4.2 illustrates the measurements for this experiment, 
following the mathematical definitions proposed earlier ('Simulation 2' in Table 4.2).
Figure 4.6(b) depicts the hypergraph Ç of 'chatty games' played by the agents in Sim­
ulation 2. In this simulation, as I said, all the agents have the same value of CRR and 
FCT. As we can see in that figure, the aggregation pattern of one group of agents found 
in Simulation 1 (see Subfigure 4.5(b)) is not present. By observing this plot we cannot 
infer the group origin of the sign as we did before. Group members are scattered along 
a linear trend, which demonstrates that some agents were able to communicate more 
often, although this feature is not exclusive of any group in particular. In the absence
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Figure 4.6: A n a ly s is  o f  S im u la tio n  2 , in  w h ich  a ll th e  a g e n ts  h ad  th e  sa m e  c o m m u n ic a tiv e  s t r a te g y  (i.e ., 
th e  sa m e  c o m b in a tio n  o f  p a ra m e te rs  F C T  a n d  C R R ), so  th ere  is n o  c o m m u n ic a tiv e  a d v a n ta g e  a m o n g  
th em .
o f an y b eh av iou ra l ad van tage, all the agen t h ave, prim a facie, the sam e prob ability  p  to  
spread  their lex icon s. H ow ever, b y  u s in g  P rop osition  4 . 1 , 1 can  ca lcu late (ex-post) the  
p robability  p  that an y  grou p  h as to spread  its o w n  lex icon . Table 4.2 sh o w s the resu lts  
o f su ch  an a lysis, as S im u lation  2.
Table 4.2: S im u la tio n  m e a su re m e n ts  o f  th e  g r o u p  p r o b a b ili ty  to  sp re a d  o n e  w o r d - to p ic  a s so c ia tio n  to  
th e  p o p u la tio n . T he la s t  r o w  sh o w s  th e  p ro b a b ili ty  p f o r  each  g ro u p .
M easu rem ents
S im u lation  1 S im u lation  2
Y ellow G reen Blue V iolet Y ellow G reen Blue V iolet
V9 7.99 5.71 1.75 490.27 232.78 1.58 56.81 4.46
s9 117 161 102 842 278 157 213 107
H 9 440 399 376 76 144 253 160 198
p 9 0.05% 0.04% 0.01% 99.9% 85.05% 0.19% 14.31% 0.46%
A s it w a s m en tion ed  before, the w ord  that p reva iled  for the topic 'flow er ' in S im u la ­
tion  2 cam e from  the y e llo w  group . Table 4.2 sh o w s that the h igh est p g w a s in d eed
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for group yellow, at 85 percent. This result demonstrates that the behavioural rule 
stated in Proposition 4.1 is valid even when the agents share the same communicative 
strategy, so no one has an advantage. Evidently, the particular values of vgr Sg/ and Hg 
are defined by stochastic processes. But for analytical purposes, what matters the most 
is to know the behavioural rule, the precise way in which these elements are related. 
I established that relationship when I defined Lg and pg in Proposition 4.1. Finally I 
have to stress that this analysis does not take into account an important aspect that 
drives the evolution of the model. It considers only already defined groups. What 
could be of interest to investigate is the role played by mixed groups. Sometimes the 
analysis shows that a certain group has a higher probability of affecting the lexicon, 
although the word in the shared lexicon comes from another group. This happens 
because there are mixed groups, where, for instance, an agent from the blue group 
exploits the high overall mutual relation value of the green group and spreads its own 
word in the shared lexicon.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter I have described a computer simulation about the emergence of sym­
bolic communication that considers some spatial constraints. This simulation aimed 
to model the emergence of a symbolic communicative system over time in a way that 
reproduces two important evolutionary pressures: the improbability that one cultural 
sign means the same for different agents and the improbability that speakers can reach 
recipients beyond those present. Based on these improbabilities, I defined a theoret­
ical model that combines two dimensions: the capability of reaching recipients, which 
was operationalised as the audibility radius, and the frequency of changing the topic, 
which was operationalised as the step length. The combination of these two dimen­
sions results in different communicative strategies, modelled here by different groups 
of agents. By using this simulation I have clarified what agent behaviour most effect­
ively spreads their own cultural signs across the population and by a further analysis 
we have explained why that is the case.
The model shows that the group of agents able to reach more hearers and less prone to 
changing the topic has the highest likelihood of affecting the shared lexicon. In terms
4.5. Summary 111
of agents' actions, that group manifests some sort of iterative behaviour: these agents 
perform many communicative interactions about the same topic. This behaviour leads 
these agents to share a strong word-topic association widely. The interaction of this 
group of agents with other groups (with different behaviours) brought about another 
effect: the agents are not particularly aware of the other groups' word-topic associ­
ations. They move around a small area, and hardly explore the rest of the world (i.e., 
they hardly change their topic). The spreading of their lexicon is in fact carried out 
by the other groups, particularly those which move more quickly (i.e., they frequently 
change their topic).
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Chapter
The Evolution of Cooperative 
Breeding
Years before a mother's previous children were self- 
sufficient, she w ould  give birth to another infant, and the care 
these dependent youngsters required w ould  be far in excess 
of what a foraging mother by herself could regularly sup­
ply. Both before birth and especially afterward, the mother 
needed help from others.
Sarah Hrdy, M o th e r s  a n d  O th e r s ,  2009
5.1 Introduction
Some of the most fundamental questions concerning our evolutionary origins, our 
interactions, and the organisation of society are centred around the issues of coopera­
tion (i.e., when two or more individuals engage in joint actions that result in mutual 
benefit) and altruism or 'pure cooperation' (i.e., acts that benefit others at a personal 
cost). A wide range of phenomena can be related to the human-specific tendency to 
cooperate with others, from human morality and language to the emergence of social 
institutions (Boyd, 2006; Nowak, 2006; Warneken et al., 2007). Since the classical obser­
vations made by Mauss (2001) about 'the gift economy', social scientists have known
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that social behaviour is permeated by networks of cooperation and reciprocity. Recent 
advances in cognitive sciences have unravelled some of the biological mechanisms 
that underpin this hardwired disposition to cooperate and allow the development of 
the tools and technologies we have invented, the ways in which we communicate and 
represent the physical and social world, and the complex institutions we have estab­
lished.
As discussed in Chapter 3, these findings indicate that the development, transmission, 
and improvement of cultural artefacts (both material and symbolic) are the result of a 
species-unique mode of social cognition: the cognitive ability to understand conspecif- 
ics as intentional beings (Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello and Rakoczy, 2003). Thanks 
to this unique mode of social cognition, less developed or not present at all in other 
primates (Call and Tomasello, 1999; Herrmann et al., 2007,2010, although see de Waal 
et al., 2008; Preston and de Waal, 2002), human beings are able to cooperate because 
they can imagine themselves 'in the shoes' of some other person, so they can under­
stand the intentional meaning of other individuals' actions. In a distinctive difference 
with other primates, humans participate in 'collaborative activities', such as gather­
ing, hunting, and breeding. In these collective and often highly ritualised behaviours, 
they are also able to learn in a genuine social way; not just from the other but through 
the other. Because of these characteristics, humans are the only species biologically 
adapted for participating in cooperative activities involving shared intentions, that is, 
the ability of sharing with others goals and intentions, along with the desire to do 
so (Plotkin, 2003; Tomasello, 2000). Capacities for learning from each other and the 
sophisticated cooperation that flowed from this enhanced readiness for social cogni­
tion led to unprecedented advances in the realm of culture—with cumulative cultural 
knowledge or gradual advances that eventually took on a life of their own.
Cultural evolution was only possible when this cognitive ability to understand the 
others as intentional beings and the consequent networks of cooperation and recipro­
city that it made possible were fully established. These were the critical cognitive traits 
that emerged and set the ancestors of humans apart from other non-human primates. 
The emergence of uniquely powerful forms of social cognition and cooperation almost 
certainly preceded the geographical spread of a species whose numbers did not begin
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to really expand until 70,000 years ago (Hrdy, 2009). But what was the initial payoff? 
How could a cooperative and hypersocial primate evolve in the first place? What kind 
of selective pressure transformed our ancestors into 'obligate collaborators'?
In this chapter, I hypothesise that the socio-ecological pressure that made possible 
the emergence of these networks of cooperation and reciprocity was constituted after 
some dramatic physiological changes that the genus Homo experienced in comparison 
to earlier ancestors. I have already discussed the specific details of these physiological 
changes in Chapter 3, so here I will just refer to their main characteristics. The hypo­
thesis I want to test can be put in two different, although related, parts. Firstly, body 
changes (e.g., larger relative brain sizes, larger bodies, slower rates of maturation and 
growth) caused greater energy requirements for mothers during gestation, lactation 
and during the offspring's extended period of maternal dependency, which greatly 
increased female reproductive costs, compared with male reproductive costs. Because 
of these high energy demands over mothers, evolution favoured a series of changes 
in biology, behaviour and social arrangements that combined made possible a form of 
cooperative breeding similar, but not identical to, equivalent breeding systems present 
in other primates. In this cooperative breeding, related and unrelated helpers cooper­
ate with mothers in providing child care, even when these mothers do not reciproc­
ate. Secondly, the emergence of this non-reciprocal behaviour produced a sustained 
population growth, for mothers receiving help from others were able to reproduce 
faster, producing more and healthier offspring. Faster reproductive rates increased 
the population size and, consequently, the overall social density, so the repertoire of 
skilful individuals producing cultural innovations—or social models to imitate— also 
increased.
In order to test these hypotheses, the chapter reports the results of an ABM that 
combines evolutionary biology, genetic computation and game theory. The object­
ive of this model is to simulate the endogenous emergence of cooperative breeding, 
an evolutionary achievement that compensated for the differences in reproductive 
costs between human males and females that the hominin lineage experienced during 
phylogeny. The model also allows us to understand the effects of these cooperative 
strategies on population dynamics and study the potential regimes of cultural com­
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plexity that different population sizes could sustain. The chapter begins by suggest­
ing that the physiological modifications experienced during human phylogeny (i.e., a 
reduction in sexual body size dimorphism, longer periods of infant dependency and 
faster female reproductive rates, which greatly increased the reproductive costs for 
females (see Chapter 3, especially Subsection 3.5.2) are necessary to explain the social 
organisation of early humans, in particular the evolutionary emergence of cooperative 
breeding (Section 5.2). Later, to test the proposed hypotheses, an ABM is introduced, 
describing in detail its entities, properties and modelled mechanisms (Section 5.3). 
The model results and analyses are reported in the following section (Section 5.4). The 
chapter finishes with a synthesis of the main simulation results (Section 5.5).
5.2 The Emergence of Cooperative Breeding
In Chapter 3 (see Section 3.5.2), we indicated that the hominin lineage experienced a 
series of morphological and biological changes that greatly increased the reproductive 
costs to mothers. Thus, having considered the relative smaller size at weaning of hu­
man babies, the long period of body maturity that follows weaning (i.e., childhood), 
the consequent extended period of dependency on adults for food and protection that 
children require in order to survive, the comparatively faster reproductive rates that 
human females have, and the evolutionary tendency towards reduced sexual body 
size dimorphism, it is easy to appreciate the high energy burden that human mothers 
have. The three dimensions tackled in Section 3.5.2 demonstrate that female repro­
ductive effort—defined as the energy investment in breeding a human child—is con­
siderably higher in a threefold sense; (1) it is higher compared with early hominids; 
(2) compared with extant hominids; and (3) compared with the reproductive effort of 
human males. Consequently, it is highly improbable that mothers with such a high 
energy burden could breed by themselves two or more children at the same time, as is 
the case for modem human mothers. Therefore, how could early mothers cope with 
this situation?
The evolution of complex life histories in human beings discussed in Chapter 3 came 
with equally complex levels of life history trade-offs. One of these trade-offs, possibly 
the most important one, is an innate tendency for pro-social behaviours among con-
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specifics; pro-social behaviours aimed to aid and assist mothers and their offspring 
to increase the survival rates of the latter. More precisely, an evolutionary scenario in 
which the biological costs of reproduction for females have skyrocketed during phylo­
geny can bring forth a strong selective pressure for cooperation; that is to say, cooperat­
ive behaviours among related and non-related individuals, devoted to help mothers 
in taking care of their babies, can evolve. In animal behaviour, the care of another non­
related animal's offspring is called 'cooperative breeding', defined as those situations in 
which mothers voluntarily permit access to their infants and many group members 
are actively engaged in providing child care—allomaternal care— thereby increasing 
infants' health and survival (Clutton-Brock, 2002; Riedman, 1982). In a cooperative- 
breeding scenario, helpers—all those who are not the mother and are not genetically 
related—often engage in a variety of pro-social behaviours, such as social grooming, 
active food provisioning and vigilance and protection.
Although rare, cooperative breeding can be found among different vertebrates, ran­
ging from birds to New World monkeys and great apes (Hemelrijk and Luteijn, 1998; 
Lazaro-Perea et al., 2004; Stiver and Alonzo, 2011). The evolutionary advantage of 
this collaborative behaviour is clear. Ross and MacLarnon (2000), after surveying the 
relevant literature, found a positive correlation between the amount of allocare that 
mothers in different anthropoid received and their reproductive rates. This result sug­
gests that mothers in different species of primates allow non-maternal care of their 
infants in order to increase their own reproductive output.
Human beings are the extreme case of alloparental care. According to Hrdy (2009), 
in all the great ape species the mother provides basically 100 percent of childcare. 
In contrast, among humans, across traditional and modern societies, the average fig­
ure is closer to 50 percent. This tremendous difference indicates that humans have a 
much larger social base of support. Participants include siblings of the mother and 
the child, other genetic and social kin, and unrelated men and women of all ages 
(Konner, 2010; Kramer, 2007). This pattern of support for mothers and their weaned 
children is nearly universal in human societies, and goes beyond the natural cooperat­
ive breeding of other mammals, since human societies have extended and reinforced 
this biological trait in cultural institutions such as marriage, collective management of
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mothers' welfare, and gender-role construction (Bentley and Mace, 2009; Bogin, 2009). 
Some authors have referred to this extreme form of cooperative breeding in humans 
as 'the hominin adaptation' (Lancaster, 1983), but Bogin (2010) thinks that it is bet­
ter described with the label 'bio-cultural cooperative breeding' or, more succinctly, 
'bio-cultural reproduction'. All in all, this extreme and highly complex tendency for 
cooperative breeding is an effective behavioural response to the high reproductive ef­
fort that human females have to undertake. Therefore, cooperative breeding might be 
understood as an evolutionary adaptation to reduce the mothers' energy burden of 
reproduction costs.
Such a widespread behaviour seems to be deeply rooted in human cognition, derived 
from the biological basis of human attachment, empathy, and love (Hrdy, 2009; To­
masello, 2009). Recent research (cited in Burkart et al., 2009) has established that 
cooperative breeding is mainly observed in species with pro-social tendencies; spe­
cies endowed with enhanced socio-cognitive abilities and with high social tolerance 
towards related and non-related conspecifics. Therefore, socio-cognitive abilities and 
cooperative breeding seems to be related. Experimental research has found that, in dif­
ferent tests measuring their performance in social cognitive tasks, cooperative breeder 
species outperform independent breeding species—that is, species with exclusive ma­
ternal care—from similar taxa; however, the former species performed lower in non­
social cognitive tasks. Similar conclusions have been obtained from comparisons in 
cognitive tasks performed by human children and adult Pan troglodytes or chimpan­
zees—a well known independent breeding species. For example, in a series of studies, 
Herrmann and her colleagues (2007; 2010) determined that although humans share 
many cognitive skills with nonhuman apes, especially for dealing with the physical 
world, humans have also evolved some specialised and unique skills of social cog­
nition. All these considerations might explain why humans, since their infancy, are 
prone to collaborative activities and social learning. However, these are still prelim­
inary results, and more research is needed to establish the extent of these differences. 
So far, the available evidence indicates that these social cognitive abilities are likely 
to be the evolutionary result of motivational changes triggered by cooperative breed­
ing (Burkart et al., 2009), describing since its emergence a co-evolutionary dynamic
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among three dimensions: human-specific life history, enhanced social cognition, and 
cooperative behaviours.
This co-evolutionary dynamic and its effect on cultural evolution is expressed in dif­
ferent ways. For instance, the evolution of the childhood period allows for an extens­
ive time of cultural learning in which children can be socialised and acquire language 
(Hurford, 1991; Locke and Bogin, 2006; Tomasello, 1996). Another example is the so 
called 'grandmother hypothesis', which establishes (in one of its versions) that the 
long period of post-reproductive lifespan that characterises female humans—in sharp 
contrast to what is observed in other great apes—represents an evolutionary advant­
age to humans, since increased longevity is important in enhancing the inclusive fitness 
of grandmothers who, perhaps as early as the first Homo populations, invested in their 
reproductive-age daughters and their offspring, improving infant and child survival 
rates (Hawkes et al., 1998; O Connell et al., 1999). But these evolutionary changes in 
longevity also have implications for the development of human culture. For instance, 
longevity may be necessary for the transgenerational accumulation and transfer of in­
formation that underpins complex kinship systems and other uniquely human social 
networks (Caspar! and Lee, 2004). The number of generations present in a community, 
together with the presence or absence of fathers and other helpers, can affect the op­
portunities for cultural transmission between different individuals. The ultimate effect 
of this higher population density, made possible only because humans were already 
good at cooperating, is that groups with greater internal cohesion will prevail over 
less cooperative groups (Richerson and Boyd, 2005).
5.3 The Simulation
In order to determine how plausible the hypothesised relation between female re­
productive costs and the emergence of cooperative breeding, I developed an ABM. 
The model examines how differential reproductive effort between sexes influences 
the emergence and maintenance of inter and intra-sex cooperation, which drives the 
system to population growth since female agents produce more offspring. The object­
ive of this simulation is to evaluate, on the one hand, the extent to which cooperative 
breeding can endogenously emerge in a artificial society made of sexually different
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agents in order to compensate for the high reproductive costs of mothers and, on the 
other, to study the effect of this cooperative behaviour on population growth. In par­
ticular, this artificial society allows us to test the hypothesis that big differences in the 
reproductive costs between males and females can bring about cooperative breeding, 
addressing the main characteristics of this behaviour. More specifically, the hypothesis 
I want to test, proposed by history life theory, states that: when the reproductive effort 
of females is higher than the reproductive effort of males, paternal care should evolve, 
for it compensates for the high energy demands that reproduction involves for moth­
ers. As stated previously, a second phenomenon of interest is the possible effect of this 
cooperative breeding on population dynamics. We expect that the emergence of co­
operative breeding, which allows females to increase their reproduction rates, should 
yield sustained population growth. The specific characteristics of this population dy­
namics will be analysed in detail.
In the model, the population is made up of sexually reproducing agents that are en­
dowed with sexual differences—so the population of agents is structured into two 
different classes: males and females. These sexual differences correspond to differ­
ences in the reproductive costs between sexes. The specific instance of cooperative 
breeding that is analysed in the simulation corresponds to 'paternal care' —one form of 
cooperative breeding—in which males share with females the costs of childcare.
The simulation is based on evolutionary game theory and its application to evolutionary 
biology and anthropology (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Gintis, 2000, 2007; Trivers, 
1971). Since we are interested in studying the emergence of a new level of organ­
isation (i.e., a particular structure of cooperation) from interactions of independent 
decision-makers, evolutionary game theory seems to be a good modelling framework 
(Taylor and Nowak, 2007). Game theory is particularly useful to model situations in 
which at least one agent can act to maximise her utility through anticipating the re­
sponses to her actions by one or more other agents. These situations are referred to 
as strategic games, and the agents involved in games are referred to as players1. Each 
player in a game faces a choice of two or more possible strategies. A  strategy is a pre­
determined 'programme of play' that tells the agent what actions to take in response to
^We use the expressions agent and player interchangeably throughout this chapter.
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every possible action other agents might deploy. Therefore, a strategic game captures 
the interaction between players by allowing each player to be affected by the actions 
of all players, not only her own action. It is assumed that each player has subjective 
preferences about the action profile— the list of all players' actions, and that these pref­
erences are consistent— in  the sense that if the player prefers the action a to the action 
b, and the action b to the action c, then she prefers the action a to the action c. Pref­
erences are usually modelled by payoff functions, which associate a number with each 
action in such a way that actions with higher numbers are preferred. More formally, 
the payoff function u represents a player's preference if, for any actions a and b in the 
set of actions A—all the actions that, under some circumstances, are available to the 
player—we have that
u(a) > u{b) <=> the player prefers a to b. (5.1)
Finally, it is a requirement of game theory that the action chosen by a player is at least 
as good, according to her preferences, as every other available action. In evolutionary scen­
arios, game theory has allowed researchers to predict how organisms ought to inter­
act with other organisms in order to enhance their/ztoess—i.e., to produce more off­
spring in some particular environment— by co-evolving their own strategies (Smith, 
1982). In the simulation presented in this chapter, we model the social interactions 
among agents using the Prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod, 1990; Axelrod and Hamilton, 
1981), which has become the leading paradigm to explain cooperative behaviour in 
the biological and the social sciences (Colman, 1995). The prisoner's dilemma is a ca­
nonical example of a game that shows why two players might not cooperate, even if 
it appears that it is in their best interest to do so. The word dilemma is key: players 
are in a situation in which they have to decide on one action among a set of possible 
actions taking into account what the other player should decide, which is uncertain. 
Since in this chapter the interest is in modelling how the relative costs of reproduction 
for males and females affect the evolution of cooperative strategies, we have to explain 
why the prisoner's dilemma is a good theoretical framework to model this situation.
Following the canonical terminology in evolutionary biology (Trivers, 1972), the con­
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cept 'reproductive effort' to identify a particular fitness 'trade-off' is employed. Re­
productive effort refers to all forms of parental expenditure associated with produ­
cing and rearing a child which, at the same time, limits the parents' ability to invest 
in another child. In other words, a fitness trade-off is presumed to exist between the 
immediate fitness increment parents receive from enhancing the survival of their off­
spring and the delayed fitness parents gain from future reproduction, the former com­
ing at the expense of the latter (Clutton-Brock, 1989). Reproductive effort consists of 
two components, parental investment and mating costs. Parental investment measures 
the energy costs of all behaviours that directly enhance the fitness of the current off­
spring. Mating costs measures the energy spent for attracting and accessing sexual 
partners.
In mammals, males and females experience this fitness trade-off in different ways, 
resulting in a taxonomic bias toward maternal care and away from paternal care. This 
difference is explained by the internal gestation and obligatory postpartum suckling 
in mammals, which yields a reproductive difference in the rate at which male and 
female can reproduce: during the long period between gestation and children's ma­
turity (usually after weaning) females cannot reproduce, whilst males can. When this 
situation is combined with the ability of females to care effectively for offspring, this 
reproductive difference results in males focusing on mating effort, through male-male 
competition (or 'sexual competition') and females focusing on parental investment 
(Clutton-Brock, 1989; Wade and Shuster, 2002).
However, when females cannot care effectively for offspring on their own, because of 
environmental (e.g., lack of resources, adverse climate conditions) or biological (e.g., 
low sexual body size dimorphism) reasons, mothers confront the difficult challenge 
of producing viable offspring without having the ability to do so. As discussed in 
the previous section, an evolutionary response to this challenge is for females to eli­
cit cooperation from others in breeding activities. More than forty years ago, Trivers 
(1971) analysed this scenario using the prisoner's dilemma and his theory of reciprocal 
altruism. He argued that, if individuals assist each other in turns—that is, if the re­
ceiver is likely to return the favour—and the costs of cooperation are relatively low to 
donors while the benefits are high to recipients, reciprocal cooperation could evolve
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among related and even unrelated individuals. This is precisely the situation we want 
to model.
The simulation reported in this chapter is based on previous ABMs by Key (1999) 
and Key and Aiellio (2000), which also tackled how relative reproductive effort influ­
ences cooperation between males and females. Their results will be used as bench­
marks for our own findings. However, the model presented here has important modi­
fications compared with previous simulations in the literature. In this model: (1) 
agents describe complete histories of life, which means that they are born, have a 
non-reproductive period of childhood, then become fertile adults, so they can pro­
duce offspring, and finally they die after a period of time; (2) there is a limited set of 
strategies that the agents use to play the prisoner's dilemma and they are contingent 
on the sex of the opponent player; and (3) the population of agents might increase or 
decrease over time—eventually the artificial society might disappear with a popula­
tion of zero agents. All these features allow the simulation to replicate more plausible 
conditions, so instead of studying the evolution of cooperation assuming constant 
population sizes and homogeneous and 'unisex' players, the simulation reported in 
this chapter incorporates heterogeneity in life history differences in the reproduct­
ive efforts between sexes, and also ecological dynamics into evolutionary games, re­
vealing the mechanisms for maintaining cooperation and their relation to population 
growth.
5.3.1 Agents' Attributes
Let there be a set of agents A = {oi, . . . ,  a^,. . . ,  an} and i =  1, . . . ,  n. At the beginning 
of the simulation, the population size is N t. Agents can be either males or females. 
They also have complete life histories, so they are born, become older with each sim­
ulation step and live until the maximum agent age is reached, a model parameter 
which is set by Max Age. Agents are endowed with an internal memory m, so  agents 
can remember their last interaction with each other agent.
Agents also have a numerical vector that establishes their current Energy Level. It is as­
sumed that the only difference between male and female agents lies in their reproduct­
ive costs. MRC stands for Male Reproductive Costs and FRC stands for Female Reproduct­
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ive Costs and these are simulation parameters. The agents can breed through sexual 
reproduction. Female agents can produce offspring, provided they interact with one 
agent of opposite sex and both of them are fertile. An agent is fertile if he or she is an 
adult —therefore, when the agent has reached sexual maturity—and if he or she has 
enough energy to pay for its reproductive costs, set by MRC if the agent is a male, or 
FRC if the agent is a female. Sexual maturity is a model's parameter set by Reproduct­
ive Age. To pay the reproductive costs, individual agents must gain energy-points by 
playing the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) with other agents. This means that the 
agents with the best strategies for playing the IPD will have the most offspring, since 
only when a certain level of energy intake has been achieved can an agent reproduce. 
Therefore, the points gained by the agents are equivalent to fitness.
It is important to stress that, in this model, reproductive costs represent the minimum 
amount of energy required to produce an offspring. Investment below the minimum 
value would result in the death of the infant, and it is assumed that agents do not 
waste energy (points) in this way. On the other hand, agents could invest more than 
the minimum amount of energy. However, it is assumed here that any excess of energy 
is conserved and contributes to the production of the next offspring. For instance, if 
the reproductive cost is 500 and an agent has 700 points, after reproduction its score 
will be reduced to 200 points and it must gain only another 300 points (through games 
of the IPD) in order to reproduce again. Also, after a male and a female agent have 
finished interacting (i.e., playing the IPD) they will reproduce, with the proviso that 
both of them are fertile adults. This does not guarantee reproductive access for males, 
but makes it likely. Finally, agents do not move in the environment, which is entirely 
neutral and has no effect on the agents' behaviours.
5.3.2 Social Interactions
Let Nt be a well-mixed population in time t, in which any two agents interact with 
the same probability. Social interactions occur in each simulation step t, when agents 
attempt to find a partner to play the prisoner's dilemma and to reproduce (they do the 
latter provided both agents are opposite sex and fertile). The game is played between 
pairs of agents randomly selected. In each interaction agents might cooperate or de-
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feet, because cooperation and defection are the two possible actions that are defined 
by the prisoner's dilemma. Behaviour a = 1 corresponds to cooperation and a =  2 to 
defection. The interactions, therefore, might report individual benefits or losses. The 
success of the interactions for each individual—which is quantified in terms of 'pay­
offs'—depends on the own strategy i and the strategy j  of the respective interaction 
partner. When the payoff for the individual i is Pÿ, the payoff for the interaction part­
ner is Pj{. The payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma (Axelrod, 1990; Axelrod and 
Hamilton, 1981) that summarises the possible payoffs is given by:
The entries of the payoff matrix (5.2) refer to the row player. If a cooperator, C, in­
teracts with a defector, D, the cooperator gets the "sucker's payoff," S, whereas the 
defector gets the highest payoff of the game, T, which denotes the "temptation to de­
fect." Two defectors obtain the payoff P , which stands for the "punishment" of mutual 
defection. Therefore, P u  = R, P u  — S, P21 — T  and P22 =  P. The game is a prisoner's 
dilemma if for each player their action preferences are ordered by T > P  > P  > 5. 
Finally, given that in the simulation the game is repeatedly played by two players, 
the following condition should be added: 2 x P  > P  + 5, to prevent alternating co­
operation and defection giving a greater reward than mutual cooperation. The payoff 
matrix (5.2) together with these two conditions can be seen as mathematical defini­
tions of "cooperation" and "defection." The 1-stage prisoner's dilemma has only one 
agents' action that is a 'Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1950): defection (an outcome that is 
Pareto inferior). Consequently, the evolution of cooperation requires specific mechan­
isms that allow 'natural selection' to favour cooperation over defection. One of these 
mechanisms takes place when a group of players interacts repeatedly, in which case 
each member can condition her action at each time point on the other players' previ­
ous actions. In evolutionary game theory, this mechanism is known as direct reciprocity 
(Nowak, 2006), that is, there are repeated interactions between the same two players 
over time. This is the mechanism implemented in the simulation.
C D
(5.2)
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5.3.3 Strategies and Reproduction
It cannot be assumed that a female agent will behave in the same way with another 
female as she would with a male (Key, 1999; Key and Aiello, 2000). Four possible situ­
ations could arise: 1) a male agent interacts with a female agent; 2) a female agent inter­
acts with a female agent; 3) a female agent interacts with a male agent; 4) a male agent 
interacts against a male agent. In this simulation, each agent i carries four strategies, 
one for each of these possible situations, which is encoded as genetic information to 
be transferred to their offspring. Although a male agent, for instance, only requires 
strategies 1) and 4), his potential daughters will require information from strategies 
2) and 3). By carrying all four strategies an agent contributes to the behaviour of its 
offspring regardless of their sex.
Let Qi be the set of strategies or "strategy strings' that agent i carries, so the four 
strategies defined in the previous paragraph are expressed as 0* =  {£, Qh In 
the simulation, 0* is used as the agent's chromosomes, since reproduction involves 
crossover of the parents' information. Let ©i be the strategy string of a fertile male 
agent, such that ©i =  {(%, rji, and 0 2 be the strategy string of a fertile female
agent, such that 0 2 = {£2? 02, ^2}- When these two agents interact, they can pro­
duce a new offspring, whose strategy strings will be defined as ©3 =  { (3, rj3,03, tf3}. 
0 3 is made by crossing over ©1 and 0 2. To include errors in transmission, mutations 
occur at rate g. Finally, offspring are randomly assigned a sex, their age is set to zero 
and their memory to null. When they are bom, they are located next to one of the 
parents (one step distant).
5.3.4 Initialisation
The simulation allows an exploration of the effect of varying two parameters, MRC 
and FRC, on the evolution of cooperation and the consequent population dynamics. 
At the beginning of the simulation, t = 0, the population consists of 250 agents, made 
up of 50 percent females, the agents' memory is empty and age and Energy Level are 
randomly set, as are the strategies in each agent's strings ©*. Each simulation step t 
corresponds to 0.02 years and agents die when they are 40 years old (so agents live 
for 2,000 time steps). The agents' payoff matrix is given by T  = 5, R  = 3, P  = 1, and
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5  =  0. There is a set S  o f five  strateg ies, w h ich  are d efin ed  as fo llow s: 1) tit-for-tat: 
coop erate in  the first en cou n ter and  th en  ch o o se  the sam e action  the o p p on en t chose; 
2) unforgiving: coop erate u n le ss  an o p p on en t defects on ce, th en  a lw a y s d efect in  each  
in teraction  w ith  it; 3) random: ran d om ly  coop erate or defect; 4) defect: a lw a y s  defect; 
and 5) cooperate: a lw a y s  cooperate. Each agen t h as its strateg ies en co d ed  in  a strategy  
string o f 4 b its. D u r in g  reprodu ction  the strategy  strin gs o f each  parent are 'crossed  
over ' and m ay  m utate , w ith  a ch an ce p  — 0.006. See F igure 5.1 for a v isu a l exp lan ation  
o f th is crossin g  over process.
c” I
J
1
a*
m m 1
? 3 2
I I
1) Strategy Matrix
2) Parents
3) Strategy strings
4) Crossover
I
5) Offspring
Figure 5.1: R e p ro d u c tio n  in v o lv e s  c ro sso v e r  o f  the p a re n t's  s t r a te g y  s tr in g s . Each p a r e n t has i ts  o w n  
s tr a te g y  m a tr ix  w h ich  d e te rm in e s  h o w  th e y  p la y  a g a in s t  a g e n ts  o f  d iffe ren t a n d  s im ila r  sex . W h en  tw o  
a g e n ts  o f  o p p o s ite  se x  p la y  th e  I P D — a n d  p ro v id e d  th e y  a re  f e r t i l e — th e  fo u r  a lle le s  in  th e ir  s tr a te g i /  
s tr in g s  are cro ssed  o v e r  r a n d o m ly  in  o rd er  to  p ro d u c e  th e  g e n e tic a l  in fo rm a tio n  th e ir  o ffsp r in g  w il l  
h ave . A s  can  be seen  in  th is  f ig u r e , in  th e  ex a m p le  the f i r s t  a n d  fo u r th  a lle les  in  th e  o ffsp rin g 's  s tr a te g i /  
s t r in g  cam e f r o m  th e  fa th e r , w h i ls t  th e  sec o n d  a n d  th ir d  a lle les  ca m e f r o m  th e  m other.
A gen ts reach sexu a l m atu rity— i.e., they can  reprodu ce— w h e n  they are 15 years old  
(so, Reproductive A g e=  15) and they live  until th ey  are 40 years old  (so. M a x  A g e=  40).
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Both Reproductive Age and Max Age were set taking into account the current wild chim­
panzee reproductive schedule and lifespan, which are likely to be similar to early hu­
mans (Thompson et al., 2007). The simulation was built using NetLogo 4.1.3 (Wi- 
lensky, 2011a), and the model itself is an extension of the N-person IPD model avail­
able in the NetLogo Models Library (Wilensky, 2011b). Two stop conditions were es­
tablished: 1) a simulation stops once the population size reaches 2,500 agents (10 times 
the initial population size); and 2) it stops once the simulated time reaches 4,550 years 
(or 227,500 steps), which corresponds to a maximum of approximately 114 genera­
tions. Of course, the simulation also stops if no agents survive (i.e., the population be­
comes extinct or its size equals zero). Statistical analyses on these results were carried 
out using the statistical software R (2011). The simulations were extensively tested 
by fixing the strategy strings to values for which there were known outcomes, and 
by meticulously following each stage of interaction and reproduction when strategy 
strings were randomly generated. Simulations took anywhere from a few minutes to 
three hours to complete.
5.4 Results and Analyses
The experiments were carried out by exploring the parameter space given by the com­
bination of MRC and FRC, varying MRC from 200 to 2,000 by 200 energy units, and 
keeping FRC constant at 2,000. By so doing, the simulation addressed the effect of in­
creasing or decreasing the ratio of reproductive effort between sexes on the evolution 
of cooperation and population dynamics. It was assumed in this set of experiments 
that female reproductive costs are high, given the energy burden that reproduction 
implies for them. To have more robust results, each parameter combination was run 
25 times. Two hundred and twenty five such experiments were performed in order to 
study the evolution of cooperation and population dynamics over time.
The general model results are described in Subsection 5.4.1. They show that, when 
the reproductive effort required by a male to produce offspring is low in comparison 
to female reproductive effort, the likelihood of a simulation to culminate in extinction 
is lower. This result might be explained by the emergence of the so-called male 'non­
reciprocal altruism', something that is confirmed by the statistical analysis carried out
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in this subsection in order to compare inter- and intra-sex interactions. It is shown in 
Subsection 5.4.2 that different types of evolutionary structure of cooperation among 
agents might lead to different population dynamics. In particular, the emergence of 
male non-reciprocal altruism is associated with both exponential and steady popula­
tion growth, and similar cooperation levels between males and females are associated 
with population extinction. Finally, Subsection 5.4.3 presents an analysis of the evol­
ution of the strategies in inter-sex interactions, which helps to understand better the 
findings from the previous subsections.
5.4.1 General Results
Figure 5.2 reproduces the main results of the experiments. In order to assess the effect 
of the relationship between the reproductive costs of males and females on population 
dynamics, the analysis considered the ratio of MRC to FRC. This ratio establishes a 
continuum between no differences and maximum difference in the reproductive costs 
of both sexes. Thus, yyjg - =  0.1 corresponds to the maximum studied difference 
between the reproductive effort of males and females, that is, MRC equals 200 while 
FRC equals 2,000. On the other hand, when =  1.0, both MRC and FRC equal 
2,000.
Plot 5.2(a) depicts the percentage of simulations that, in each parameter combination, 
reached the maximum number of agents (N=2,500) and the percentage of simulations 
that became extinct (N=0). For easy representation, the percentages of extinct simu­
lations are shown in negative values (red colour) and the percentages of simulations 
that reached the maximum population are shown in positive values (blue colour), so 
the absolute value of the sum of both percentages corresponds to the number of sim­
ulations that became extinct and the simulations that reached the maximum number 
of agents2.
As can be seen there, there is a nonlinear relation between the magnitude of the dif­
ferences in reproductive costs and population dynamics. Plot 5.2(a) shows that, when
2A third group of simulations that did not become extinct, but did not reached the maximum number 
of agents (so they describe slow rates of population growth), is not plotted, but it can be determined by 
subtracting 100 percent from the absolute value already explained.
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there is no difference of reproductive costs is non-existent or small between males and 
females—ranging from 0 percent to 25 percent higher for females, or the parameter 
range given by > 0.8—no simulation reached the maximum number of agents 
during the analysed period of time, and actually most of them became extinct. Only 
when FRC was 42 percent higher than MRC did some simulations reach the maximum 
number of agents. The relationship is, from that point onwards, inverse: the smaller 
the reproductive efforts of males and females ratio is, the more likely it is that simula­
tions will reach the maximum population (and consequently the extinction rate will be 
smaller). Although it can be seen in Plot 5.2(a) that there are some points in which this 
tendency drops down, particularly when =  0.5 and =  0.1, the inverse rela­
tionship is clear. It is important to notice though that there are high extinction rates all 
along the parameter space, and even at the point in which more simulations reached 
2,500 agents, that is, when = 0.2, 52 percent of the simulations became extinct. 
That is, even though the inverse relationship between magnitude of the differences in 
reproductive costs and the population's fate is evident in the plot, the probability of 
extinction is always higher than the probability of reaching the maximum population.
Plot 5.2(b) depicts the average points or scores earned per player per game of the pris­
oner's dilemma played during the set of experiments. The shown averages corres­
pond to the points earned per agent per game at the final time-step of the non-extinct 
simulations (i.e., either when the maximum population or the maximum number of 
generations were reached). These averages represent how cooperation, measured in 
terms of earned points, evolved over the simulated time. The average scores are plot­
ted according to each interaction type (i.e., male-male, female-female, male-female, 
female-male). Thus, Plot 5.2(b) shows how these averages varied at different values of 
the ratio MRC to FRC.
As can be seen there, as the ratio increases, the different types of interactions tend to 
converge to an average of 3 points. Since 3 points is what agents get in the prisoner's 
dilemma when they cooperate (see Equation 5.2), this result indicates that there is a se­
lective pressure that favours the emergence of cooperation among all the agents when 
both males and females have equally high reproductive costs. This means that when 
the difference in the reproductive effort of both sexes are similar or slightly higher for
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Figure 5.2: M a in  s im u la tio n  re s u lts  a fte r  e x p lo r in g  th e  p a r a m e te r  sp a ce  o f  M R C  a n d  F R C  (s h o w n  as 
ra tio ) . P lo t 5 .2 (a ) d e p ic ts  the p e rc e n ta g e  o f  s im u la t io n s  th a t reach ed  th e  m a x im u m  p o p u la tio n  a n d  th e  
p e rc e n ta g e  o f  s im u la t io n s  a t  w h ich  p o p u la tio n s  w e n t  e x tin c t. P lo t 5 .2 (b )  su m m a r is e s  th e  a v e r a g e  sco re  
p e r  p la y e r  p e r  g a m e  o f  th e  p r iso n e r 's  d ilem m a . S cores are s h o w n  s e p a r a te ly  f o r  d iffe re n t in te ra c tio n  
ty p e s:  m a le  v s . m a le , fe m a le  v s . fe m a le , m a le  v s . fe m a le  a n d  fe m a le  v s . m ale.
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females—i.e., when MRC are 25% less than FRC, or > 0.8—, most of the agents 
will tend to cooperate with each other, regardless of the sex of their opponents. This 
selective pressure is understandable, since low differences in the reproductive effort 
of both sexes means that producing an offspring is equally costly for males and fe­
males. So, over generations, it is expected that, on the one hand, defectors of both 
sexes will be punished and, on the other, cooperators will be rewarded. In that way, 
only those agents that cooperate equally in producing an offspring can reproduce at 
higher rates and, consequently, their cooperative strategy strings end up prevailing 
within the population.
However, results presented in Plot 5.2(b) must be interpreted by taking into account 
the results shown in Plot 5.2(a), which indicate that when the differences in the repro­
ductive effort of males and females are low, few simulations reached the maximum 
population. Most of them ended with the population becoming extinct (that is the 
reason why Plot 5.2(b) does not depict results when = 1.0; in that combination 
of parameters all 25 simulations became extinct). These results indicate that, although 
the selective pressure to cooperate in producing an offspring might be high when 
both sexes experience high costs to reproduce, the emergence of cooperation is not 
enough to compensate for the high reproductive effort that males and females have, 
and therefore populations facing this situation are likely to disappear via extinction or 
experience low rates of population growth.
Plot 5.2(b) also shows that, although agents frequently cooperate regardless of the 
opponent's sex when the reproductive efforts of both males and females are equally 
(or similarly) high, a different picture is drawn when there are high differences in 
the reproductive costs between sexes. The greater the difference in MRC and FRC, 
especially when < 0.4, the greater the divergence in the males' and females' 
average scores. For instance, when FRC are 10 times higher than MRC —i.e., when 
= 1.0—female agents gained, on average, 3.51 points from their games against 
males, whilst males obtained just over 1.33 points in return. This means that, when 
female agents had higher reproductive costs than males, male agents were mainly co­
operating when playing against females, whilst female agents were exploiting males 
by defection (thus, males were mainly receiving the sucker payoff). This pattern is con-
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sistent even when FRC are 67 percent higher than MRC—i.e., when = 0.6; in that
parameter combination, female agents gained, on average, 3.44 points playing against 
male agents, whilst male agents obtained an average of 2.22 points in return. That is 
not the case in same-sex interactions, whose averages do not differ much, around 2.5 
points, which indicates 'weak cooperation' in intra-sex interactions.
These results are consistent with those presented in previous published simulations 
using similar computational methods. Kay and colleagues (1999; 2000) reported a sim­
ilar inter-sex pattern in their own simulations. They argued that this divergence was 
demonstrative of the emergence of male 'non-reciprocal altruism', also known as pure 
altruism, since male agents cooperate with females, even though female agents do not 
reciprocate. That is, male agents (or at least a significant proportion of them) have no 
long-term reward for their cooperative behaviour. In the previous research, this male 
non-reciprocal altruism has been compared with male investment in a female and her 
offspring (Key and Aiello, 2000). Although the concept of 'non-reciprocal altruism' 
might be contentious (West et al., 2007), the idea behind the concept, as employed 
by those authors, is consistent with the inter-sex cooperation results reported in this 
chapter: an important fraction of males is behaving altruistically, because their beha­
viour, although beneficial for females, is costly for themselves.
As was seen in Plot 5.2(a), there is an association between how big the differences in re­
productive costs of males and females are and population dynamics. This association 
is brought about by a direct relationship between, on the one hand, increasing differ­
ences in reproductive costs of males and females (in which male reproductive costs 
are low in comparison to female reproductive costs) and, on the other, an increasing 
divergence in the cooperation levels between males and females. Thus, when the re­
productive effort of females agents is much higher than that of male agents, evolution 
will favour the emergence of non-reciprocal altruism between sexes: males will tend 
to cooperate with females even though the latter do not always reciprocate. As already 
claimed, in his theory of reciprocal altruism, Trivers (1971) argued that if individuals 
assisted each other in turns and the costs of cooperation were relatively low to donors 
while the benefits were high to recipients, reciprocal cooperation could evolve among 
related and even unrelated individuals. In the models presented here, the costs of co-
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Table 5.1: Correlation matrix of simulation results in inter- and intra-sex interactions. Spearman's
rank correlation coefficient p
Male vs. Male vs. Female vs. Female vs. Total
Male Female Female Male Agents
Male vs. 1.000
Male
Male vs. 0.057 1.000
Female (0.668)
Female vs. -0.057 0.457** 1.000
Female (0.670) (0.000)
Female vs. 0.002 -0.627** -0.361** 1.000
Male (0.987) (0.000) (0.000)
Total -0.075 -0.637** -0.263* 0.523**
Agents (0.574) (0.000) (0.046) (0.000)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed); * Correlation is sig­
nificant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed); Significance levels in parentheses.
operation are comparatively lower for males, since male reproductive costs are lower 
than female reproductive costs. However, the model results presented here slightly 
differ from Trivers' prediction, because female agents can benefit if they do not re­
ciprocate males' cooperation. By 'exploiting' male cooperation, female agents might 
offset their high reproductive burden, and since males' reproductive costs are smal­
ler than those of females, they can 'afford' to receive the sucker payoff when playing 
against females—provided male agents cooperate with each other most of the time. 
Thanks to this non-reciprocal behaviour, females are able to reach the energy costs 
of reproduction sooner and, consequently, their inter-birth intervals are shortened, 
so they reproduce faster. Female agents, on the other hand, cannot afford to be ex­
ploited, since their reproductive costs are extremely high. They need to earn as many 
points as they can in order to produce an offspring, so over evolutionary time they 
will punish non-cooperative males, who will tend to reproduce less and, therefore, 
their non-cooperative strategy strings will tend to vanish from the agent population.
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Table 5.1 shows the correlation matrix of the averaged scores of the four types of inter­
actions and the total number of agents the 250 simulations reached. Given the evident 
non-linear trend we observed in Figure 5.2, a Spearman's rank correlation coefficient 
p was used. The correlation matrix confirms some points made above: the higher 
the scores obtained by female agents playing against males, the lower the scores male 
agents earned playing against females (p =  —0.627, p < 0.001). Table 5.1 also confirms 
that the scores female agents obtained in inter-sex interactions are positively correl­
ated to the total number of agents the simulations reached (p =  0.523, p < 0.001). 
That is, the more points female agents got playing against male agents, the larger 
the final population. But it also suggests that higher average scores for females in 
intra-sex interactions are negatively associated with average female scores in inter-sex 
interactions (p =  —0.361, p < 0.001). In those simulations in which female intra-sex 
cooperation was high, female agents obtained less points, on average, from males. 
This last phenomenon can be explained by two possible mechanisms: either there is, 
over time, a lower pressure for female agents to exploit male agents when the former 
group experiences high levels of intra-sex cooperation (i.e., when female vs. female 
cooperation is high, lower female exploitation of males is observed) or, alternatively, 
lower cooperation levels from male agents towards female agents lead the latter to 
increase their intra-sex cooperation (i.e., when males' non-reciprocal altruism is not 
present, female agents tend to cooperate more with other females).
In either case, this negative correlation indicates certain flexibility and opportunistic 
behaviour between sexes (observed over evolution) not just in eliciting cooperative 
breeding but also in providing it: when female agents do not obtain enough cooper­
ation (i.e., points) from male agents, female intra-sex cooperation becomes higher or, 
in a different but equivalent way, the more help female agents receive from other fe­
male agents, the less help from male agents they need. This flexibility or opportunistic 
behaviour in the interactions is also expressed in the positive correlation between the 
average scores obtained by male agents playing against females and the average score 
obtained by female agents in intra-sex interactions; when female cooperation is high, 
male agents gain more points from females (p =  0.457, p < 0.001).
Finally, there is a weak, although significant, negative correlation between the scores
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that female agents obtained playing against other females and the total number of 
agents the simulations reached (p = —0.263, p =  0.046). This result suggests that fe­
male agents require a moderate level of mutual exploitation, which can favour the 
small group of female intra-sex defectors who can earn even more points and, there­
fore, reproduce faster, so the simulation can reach a higher number of agents.
To sum up, the comparison between the results shown in Plot 5.2(b) with those in 
Plot 5.2(a) in Figure 5.2 reveals a clear, although counterintuitive, picture. Larger dif­
ferences in the reproductive effort of male and female agents (differences in which 
males have lower reproductive costs than females) are associated with faster popula­
tion growth rates (and therefore, it is more probable that some simulations reach the 
maximum number of agents) and lower extinction rates. Low or non-existing differ­
ences in reproductive costs between sexes produced more cooperation among agents, 
regardless of the opponents' sex, something that might be observed in Plot 5.2(b) as 
the averaged scores by type of interactions are more or less similar (that is, when 
y n c  — 0-8). In these cases, few (if any) simulations described population growth and 
most populations became extinct, as can be seen in Plot 5.2(a). Conversely, high differ­
ences in the reproductive efforts of both sexes, particularly when female reproductive 
costs are higher than those of males (that is, when < 0.4), led to weak coopera­
tion among agents with similar sex and produced a remarkable divergence in inter-sex 
interactions, as Plot 5.2(b) shows, with an important proportion of male agents uncon­
ditionally cooperating with females and female agents mainly exploiting males by 
defection. In these cases. Plot 5.2(a) demonstrates that more simulations reached the 
maximum number of agents and fewer populations became extinct. This indicates that 
once male non-reciprocal altruism emerges, that is, once a proportion of males uncon­
ditionally cooperate with females who do not reciprocate, then the fitness of exploit­
ative females is enhanced, so they can produce more offspring, leading to higher rates 
of population growth. Based on this mechanism, some simulations reached the max­
imum number of agents during the analysed period of time. Of course, as mentioned 
before, high differences in the reproductive efforts between sexes do not increase the 
likelihood that a population will survive. As Plot 5.2(a) shows, even when FRC are 
much higher than MRC, the extinction rates are, although lower in comparison to the
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p rev io u s case, still h igh.
Parameter Space
Male vs. Female Interactions
Figure 5.3: P o ly n o m ia l reg ressio n  p la n e , in  w h ich  th e  o u tp u t  v a r ia b le  is th e  n u m b e r  o f  a g e n ts , iv h ile  
M R C /F R C  a n d  th e  a v e ra g e d  S core  o f  M a le  v s . F em ale In te r a c tio n s  are th e  e x p la n a to ry  va r ia b le s .
Therefore, the em ergen ce of m ale non-reciprocal a ltru ism  seem s to m ake a d ifferen ce  
in  the p o p u la tio n  d yn am ics of the an a lysed  artificial soc ieties. P lot 5.3 sh o w s  the re­
gression  p lan e o f a local p o ly n o m ia l regression  m o d e l, fitted  b y  w e ig h ted  last sq uares  
(sm ooth n ess a  — 0.45, d egree d  =  0), u s in g  the data from  the 250 sim u la tion s. This  
p lo t is p resen ted  in  order to v isu a lise  the exp erim en t param eter space, d ra w in g  a re­
gression  p lan e  in w h ich  the final num ber o f agen ts that the sim u la tion s reached is the  
o u tp u t variable, an d  the m o d e l exp lan atory variables are the ratio o f M RC an d  FRC 
and the averaged  score ob tain ed  b y  m ale agen ts w h e n  th ey  p layed  aga in st fem ale  
agen ts. A s can be seen  there, lo w  average scores o f m ale  agen ts, b e tw e en  1 and 2, and  
lo w  v a lu es o f y y y f  w ere correlated w ith  h igher p op u la tion  s izes. It sh o u ld  a lso  be
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noticed that the axis 'Score Male vs. Female Interactions' in Figure 5.3 reaches a max­
imum of 3, which is consistent with what is shown in Figure 5.2(b). This maximum 
score of 3 indicates that male agents, on average, hardly ever ended up exploiting 
female agents.
A different picture is observed when we consider the average score obtained by fe­
male agents when they play against male agents. Figure 5.4 depicts the regression 
plane of a local polynomial regression model, fitted using the same technique and 
parameters as Figure 5.3. In this case the regression plane reaches a maximum num­
ber of agents when the average score of female agents in inter-sex interactions is higher 
than 3 points (which means that females are exploiting males) and low values of 
(which means that female reproductive costs are higher than male reproductive costs). 
That combination of parameters maximises the likelihood of reaching bigger popula­
tion sizes.
The analysis presented so far indicates that, when female reproductive costs are much 
higher than that of males, the simulations with population growth were those in which 
high inter-sex divergences in cooperation were observed. These differences translate 
to male agents mainly cooperating with female agents, even though the latter group 
does not reciprocate. In situations of high divergence in the reproductive effort of 
both sexes (in favour of males), females performed an exploitative strategy against 
males most of the time. And despite this exploitative behaviour, males' cooperation 
levels were much higher than expected. However, we have to consider that male 
non-reciprocal altruism is only possible when male reproductive effort is smaller than 
female reproductive effort, so males can afford receiving the sucker payoff when they 
play against females. On the other hand, by holding an exploitative strategy against 
males, female (defective) agents enhance their fitness (i.e., they reproduce faster) since 
they receive enough points from cooperative males to cover their high reproductive 
costs. This non-reciprocal behaviour, in turn, boosts the population growth, because 
female agents can produce more offspring. In summary, in contexts of high differences 
in the reproductive effort of sexes, evolution tends to enhance the fitness of cooperat­
ive strategy strings for males and defective strategy strings for females. This point is 
discussed further later in the chapter.
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Figure 5.4: P o ly n o m ia l reg ressio n  p la n e , in  w h ic h  th e  o u tp u t  v a r ia b le  is th e  n u m b e r  o f  a g e n ts , iv h ile  
M R C /F R C  a n d  th e  a v e ra g e d  S core  o f  F em ale  v s . M a le  I n te ra c tio n s  a re  th e  e x p la n a to ry  va ria b les .
So far, the an a lysis o f the sim u la tion  resu lts has fo cu sed  ex c lu siv e ly  o n  average scores  
ob tain ed  b y  the agen ts in  four d ifferent typ es o f in teractions. H ow ever , an other w a y  
to an a lyse  the sim u la tion  resu lts is to in vestiga te  the coop eration  le v e ls  that the last 
gen eration  o f agen ts had  in  each  o f the n on -extin ct s im u lation s. This k in d  o f ana­
ly sis  a llo w s u s to d eterm in e h o w  coop eration  e v o lv e d  in  the last gen eration  o f agen ts, 
con sid er in g  d ifferent com b ination s o f rep rod u ctive costs. Table 5.2 p resen ts the g e n ­
eral resu lts o f coop eration  for each com b in ation  o f param eters. It can be seen  that 
in tra-sex in teractions p rod u ced  h ig h  le v e ls  o f coop eration . Thus, fem ale  agen ts ten ­
d ed  to coop erate w ith  each  other m ore, a lth ou gh  a lo w  average o f coop eration  w a s  
ob served  w h e n  fem ales' reprodu ctive costs w ere ten tim es h igher than m ales' repro­
d u ctiv e  costs (i.e., w h e n  =  0.1). H ow ever, in  general, fem ale  in tra-sex coop er-
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Table 5.2: Proportion of cooperators in different types of interactions
Statistics* Male vs. Male vs. Female vs. Female vs.
Male Female Female Male
MRC 200 - FRC 2,000 N  = 10
Mean 76% 80% 53% 36%
Std. Dev. 21% 11% 32% 29%
MRC 400 - FRC 2,000 N  = 12
Mean 68% 81% 69% 40%
Std. Dev. 22% 14% 23% 31%
MRC 600 - FRC 2,000 A = 12
Mean 63% 68% 79% 28%
Std. Dev. 41% 29% 27% 28%
MRC 800 - FRC 2,000 AT = 5
Mean 69% 75% 87% 44%
Std. Dev. 35% 15% 17% 17%
MRC 1,000 - FRC 2,000 N  = 3
Mean 100% 92% 61% 94%
Std. Dev. 0% 11% 8% 8%
MRC 1,200 - FRC 2,000 N  = 6
Mean 54% 97% 77% 73%
Std. Dev. 45% 4% 40% 41%
MRC 1,400 - FRC 2,000 N  = 7
Mean 75% 91% 97% 83%
Std. Dev. 43% 12% 9% 24%
MRC 1,600 - FRC 2,000 N  = 2
Mean 100% 89% 83% 83%
Std. Dev. 0% 16% 25% 24%
MRC 1,800 - FRC 2,000 N  = 1
Mean 100% 100% 100% 100%
Std. Dev.
General Results N  = 58
Mean 71% 82% 75% 51%
Std. Dev. 33% 19% 28% 35%
* Statistics were estimated over all the simulations that did not become extinct, con­
sidering the extant population at last simulation step.
ation levels were slightly higher than male intra-sex cooperation levels. A different 
picture emerges when we focus on the cooperation levels in inter-sex interactions. The 
results in Table 5.2 indicate that, when FRC are much higher than MRC —especially
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when < 0.4—female agents had low levels of cooperation with male agents (a 
result that is consistent with those presented in Plot 5.2(b)). Since male agents, on the 
other hand, had much higher cooperation levels with female agents, it is clear that, as 
mentioned previously, male agents are mostly cooperating with female agents, even 
though the latter do not reciprocate.
5.4.2 Evolution of Cooperation and Population Dynamics
In order to understand the evolution of non-reciprocal altruism and its relation to pop­
ulation dynamics, it is necessary to pay attention to how artificial societies evolve over 
time, which characteristics the population growth has and the peculiarities of the tra­
jectory that intergenerational evolution described to produce the kind of cooperation 
discussed in the previous subsection. To do so, the analyses will consider just the 25 
simulations carried out to sample one parameter combination, so the amount of data 
to investigate is lower and the analysis focuses on one paradigmatic case. Since the 
emergence of males' non-reciprocal altruism is related to the differences in the repro­
ductive costs between sexes, the presentation of the results will be restricted to the 
maximum difference in the reproductive effort that was measured in the experiments, 
that is: when MRC equals 200 and FRC equals 2,000, or = 0.1. As observed in 
Figure 5.2, this parameter combination is the paradigmatic case of population growth 
and male non-reciprocal altruism.
Figure 5.5 presents three different types of population dynamics that were observed 
in the parameter combination of MRC = 200 and FRC = 2,000. The three different 
population growths correspond to 'Exponential Growth', 'Steady Growth' and 'Ex­
tinction'. The six simulations that reached the maximum number of agents (i.e., 2,000 
agents) during the analysed period of time were the ones that described exponential 
population growth. As can be seen in Figure 5.5, the pattern described in the first 
plot indicates that the artificial societies that reached the maximum population ex­
perienced for many generations a steady population dynamics. But then, suddenly, 
these six artificial societies experienced a phase transition (Janson et al., 2000), since 
the population dynamics changed and the steady growth in each one was replaced 
by an exponential growth; after that phase transition, in a few generations the simula-
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tion s reached  the m ax im u m  num ber of agen ts. A lth o u g h  the p h ase  transition  b e tw e en  
stead y  an d  exp on en tia l g row th  m ig h t occur in  an y  p eriod  o f tim e, the u su a lly  lo n g  
p eriod  o f tim e in  w h ich  the s im u lation s h ad  stea d y  g row th  in d icates that so m e b eh a­
v iou r at the m icro -leve l is b e in g  incubated  or reinforced  for m a n y  gen erations, perh ap s  
w ith  so m e d ela y s or backw ard  m o v em en t but, after a certain  p o in t, the in cu batin g  
m icro-b eh aviou r p rod u ces a 'tip p in g-p o in t' so  the p o p u la tio n  d yn am ics are dram atic­
a lly  altered. This m icro-b eh aviou r m igh t w e ll b e the em ergen ce o f m ale  non-reciprocal 
a ltru ism  d iscu ssed  p reviously , w h ich  w a s related  to lo w er  extin ction  rates an d  a lso  
associa ted  w ith  the sim u la tion s that reached the m a x im u m  n um ber o f agen ts. It is 
in teresting  that d u r in g  the 'in cu b ation  p eriod ', the p o p u la tio n  s ize  is  re latively  sm all, 
u su a lly  around  500 agents.
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Figure 5.5: T h ree d iffe ren t p a t te r n s  o f  p o p u la tio n  g r o w th  d u r in g  th e  2 5  s im u la t io n s  f o r  =  0.1. 
T h e p a t te r n s  c o rre sp o n d  to  'E x p o n e n tia l g r o w th ' , 'S te a d y  G r o w th '  a n d  'E x tin c tio n '.
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The second plot in Figure 5.5 depicts the population dynamics of those simulations 
that neither reached the maximum population nor became extinct during the ana­
lysed period of time. Although they are identified with the term ^Steady Growth', 
one of them had an exponential growth and reached a maximum of 2,309 agents (in 
generation number 57 or year 2,282). However, from that point onwards the simu­
lation started a period of slow decay in the number of agents, until the maximum 
time was reached, when the simulation finally ended with 1,536 agents. It is likely 
that this simulation described a similar micro-behaviour that brought about the ex­
ponential growth in the previously analysed simulations—i.e., male non-reciprocal 
altruism—but this dynamic was thwarted in some way, so the exponential growth 
halted. Finally, the last plot in Figure 5.5 depicts the population dynamics of the 15 ex­
tinct simulations observed. As can be seen there, none of those simulations described 
a period of rapid growth, so the micro-behaviour leading to exponential growth never 
emerged. In these 15 simulations no form of male non-reciprocal altruism was ob­
served, as will be discussed later in this section. This analysis shows that the kind of 
population growth that male non-reciprocal altruism produces is an exponential one.
Male non-reciprocal altruism, as it is understood here, has to do with a fraction of co­
operative male agents being exploited by female agents (and, therefore, these group 
of males receiving the sucker pay-off), so females can earn more points and reproduce 
faster. This pattern leads the system towards population growth, which, as discussed 
above, is an exponential one. However, it has still to be shown that the inter-sex struc­
ture of cooperation in those simulations describing exponential growth diverge over 
time; that is, male agents mainly cooperate with female agents, but the latter mainly 
defect. The evolution of cooperation has, therefore, to be observed over time.
A simple measure of the percentage of cooperation in the artificial societies is inad­
equate because it is extremely volatile over time, especially when the number of agents 
is small. In order to distinguish the systematic trends of inter and intra-sex coopera­
tion over time from random blips, a smoothing procedure was applied to the 'histor­
ical' data, in particular, a moving average with equal weights technique was used in 
order to smooth the crude data (Shumway and Stoffer, 2006). Let us begin by defining 
this smoothing procedure in formal terms. If xt represents the observed cooperation
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levels over time (either inter- or intra-sex cooperation), and mt is the decomposition 
of x t into a trend, then
k
Tïit — ^   ^djXi—j  (5.3)
j ——k
where dj = a_j > 0 and Y^j=-k a 3 =  1 is a symmetric moving average of the data. 
In the analyses that follow, k — 40. The smoothing procedure in Equation (5.3) was 
applied to the time series of inter- and intra-sex cooperation for the 25 simulations run 
to sample - 0.1.
Figure 5.6 depicts the evolutionary trends that cooperation in inter- and intra-sex inter­
actions followed during three different population dynamics. Each plot also shows the 
number of births during the three simulations (vertical spikes), so the type of relation 
between the structure of cooperation between sexes and the number of births might 
be established. Subfigure 5.6(a) shows the evolution of cooperation between sexes 
in a simulation in which the population dynamics described an exponential growth 
(i.e., run 19). As can be seen, there is a clear divergence in the trajectory of coopera­
tion between sexes (see first plot in Subfigure 5.6(a), entitled Inter-Sex Interactions'). 
On the one hand, male agents tend to maintain relatively high levels of cooperation 
with female agents, and during the last 10 generations (before the simulation reached 
the maximum number of agents) male cooperation towards females increased from 
64 precent to 78 percent on average. On the other hand, female agents decreased 
their cooperation towards male agents from the early stages of this simulation. At 
the end, as can be seen in Subfigure 5.6(a), during the last 10 generations, female co­
operation towards males decreased from 42 percent to just 18 percent on average. For 
this reason, during the last 10 generations, whilst female agents playing against male 
agents earned, on average, 3.13 points, male agents obtained just 1.4 points when they 
played against female agents (and whilst females vs. males average scores equaled 
3.62 during the last 5 generations, males vs. females scores equaled just 0.93 in the 
same period). Therefore, an increasing percentage of females exploited males—who 
did not decrease their cooperative levels. At the same time, as can be seen in the 
second plot in Subfigure 5.6(a) entitled Tntra-Sex Interactions', intra-sex cooperation
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Figure 5.6: Evolution of cooperation in inter- and intra-sex interactions in three different simulations. 
Vertical spikes (red) represent births and lines represent the moving average (with a window  o /±  81) of 
the average cooperation for each type of interaction.
stea d ily  in creased  over tim e for b oth  sexes. M ale agen ts coop erated  w ith  each  other  
a lm ost a lw ays. H ow ever, fem ale coop eration , a lth ou gh  increasing over tim e, reached  
a m ax im u m  of 85 percent and h ad  a sm all drop  at the en d  o f the sim u la tion  to 80
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percent.
As established above (see Table 5.1 and its explanation), it seems that simulations 
that reached the maximum population (all of them describing a phase transition from 
steady growth to exponential growth) had a small group of female agents that de­
veloped an exploitative strategy not only against male agents, but also against other 
female agents. Thus, since females were obtaining more points from males, they were 
able to cover their high reproductive costs faster; consequently, they reproduced faster. 
For instance, during the last 10 generations, the annual number of births in this simu­
lation increased from 7 to 79, with annual average births equalling 19.4 during the last 
10 generations, 29.56 during the last 5 generations, and 61.7 during the last genera­
tion. All these elements demonstrate that male non-reciprocal altruism, together with 
a small number of female agents who also exploit other females, is a key evolutionary 
factor to accelerate population growth.
Subfigure 5.6(b) depicts the evolution of inter- and intra-sex interactions cooperation 
during a simulation that became extinct (i.e., run 10). Despite the fact the plotted 
series in Subfigure 5.6(b) are extremely volatile during the final stages of the simula­
tion—due to the small number of remaining agents before extinction—it is possible 
to see remarkable differences with the simulation that described exponential growth 
(that is to say, by comparing subfigures 5.6(b) and 5.6(a)). In run 10, inter-sex co­
operation converged early after the simulation began and it was similar most of the 
time (see first plot in Subfigure 5.6(b)). On the other hand, intra-sex cooperation was 
much more erratic, although female agents tended to cooperate with each other more 
than males did among themselves (see second plot in Subfigure 5.6(b)). All in all, 
the emergent cooperation structure of this simulation reinforces the idea that female 
agents require male non-reciprocal altruism to reproduce faster. In this case, since the 
levels of inter-sex cooperation were similarly high (70 percent on average), females 
were obtaining just 2.63 points on average when they played against males (and just 
2.7 points on average during the last 10 generations). Since females have high repro­
ductive costs, much higher than those of males, inter-sex cooperation does not help 
females to cover their reproductive effort. This fact is expressed in the low annual 
number of births, which during the last 10 generations dropped from just 3 births in
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year 1,278—when the population total just 166 agents—to no further births from year 
1,638 onwards (with a maximum of 7 annual births by year 1,281). The population be­
came extinct by year 1,677. This adverse evolutionary scenario was magnified by the 
fact that intra-sex cooperation, although still high, was not high enough for females to 
compensate for the low points earned in inter-sex interactions.
Finally, the third pair of plots in Figure 5.6 (presented in Subfigure 5.6(c)) show the 
evolution of cooperation in inter- and intra-sex interactions during a simulation (run 
13) that described a steady population growth. In contrast to the previous two ana­
lysed simulations in Plots 5.6(a) and 5.6(b), the simulation reproduced in Subfigure 
5.6(c) covered the maximum period of time. In this simulation, with a steady pop­
ulation growth, inter-sex cooperation was for most of the time at similar levels and, 
by generation 75 full cooperation had emerged. Just a few generations after that, full 
intra-sex cooperation emerged. From then onwards, all the agents were cooperating 
with each other, regardless of their opponent's sex, and consequently all the agents in 
the simulation earned 3 points when they played the prisoner's dilemma. Subfigure 
5.6(c) also shows that full cooperation can sustain a steady population growth. Thus, 
during the last 25 generations, the annual number of births increased from 10 to 28 
by year 4,550, when the simulation stopped because the maximum number of time 
steps was reached, with annual average births equalling 14.27 during the last 25 gen­
erations; 20.31 during the last 10 generations; 22.31 during the last 5 generations; and, 
finally the annual average births equalled 23.57 during the last 40 years of the simula­
tion (i.e., during the last generation of agents). When the maximum number of years 
was reached, this artificial society had a population of 943 agents. This indicates that, 
although the population growth does not resemble that of run 19, which described 
an exponential population growth, in run 13 the population was indeed increasing, 
although in a steadier way. Finally, it has to be noticed that, among the 25 simulations 
run in this combination of parameters (and, actually, from the 250 simulations that 
were run in the experimental setting), only in simulation number 13 did full coopera­
tion among the agents, regardless of their sex, evolve. Therefore, the emergence of full 
cooperation is a rather unlikely event.
In order to establish whether these results can be generalised to the whole set of ex­
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periments (i.e., the 25 simulations with this combination of parameters, that is, when 
p jgr  — 0.1) a comparison of the evolution of cooperation in inter- and intra-sex in­
teractions over time was carried out. The comparison was performed by subtracting 
the inter-sex cooperation trends and the intra-sex cooperation trends described before. 
Thus, let us define formally the comparison procedure.
Definition 5.1. Inter-sex cooperation difference of simulation j
Let Coop3mgietjfrmle be the cooperation level trend of male agents when they play against 
female agents in simulation j  at time t. Let us measure this trend during the period of 
time T : T  E N. Also, let Coopjgmale malet be the cooperation level trend of female agents 
when they play against male agents in simulation j  at time t e T .  Then, the difference 
D between these two time series is expressed in equation (5.4)
T
rJ  =  (C w p in a k t je m a le p  C o 0Pfemalet ,m alet) " (5 ‘4 )
where TJ' represents the difference in the inter-sex cooperative levels in simulation 
j  during the timespan {T3t }. Equation (5.4) conveys three properties. Thus, when 
> 0, it means that >  C o o p j ^  ^ ,  so male cooperation towards
female agents is higher in magnitude than female cooperation towards male agents. 
The opposite is true when P  < 0, which means that C o o p ^ j ^  <  C o o p j ^ ^ .  
Finally, when D7 = 0, the cooperation levels in inter-sex interactions during simulation 
j  are equal, that is C o o p j , ^ ^  =  C o o p j ^  ^ .  Only P  > 0 would be consistent 
with the claimed emergence of male non-reciprocal altruism. Also, according to what 
was claimed previously, the value P  œ 0 should be correlated with extinct simula­
tions. Therefore, the expected result would be that the group of simulations describing 
exponential population growth should have a positive and much higher cooperation 
difference in inter-sex interactions compared with the extinct simulations.
Since it is also important to consider the potential differences in the cooperation levels 
in intra-sex interactions, a similar analysis of the differences in the cooperation levels 
among same-sex agents was performed.
Definition 5.2. Intra-sex cooperation difference of simulation j
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Let Coop3^ ^  malet be the cooperation level trend of male agents when they play against
male agents in simulation j  at time t. Let us measure this trend during the period 
of time T  : T  e  N. Also, let Coopjemale^ gmalg^ be the cooperation level trend of female 
agents when they play against female agents in simulation j  at time t G T. Then, the 
difference D between these two time series is expressed in equation (5.5)
where AJ is the difference in the intra-sex cooperative levels in simulation j  during the
discussed for Equation (5.4), so according to the values AJ takes, we can establish 
whether males are more cooperative among themselves compared with females, when 
AJ > 0, whether their intra-sex cooperation levels are the same or, when AJ =  0, 
finally, whether females cooperate among themselves more than males, when AJ < 0. 
This analysis provides a good way to generalise the results of the three simulations 
discussed in Figure 5.6 to the 25 simulations in the parameter combination = 0.1.
Figure 5.7 shows two box plots that depict the differences in cooperation levels in 
inter- and intra-sex interactions, grouped according to the three different population 
dynamics that were identified over time in the experiments. Both box plots present 
historical data, so they establish what the differences in cooperation levels were for 
most of the simulated time. The 25 simulations were considered together to produce 
these plots, so the results are more robust. The measures of the central tendency cor­
respond to the mean and median differences of cooperation levels for the simulations 
over time and the boxes contain half of the historical data within the interquartile 
range. The outliers (i.e., time steps more than 1.5 times the box lengths away) were 
removed to facilitate representation. Therefore, box plots in Figure 5.7 present the con­
solidate time series of inter- and intra-sex cooperation observed in the experimental 
setting made of 25 runs to sample the simulation dynamics in the parameter combin-
Subfigure 5.7(a) presents the box plots for the cooperation differences in inter-sex in­
teractions, or F, grouped according to the three observed population dynamics. These
(5.5)
timespan {A]} . Equation (5.5) conveys, mutatis mutandis, the same three properties
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Figure 5.7: Box plots for the difference in the cooperation levels for inter- and intra-sex interactions.
The box plots express the differences over time for the 25 simidation runs. The results are grouped 
by the three different types o f population dynamics observed in the experiments: ‘Exponential growth'
(N  = 6), 'Extinction' (N  = 15), and 'Steady growth' (N  = 4). Averages are represented by 'x'. 
Outliers have been omitted for easy visualisation.
p lots sh o w  that there is  a d ifferent pattern  in  the ev o lu tio n  o f in ter-sex coop eration  
a m on g  the grou p s, e sp ecia lly  b e tw e en  th ose sim u la tion s that d escrib ed  exp on en tia l 
and stea d y  grow th  com p ared  w ith  th ose sim u la tion s that b ecam e extinct: w h ils t  the  
m easu res o f central ten d en cy  are m u ch  h igher for the tw o  form er com p ared  w ith  the  
latter (E xponentia l grow th: E =  0.19, T  =  0.15; S tead y  grow th: E =  0.18, T — 0.12; Ex­
tinction: E =  0, E =  0), the d isp ers io n  in  the tim e series o f the extin ct s im u la tion s  
is m u ch  sm aller w h e n  com p ared  w ith  the other tw o  grou p s (E xp onentia l grow th: 
S r  =  0.17, M A D p =  0.17; S teady grow th: S'r =  0.22, M A D p =  0.18; Extinction: 
S r  =  0.08, M A D p =  0.06).
A s exp ected , the coop eration  d ifferences in  inter-sex in teractions for the grou p  o f s im ­
u la tion s d escrib in g  exp on en tia l grow th  is, on  average, p o sit iv e  an d  h igher than  the 
group  o f extinct s im u lation s. A lso , the p o sitiv e  in terquartile range in  the ex p o n en ­
tial grow th  grou p  d em on strates that Coopniale female w a s m ost o f the tim e h igher than
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C00Pfemale male (a divergence in the cooperation levels that can be observed in the inter­
sex interactions in the first plot of Subfigure 5.6(a)), although this seems to be also the 
case for those simulations describing a steady population growth. On the other hand, 
the cooperation differences in inter-sex interactions for the group of extinct simula­
tions are, on average, zero, which together with the fact that the interquartile range 
is also close to zero demonstrates that Coopmale^ gmale was most of the time equal or 
very similar to C o o p ^ ^  ^  (a similarity in the inter-sex cooperation levels that can 
be observed in the inter-sex interactions in the first plot of Subfigure 5.6(b)). A one­
way between subjects ANOVA was conducted in order to establish whether the dif­
ferences in the cooperation levels among the three groups of simulations significantly 
differed. The analyses indicated significant differences atp < 0.05 for the three groups, 
-^ 2,2759140 =  42 4 703.3, p < 0.001. These results indicate that male non-reciprocal altru­
ism is a feature present in those simulations describing both exponential and steady 
growth.
The box plots presented in Subfigure 5.7(b) depict the historical tendency and dis­
persion of the cooperation differences in intra-sex interactions. As can be seen there, 
the measures of central tendency are similar for the simulations that described ex­
ponential growth and population extinction, and these two groups differ from the 
group of simulations that described steady growth, whose measures of central tend­
ency are much higher (Exponential growth: A — 0.07, A =  0.05; Extinction: A — —0.02, 
A =  0.02; Steady growth: A =  0.21, A — 0.20). On the other hand, the dispersion in 
the group of simulations that described exponential growth is a little higher than the 
other two groups (Exponential growth: Sa = 0.27, M A D a =  0.36; Steady growth: 
SD = 0.20, M A D a = 0.22; Extinction: Sa = 0.23, M A D a = 0.22), which indicates 
higher volatility in the cooperation differences in intra-sex interactions for the former 
compared with the two latter groups.
This means that, despite some volatility in the results, on average, in simulations de­
scribing exponential growth and extinct simulations, the cooperation levels in inter­
sex interactions tended to be similar over time—that is, Coopmale male «  Coopfemalefemale. 
However, steady growth simulations described, on average, much higher cooperation 
differences in intra-sex interactions over time. The results suggest that males tended
152 Chapter 5. The Evolution o f Cooperative Breeding
to cooperate more among themselves than females did, a result that is reinforced by 
the fact that the interquartile range in these steady growth simulations shows that
Co°Vmale,male WaS m0St ° f the time hiSher than Co°Pfemale,female' To express it more Suc­
cinctly, in steady growth simulations, female intra-sex cooperation levels were smaller 
than male intra-sex cooperation levels. Consequently, the difference in the population 
dynamics between steady and exponential growth seems not to be the result of co­
operation differences in inter-sex interactions—both types of simulations described 
similar dynamics, as was shown in Subfigure 5.7(a)—but cooperation differences in 
intra-sex interactions. Thus, male non-reciprocal altruism that favours female agents 
evolved both in exponential and steady growth simulation, but higher intra-sex male 
cooperation compared with female intra-sex cooperation is associated with a steady 
population growth. The one-way between subjects ANOVA indicated significant dif­
ferences at the p < 0.05 for the three groups, .Fh,2650409 =  23 9 9 80.12, p < 0.001.
5.4.3 Evolution of Strategies
A final analysis examines the evolution of the agents' strategy strings, which de­
termine the action the agents will choose at any stage of the game during their life. 
Although the strategy strings specify the complete action plan that agents play in 
inter- and intra-sex interactions, this subsection will focus on the evolution of inter­
sex strategies, that is, the evolution of strategies within the population of agents that 
determined the actions to be performed in male vs. female and female vs. female in­
teractions. As described in Subsection 5.3.3, these strategies are only one part of the 
full genetic information the agents carry out (subject to 'natural selection').
To get an impression of how the evolutionary process took place. Figure 5.8 shows 
the evolution of the strategies in the whole agent population for the three simulations 
analysed in Subsection 5.4.2, so comparisons can be established between these results 
and the ones presented in that subsection. Each pair of stacked plots in Figure 5.8 rep­
resents the proportion (or density) of agents in the population having one of the five 
strategies (i.e., random, cooperate, defect, tit-for-tat, unforgiven) in each simulation 
step, either for male vs. female or female vs. male interactions. These plots, therefore, 
are recording the evolutionary history of the five strategies. Since all the simulations
5.4. Results and Analyses 153
are in itia lised  w ith  250 agen ts e n d o w e d  w ith  ran d om ly  a ssign ed  strateg ies, the s im u ­
lations b eg in  w ith  a u n iform  d istrib ution  o f strateg ies a m o n g  the agen ts, w ith  each  of  
the five  strateg ies co v erin g  ap p rox im ately  20 p ercent o f the agen ts. This an a lysis  a l­
lo w s  u s to  ob serve h o w  'natural se lection ' w ork s, se lec tin g  th ose stra teg ies that m ax­
im ise  the agen ts' inclusive fitn ess— that is, the effect o f o n e  agen t's action s on  ev e ry ­
b o d y 's  p rod u ction  o f offspring.
E v o lu tio n  o f M ale S tra te g ie s  a g a in s t F em a le  A g e n ts E v o lu tio n  o f  M a le  S tra te g ie s  a g a in s t F em ale  A g e n ts
cooperate
E v o lu tio n  o f F em ale  S tra te g ie s  a g a in s t M ale A g e n ts E v o lu tio n  o f  F em ale  S tra te g ie s  a g a in s t M ale A g e n ts
j
Cooperate
Unforg
(a) Exponential Growth Simulation (Run 19) (b) Extinct Simulation (Run 10)
E v o lu tio n  o f M ale S tra te g ie s  a g a in s t F em ale  A g e n ts
o .a- i n m
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G enerations
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(c) Steady Growth Simulation (Run 13)
Figure 5.8: Evolution o f strategies in inter- and intra-sex interactions for three different simulations.
The pair o f stacked  p lo ts in  Subfigure 5.8(a) d ep ict the ev o lu tio n  o f strateg ies d u r in g
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the simulation that described exponential growth in male vs. female and female vs. 
male interactions respectively. The upper plot shows the evolution of strategies that 
male agents used when they played against female agents. From this plot it becomes 
clear that male agents increased their cooperation levels against females. By the end 
of the simulation—that is, when the population reached the maximum number of 
agents—the proportion of male agents being unconditional cooperators with females 
increased by up to 35 percent, and the proportion of pure male defectors decreased 
to just 4 percent. Therefore, unconditional cooperative males were subject to 'weak 
selection', against full defector males, who almost disappeared from the population. 
The conditional cooperative strategy, tit-for-tat, was also weakly selected, increasing to 
34 percent of the population of male agents. Finally, the also contingently cooperative, 
although much less forgiving, strategy 'unforgiving' represented only 5 percent of the 
male population. The proportion of random agents did not greatly vary over time; by 
the end of this simulation, there were 23 percent within the male population.
The second stacked plot in Subfigure 5.8(a) shows the evolution of strategies female 
agents used when they played against male agents. In contrast to what was observed 
in the evolution of male agents' strategies, by the end of the simulation full defec­
tion was by far the dominant strategy among female agents. Defection alleles had 
increased to 70 percent by the end of this simulation, that is, when it reached the max­
imum population; so most female agents were constantly defecting when they played 
against male agents. Conversely, unconditional cooperators represented just 4 percent 
of the female population by the end of the simulation. Even the contingent cooperative 
strategy, tit-for-tat, decreased to just 2 percent of the female population, and the unfor­
given one was already extinct when the simulation reached the maximum number of 
agents. Finally, the proportion of random strategies among female agents experienced 
some fluctuations, and by the end was 24 percent of the female population. There­
fore, in this simulation, natural selection over time favoured the spread of exploitative 
strategies among female agents to play against male agents.
The pair of stacked plots in Subfigure 5.8(b) show the evolution of inter-sex strategies 
in simulation number 10, in which the population became extinct. These plots do not 
cover the whole timespan of this simulation; due to the decreasing population size
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(and the small number of agents the simulation had), there was high volatility during 
the last few generations. This volatility has been removed from the plots in Subfig­
ure 5.8(b) by shortening the represented timespan. Thus, these two stacked plots only 
depict the evolution of strategies until year 1,656 (whilst the whole simulation ran 
for 1,676 years before it became extinct). By that year, even though the agents were 
fully cooperating in inter-sex interactions, the population size was too small to make 
it viable. Regarding the evolution of strategies, the plots in this subfigure show that 
there is no a clear trend in the evolution of male strategies to play against females. 
On the other hand, female exploitation against males did not evolve during this sim­
ulation, since full defector alleles represented only a small portion of the whole ge­
netic diversity among female agents. As can be observed in the lower stacked plot in 
Subfigure 5.8(b) after the 10th generation unconditional cooperative alleles expanded 
among female agents, as did unforgiven strategies. This means that a large propor­
tion of female agents were cooperating when playing against males, although some 
were much less forgiving than others. By the 20th generation, 35 percent of the female 
population were unconditional cooperators playing against male agents, but just 14 
percent of male agents were unconditional cooperators playing against female agents. 
This imbalance in cooperation levels between males and females explains the fate of 
this simulation: since female agents did not receive enough points from uncondition­
ally cooperative male agents, their reproduction rates decreased, and consequently 
the artificial society ended up being unviable in the long term.
The pair of stacked plots in Subfigure 5.8(c) depict the evolution of strategy in male 
vs. female and female vs. male interactions during the simulation that was previously 
classified as describing a 'steady population growth'. As in the previous cases, the 
upper plot shows the evolution of male strategies when they played against female 
agents. In this case, from the 20th generation onwards, unconditional cooperation was 
selected, and this strategy expanded within males to reach 85 percent when the sim­
ulation reached the maximum number of time steps. The rest of the male population 
was endowed with the contingent cooperative strategy, tit-for-tat. This shows that 
in this simulation male agents were mainly unconditional cooperators with female 
agents. In the lower plot of Subfigure 5.8(c) the evolution of strategies that female
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agents played against male agents can be seen. The unforgiving strategy was dom­
inant among females after the 70th generation, eventually expanding to all females 
agents. Full cooperation in inter-sex interactions evolved, because, on the one hand, 
male agents were either unconditional or conditional cooperators (two strategies that 
always cooperate in the first move), and, on the other, female agents were also con­
ditional cooperators (with unforgiving as the selected strategy to play against males, 
a strategy which, although it also cooperates in the first move, is much less forgiv­
ing than tit-for-tat, permanently shutting down cooperation after even a single act 
of defection). However, even though full cooperation emerged in this simulation in 
inter-sex interactions, females were much less forgiving with males compared with 
male to female interactions.
So far we have discussed the evolution of inter-sex strategies in three simulations, and 
the results indicate that male non-reciprocal altruism is explained by the evolution 
of unconditional cooperative strategies in males and defecting strategies in females. 
Nevertheless, we still have to demonstrate that these results can be generalised to all 
the experiments. Tables 5.3 and 5.4 show the distribution of inter-sex strategies that 
evolved in the artificial societies that did not become extinct (58 in total), distinguish­
ing the statistics for exponential population growth simulations (31 simulation runs) 
in Table 5.3 and steady population growth (27 simulation runs) in Table 5.4.
Table 5.3 indicates that the general trend in the evolution of strategies for inter-sex 
interactions identified in simulation number 19 (see Plot 5.8(a)) is consistent for most 
of the simulations that exhibited exponential growth, over different ratios of repro­
ductive costs. Male strategies to play against females are mostly dominated by uncon­
ditional cooperative alleles and a very low proportion of pure defecting alleles (with 
the exception of the only simulation that described exponential growth in the para­
meter combination MRC = 1,400 and FRC = 2,000). The opposite trend is observed 
among female strategies to play against male agents: in that case, there is a clear dom­
inance among female agents of defecting alleles to play against male agents and a 
very low presence of unconditional cooperative alleles. This pattern in the distribu­
tion of strategies was not observed in intra-sex interactions within those simulations 
that experienced steady population growth.
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The results shown in Table 5.4 indicate that independently of how large the difference 
in the reproductive costs for female and male agents are, most of the simulations de­
scribing steady population growth present the same inter-sex pattern of cooperation. 
Although the proportion of female agents that evolved defecting alleles is slightly 
higher than the proportion of males that evolved the same allele, this strategy was 
hardly ever dominant among females. In the two cases in which defective strategies 
were dominant among female agents (in =  0.1 and — 0.3), male agents did 
not behave as non-reciprocal altruists. Among both female and male agents, condi­
tional cooperation—i.e., tit-for-tat and unforgiving strategies—evolved as the domin­
ant strategies regardless of the reproductive ratio. This demonstrates that, in steady 
population growth simulations, male non-reciprocal altruism did not evolve, reinfor­
cing the conclusion discussed in the previous subsections: male non-reciprocal altru­
ism is required for exponential population growth.
5.5 Summary
To summarise the findings established so far, the analysis in Subsection 5.4.1 estab­
lished that the greater the differences in the reproductive costs between males and 
females, the more likely a simulation will reach the maximum number of agents. This 
association is given by the structure of cooperation that emerges when the reproduct­
ive effort of males and females is considered. When male reproductive effort is less 
than female reproductive effort, male agents will tend to cooperate unconditionally 
with female agents, and females will tend to exploit or take advantage of males' un­
conditional cooperation. In this exploitative scenario, female agents are able to cover 
their high reproductive costs and, consequently, will reproduce faster. Conversely, 
when female and male reproductive efforts are equally high, inter and intra-sex co­
operation will tend to emerge, although this reciprocal structure of cooperation does 
not always allow female agents to reproduce faster, so fewer simulations will reach the 
maximum number of agents—most of them will become extinct. The results also in­
dicate the evolution of a certain flexibility and opportunistic behaviour between sexes, 
not just in eliciting cooperative breeding, but also in providing it: the more help female 
agents receive from other female agents, the less help they will elicit from males.
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Further analyses presented in Subsection 5.4.2 showed that this negative correlation 
is brought about by the emergence of male 'non-reciprocal altruism', in which a signi­
ficant proportion of males cooperate with females even though the latter (mostly) do 
not reciprocate—male agents re able to afford to receive the sucker payoff in favour of 
female agents since their reproductive costs are much lower. In this scenario, female 
agents reproduce faster, so the agent population describes an exponential growth. Al­
though full cooperation among the agents, regardless of their sex, does evolve, it oc­
curs rarely, and it produces steady population growth. Finally, the analysis described 
in Subsection 5.4.3 determined that inter-sex interactions in simulations describing 
exponential population growth are ruled by the evolution in almost one third of the 
males of unconditional cooperation and, conversely, by the evolution of female defec­
tion towards males (approximately a 50 percent of females). Two interconnected phe­
nomena occur: on the one hand, given their high reproductive costs, female agents 
need to exploit male cooperation, so females directly enhance their direct fitness by 
adopting defecting strategies to play against cooperative males; on the other, uncon­
ditional cooperative alleles among males are also selected, since they provide a source 
of indirect fitness for female agents, and males can afford the sucker payoff due to their 
low reproductive costs.
The results presented in this chapter predict the evolution of different strategies to 
cope with the challenge of reproduction when female reproductive effort is high. The 
ABM, despite its simplicity in the modelled mechanisms and dynamics, provides com­
plex results that can be falsifiable in real life situations. Primates and humans are ideal 
for such an endeavour due to variability in their cooperative relationships and par­
ental investment. Some suggestions regarding the significance of these results can be 
made in the context of previous work in the primate and human realm. This point will 
be discussed further in the Chapter 'Conclusions and Discussions' of this thesis (See 
Chapter 7).
Chapter
Population Dynamics and Cultural 
Evolution
The measure of subsistence is that of the population
Marquis de Mirabeau, L'Ami des hommes, 1756
6.1 Introduction
For centuries, population dynamics have been the focus of continuous attention. Since 
the eighteenth century, with the rise of the nation states, populations have been thought 
of as a set of processes that can be measured, regulated and managed. For this reason 
one of the greatest thinkers of our time, Michel Foucault, stated that what matters 
the most for both politicians and social scientists is to understand "what is natural in 
these processes" (Foucault, 2007, p. 98). As discussed in Chapter 5, the emergence and 
evolution of cooperative breeding, particularly male non-reciprocal altruism, seems to 
have an effect on the different trajectories that a population of agents can describe over 
time. This might be one of those natural processes that drove our evolution as cultural 
beings. According to Foucault, however, scientists and politicians are interested in the 
natural processes that underpin population growth because this knowledge helps to 
reinforce domination by the powerful; the study of these natural processes has been 
a bio-political strategy to subjugate. However, the conclusion obtained from our ana-
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lysis is far from discouraging. The ABM discussed in the previous Chapter relates 
some of the 'better angels of our nature' (Pinker, 2011), such as social cooperation, al­
truism, and the importance of child care, to our fate as a collective. By knowing that 
our most important achievement, our faculty for symbolic communication, is rooted 
in this hardwired ability to direct our attention to others, to understand them as inten­
tional beings like the self, to care for them and for their children, to be able to estab­
lishing meaningful interactions with others despite the fact that communication itself 
is improbable, facilitates our ability to reject and question the practices and beliefs 
that Foucault identified (most of the time, rightly) as oppressive, because we know 
competition, conflict and domination are not our primary and natural tendencies.
Thus, the simulation results presented in Chapter 5 predict that the emergence of co­
operative breeding, and in particular male non-reciprocal altruism, modifies the dy­
namics of the system, producing a phase transition from steady population growth 
to exponential population growth. This transition phase is explained by faster female 
reproduction rates, thanks to the unconditional cooperation they receive from others, 
especially from males. Comparisons among primate species with and without co­
operative breeding systems reveals a clear pattern. In species with allomaternal care, 
infants grow faster and their mothers breed again after shorter intervals. Presumably 
this is because mothers benefit from alloparents in different ways: they save energy, 
are better fed themselves and, after they give birth, can recover their weight faster 
(Ross and MacLarnon, 2000).
As I shall show in the next Chapter, callitrichid females, consisting of marmosets and 
tamarins, have unusually rapid reproduction rates—they can give birth to twins up to 
twice in each year—because of their cooperative breeding system, which includes re­
lated and non-related adults within the group, mainly adult males (Digby and Ferrari, 
1994). A similar pattern is observed in human societies: despite the fact of producing 
the most expensive offspring, human mothers living in 'natural' conditions (by gath­
ering and hunting) breed faster than other apes (Quinlan and Quinlan, 2007). The lo­
gical consequence of higher reproductive rates —setting aside environmental and so- 
cioecological constraints that were not included in these simulations—is a higher rate 
of population growth; and the empirical evidence in human and non-human prim-
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ates discussed so far confirms this relationship between cooperative breeding and its 
impact on demography and population dynamics.
The issue to be explored now is the possible relationship between population dens­
ity and cultural evolution, particularly, the socioecological conditions that favour the 
evolution of complex cultural artefacts, such as symbolic ones. Having demonstrated 
how lexicons can endogenously emerge and converge in asymptotic learning, ex­
amined the best communicative strategy to spread cultural signs in a population of 
independent agents, and having addressed the social niche in which human commu­
nication was possible at all, in particular the pre-linguistic stage of cooperation, the 
focus now turns to the conditions for cumulative cultural evolution, that is, to under­
stand the process by which a population of individuals can reach a regime of cumu­
lative and adaptive cultural skills, capable of sustaining the development of complex 
cultural artefacts. To do so, the simulation results presented in Chapter 5 will be used, 
particularly those related to population dynamics. Although the ABM presented in 
that chapter does not include any explicit representation of cultural skills, possible re­
gimes of cumulative cultural evolution in all these artificial societies will be inferred, 
taking into account their historical dynamics.
This chapter begins by addressing the increasing literature on population dynamics 
and its relation to cultural evolution (Section 6.2) and suggests that some simulation 
results can be related to that literature, particularly the patterns of population growth, 
already observed, focusing on cooperation, population growth and social density (Sec­
tion 6.3). A mathematical model of cumulative cultural evolution which relates pop­
ulation growth and adaptive or maladaptive changes in cultural skills is then intro­
duced, demonstrating that the artificial societies in which non-reciprocal cooperation 
emerge are able to sustain more complex cultural artefacts, such as communicative 
symbols (Section 6.4). The main findings, after using that mathematical model, are 
then presented. The chapter closes with a synthesis and some concluding remarks 
(Section 6.5).
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6.2 Cultural Evolution
While the mechanisms that drive cumulative cultural evolution are complex, on a 
broad scale there is a clear association between population size and social complexity. 
Several authors have related demography and population dynamics to cultural and 
social complexity Durkheim's (1893) classic analysis of the social division of labour es­
tablished a clear relation between higher population density and more complex modes 
of social organisation. As the frequency of social connections or interactions increases 
in a population (what he refer to as 'moral density'), the separation of the constituent 
social units begins to increase. In his words:
The division of labor develops (. . .) as there are more individuals suffi­
ciently in contact to be able to act and react upon one another. If we agree 
to call this relation and the active commerce resulting from it dynamic or 
moral density, we can say that the progress of the division of labor is in 
direct ratio to the moral or dynamic density of society. (Durkheim, 1893, p.
257)
Social complexity, as internal differentiation (i.e., division of labour) and consequent 
inter-dependence among the units (the 'active commerce resulting from' the divi­
sion of labour), results from higher population densities. Population density has 
also important implications for the so-called phenomenon of the 'wisdom of crowds' 
(Surowiecki, 2004): the idea that aggregating or averaging the imperfect, distributed 
knowledge of a large group of people can (often) yield better information. However, 
Surowiecki believed that, if a group of individuals in a population exert an excessive 
influence on those around them, a 'herding' instinct can kick in, and people will rally 
around an idea that could turn out to be wrong. In fact, earlier models, such as opinion 
dynamics simulations (Deffuant et al., 2002, 2000; Weisbuch et al., 2002), showed the 
perils of information cascades (Bikhchandani et al., 1992, 1998), in which large groups 
of people abandon whatever private information they have and, for perfectly rational 
reasons, follow the crowd; this observational learning may lead to the propagation of 
the wrong decision, preventing the efficient aggregation of information (see Smith and
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Sorensen, 2000).
However, Acemoglu and his colleagues (2011) suggested that the danger of informa­
tion cascades may not be as dire as it previously seemed. They developed a mathem­
atical model that described attempts by members of a social network to make binary 
decisions on the basis of decisions made by their neighbours (i.e., a sequential learn­
ing model over a social network). The model assumed that for all the members there 
is a single right decision, so these researchers were able to study the conditions un­
der which there will be asymptotic learning, that is, population convergence towards 
the action that yields the higher payoff. Acemoglu and his colleagues demonstrated 
that asymptotic learning exists even in large populations, because information can eas­
ily flow through the individuals' personal social connections. Therefore, bigger pop­
ulations and denser social connections can bring about asymptotic learning on the 
'right' innovations and decisions. This demonstrates that social networks can have an 
enormous impact on cumulative cultural evolution. But, although social networks can 
facilitate the spreading of cultural innovations and asymptotic social learning, they do 
not produce the innovations. So social networks are just part of the story, although an 
extremely important one.
At least two models of cumulative cultural evolution predict that larger populations 
have more diverse and more complex tool kits (see Kline and Boyd, 2010). On the 
one hand, cultural transmission might be understood as subject to a process analog­
ous to 'genetic drift' (Neiman, 1995; Sherman, 2001): cumulative cultural evolution 
is the result of selectively neutral variation—evolutionary mutations caused by random 
drift of selectively neutral mutants—into finite social-learning populations and the 
sampling error in the cultural transmission of that variation. This means that cultural 
variants are lost by chance when their practitioners are not imitated, which might be 
because these cultural innovators are poor in social capital (Putnam, 2001), unsociable 
or die unexpectedly, and thus their special skills are lost to the population. The rate 
of loss owing to cultural drift depends on the population size, so in small populations 
it would be higher than in larger ones because such random losses are more likely. 
This model predicts that lost traits can be reintroduced by the flow of people or ideas 
from other populations, so the equilibrium amount of variation depends on the rate
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of contact between groups.
On the other hand, cumulative cultural evolution might be understood as subject to 
error, and since errors will usually degrade complex adaptive traits, most 'pupils' will 
not attain the level of expertise of their cultural models. This process is counterbal­
anced by the rare ability of some individuals to learn selectively from their cultural 
models and surpass them (Henrich, 2004). As in the cultural drift models, learners 
in larger populations have access to a larger pool of cultural models, making such 
improvements more likely. Contact among different populations replenishes adapt­
ive variants lost by chance, leading to higher levels of standing variation and, con­
sequently, more adaptive traits (Powell et al., 2009). Therefore, both models predict 
that, in the same economic and ecological circumstances, smaller, isolated populations 
will have simpler cultural artefacts, establishing a clear link between demography and 
cultural evolution.
Existing empirical evidence bearing on this hypothesis has increased during the last 
decade or so. Henrich (2004) developed a model of cumulative cultural evolution 
using as an exemplary case the curious aspects of Tasmanian cultural evolution, ob­
served from the beginning of the Holocene era to the arrival of Europeans (an 8,000 
year time span). This period of time starts with the isolation from mainland Aus­
tralia of the peninsula of "Greater Tasmania" (115,000 km2), which first separated from 
Australia between 12,000 and 13,500 B.P., leaving an ocean crossing of 60 km to the 
mainland. Over the next 6,000-7,000 years, rising seas further inundated the Bassian 
plain and reduced Tasmania to its present size of 67,800 km2. During that period of 
time, Tasmanians lost a series of valuable skills and technologies, such as bone tools, 
cold-weather clothing, barbed spears, and fishing, although simpler tool kits evolved. 
Henrich attributes these losses to the isolation of Tasmania from the mainland, which 
reduced its population size.
Another study conducted by Powell and his colleagues (2009) addressed the cultural 
transition of the Upper Palaeolithic which occurred about 45,000 years ago, using a 
model similar to the one presented by Henrich. This research showed that demo­
graphy is a major determinant in the maintenance of cultural complexity and that vari­
6.2. Cultural Evolution 167
ation in regional subpopulation density and/or migratory activity results in spatial 
structuring of cultural skill accumulation. They conclude that demographic factors, 
especially changes in population size and intergroup interactions, can explain geo­
graphic variation in the timing of the first appearance of modern behaviour without 
invoking increased cognitive capacity. Similarly, Kline and Boyd (2010) established 
that population size predicts technological complexity, specifically foraging tool kits, 
among island populations in Oceania. Their research showed that both the number of 
tools used for marine foraging and the average complexity of the tools are higher in 
large populations than in small, isolated ones.
Demography and population dynamics not only alter the evolution of material arte­
facts and 'know-hows', such as tools and technologies; the evolution of complex sym­
bolic artefacts such as language can also be affected by population size, although in an 
inverse direction. Whilst tools and technologies tend to be more complex when pop­
ulation size increases, the opposite is observed in the case of languages. Lupyan and 
Dale (2010) examined the relationship between social and linguistic structure by ana­
lysing a sample of 2,236 languages and large-scale demographic information. They 
distinguished two main contexts (or 'niches') in which languages are learned and 
used: the exoteric and the esoteric, which, rather than two exclusive categories, consti­
tute the two extremes of a continuum. The exoteric linguistic niche contains languages 
with a large number of speakers, greater geographical coverage, and a greater degree 
of contact with other languages—so these languages serve as interfaces for commu­
nication among strangers (some examples are: English, Swahili, and Hindi). These au­
thors determined that languages that are on the exoteric side of the esoteric-exoteric 
continuum had overall simpler morphological systems, more frequently express se­
mantic distinctions using lexical means, and were less grammatically specified. Over­
all, the population size (i.e., 'speaker population' or number of speakers) provided 
the most predictive power in their model of language structure. The authors explain 
these differences offering a functionalist account: language structures are subjected 
to different evolutionary pressures in different social niches. Thus, the morpholo­
gical overspecification of esoteric niches is a result of a pressure to facilitate learning 
of the language by infants (without regard for adult learnability, which is irrelevant
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for languages that are not being learned by adults). In consequence, what appears 
to be functionless overspecification may provide infants with multiple cues, allow­
ing language acquisition to proceed with less reliance on extralinguistic context. On 
the contrary, languages spoken by millions of people over a diverse region are under 
greater pressure to be leamable by adult outsiders and this pressure gradually results 
in morphological simplification.
In a similar study. Walker and Hamilton (2011) demonstrated that the evolution of 
social complexity in the Austronesian and Bantu population expansions affected the 
evolution of linguistic diversity within these two language families. The Austrone­
sian social complexity, whose population expansion comprised of multiple discrete 
colonisation events of widely dispersed islands land masses, frequent demographic 
bottlenecks and unavoidable isolation by distance of local populations, produced a 
larger linguistic diversity compared with the Bantu social complexity, whose pop­
ulation expansion was almost entirely a terrestrial process, where colonising agri­
cultural populations displaced, assimilated and converted much of the indigenous 
hunter-gatherer and pastoralist populations of sub-Saharan Africa to agriculture, and 
involved fewer and less severe demographic bottlenecks by maintaining greater pop­
ulation connectivity.
6.3 Cooperation and Social Density
The ABM reviewed in Chapter 5 was built to study the pre-linguistic stage of cooper­
ation among individuals required for the emergence of symbolic communication. As 
many authors have claimed (Luhmann, 1996; Parsons and Shils, 2001; Quine, 1968), 
the origin of symbolic communication is highly problematic, because it requires the 
overcoming of a series of non-trivial obstacles, whose solution requires costly invest­
ments in coordination and cooperation. For this reason, it is likely that the first mean­
ingful gestures or symbols emerged in collaborative and ritualised contexts. As To- 
masello claims, z/[h]uman cooperative communication thus evolved first within the 
bounds of collaborative activities because these activities provided the needed com­
mon ground for establishing joint topics" (Tomasello, 2009, p. 73). Among all forms 
of cooperation and collaborative activities that human beings undertake to assist and
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take care o f others, coop erative  b reed in g  se em s to be the m o st rem arkable. The A BM  
w e  d iscu ssed  tack led  the orig ins o f  th is behaviour. Let u s an a lyse  the m ain  fin d in gs  
o n  the relation  b e tw e en  coop eration  an d  p o p u la tio n  dynam ics.
Inter-Sex Interactions
Exponential 
® Steady
e Extinction
- 0.2
I---------- 1-----------1----------1-----------1---------- 1
0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000
Maximum Time Reached
Figure 6.1: Bubble plot for the coop, differences in inter-sex interactions (Vi). The plot shows the rela­
tionship between population dynamics, cooperation differences in intra-sex interactions and maximum  
time reached. The size o f the bubble and L7 correspond to the averaged population size, over the last 10 
generations for each sinndation. Bubbles are coloured according to the types of population dynamics: 
'Exponential growth' (N  =  6), 'Extinction' (N  = 15), and 'Steady growth' (N  =  4).
Tw o b ub ble p lo ts , for inter- and  intra-sex interactions, are sh o w n  to  represent the 25 
sim u la tion s carried ou t to sam p le  the param eter sp ace g iv e n  b y  =  0.1. In F ig­
ures 6.1 an d  6.2 every  b u b b le represents o n e  sim u la tion  an d  its s ize  is p rop ortional 
to the averaged  p op u la tion  s ize  d u rin g  the last 10 gen erations. S ince the s im u la tion s  
exp erien ce three d ifferent p o p u la tio n  d yn am ics, the b u b b les in  the p lo ts are co lou red  
to represent each  group. T hese b ub ble p lo ts w ere b u ilt averag in g  the last 10 g en era ­
tions (so the com p arison s can  in clu d e the sim u la tion s that w en t extinct) for b oth  the  
p o p u la tio n  s ize  and for d ifferences in  coop eration  b e tw e en  and w ith in  sexes. T h ey  d e ­
pict in  graphical term s the relation sh ip  b etw een  coop eration  (i.e., inter- and intra-sex
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coop eration), p o p u la tio n  s ize  an d  tim e.
Intra-Sex Interactions
Exponential 
® Steady 
® Extinction
15 0.5
#
-
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Maximum Time Reached
Figure 6.2: Bubble plot for the coop, differences in intra-sex interactions (h?)- The plot shows the rela­
tionship between population dynamics, cooperation differences in intra-sex interactions and maximum  
time reached. The size o f the bubble and A i corresponds to the averaged population size, over the last 10 
generations for each simulation.
Figure 6.1 d escrib es a clear pattern: in  exp on en tia l g row th  sim u la tion s, the (averaged) 
difference b etw e en  in ter-sex coop eration  is a lw a y s p o sit iv e  and, in  fact, q u ite h igh . 
This d em on strate that fem ales are u su a lly  coop eratin g  le ss  w ith  m a les than  m ales  w ith  
fem ales (for th is reason  the d ifference b e tw e en  them  is p o sitiv e). In contrast, the s im ­
u la tion s that w en t extin ct are all grou p ed  around  zero  d ifference, w h ich  in d icates that 
m ales and fem ales w ere p erform in g  w ith  sim ilar le v e ls  o f coop eration . U n fortu n ate ly  
sin ce there w ere just four sim u la tion s that describ ed  stead y  p o p u la tio n  grow th , it is  
problem atic to extract con clu sion s ab out this group . Scru tin isin g  the sam e p lot, but 
for intra-sex interactions, in  F igure 6.2, the p icture is totally  different. There is a b ig  
d isp ersion  around the y-axis, esp ecia lly  b etw een  the grou p  o f sim u la tion s that w en t  
extinct an d  the o n es that d escribed  exp on en tia l grow th . It can  b e con clu d ed  that the  
m ost im portan t d ifference b etw een  the grou p s is g iv e n  by the characteristics o f inter-
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sex  interactions.
(a) Time step =  0; iV =  250 (b) Time step =  28, 500; TV =  54
LongitudeLongitude
(c) Time step =  64,700; N  =  252 (d) Time step =  82, 200; TV =  2,502
Figure 6.3: Population density for one simulation run that exhibited exponential growth at four  
different stages. Figures plot the agents' location in the x-coordinates (i.e., longitude) and 
y-coordinates (i.e., latitude). Darker areas indicate clusters or areas with high population density. 
Some random variation was added to the data to prevent overlap.
The A BM  reported  in  the p rev iou s chapter d o es  n ot m o d e l either the tran sm ission  
of cu ltural e lem en ts or an exp lic it n etw ork  topology . H ow ever, there is an  in terest­
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ing pattern of 'clustering' in which many individuals are grouped in a few, highly 
dense clusters over the lattice. This clustering pattern, the evolution of which can be 
observed in Figure 6.3, is a good proxy for the effects of cooperative breeding on popu­
lation density—in this figure, N  represents population size. The images on that figure 
depict the evolution of population density in one simulation that described exponen­
tial growth and, consequently, male non-reciprocal altruism evolved.
As can be seen in Subfigure 6.3(a), the simulation is initialised with the 250 agents 
randomly distributed over the lattice. Over time, this simulation described a dramatic 
reduction in population size, as can be observed in Subfigure 6.3(b), which drove the 
simulation near to the limit of extinction, with only 54 agents. That small population 
size promoted the evolution of male non-reciprocal altruism, because conditional co­
operative females were able to retaliate against non-cooperative males, whose fitness 
decreased. Unconditional cooperative alleles among males were thus selected. From 
that point, the population size started to grow. Subfigure 6.3(b) depicts the inception 
of the clustering pattern that clearly emerged when the simulation recovered its ini­
tial population size, in Subfigure 6.3(c) (note the long period of population recovery 
between that Subfigure and Subfigure 6.3(b), which indicates a regime of steady popu­
lation growth). Finally, the population growth eventually took off, until the maximum 
number of agents was reached. Subfigure 6.3(d) shows the last simulation step, when 
at least 5 dense groups of agents are clearly defined.
As noted, the environment is neutral and agents do not move on it. However, the 
clustering effect discussed above can be explained by the faster reproductive rates of 
some agents in the simulations, once cooperative breeding has emerged. Since the 
offspring are located one step away from one of the two parents, clusters of agents in 
fact represent groups of agents that produce more offspring. The results show a clear 
association between cooperative breeding and population density.
Cooperative breeding, together with some human-specific abilities and enhanced so­
cial cognition, might well have propped up cultural evolution. Since with higher 
child survival rates, faster reproductive rates and extended longevity, the popula­
tion density within the groups increases, as does the number of the so-called cul­
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tural models present within the population, that is, particularly skilful individuals who 
produce cultural innovations, the small group that constitutes the cultural innovat­
ors from whom other individuals can learn. Evidence from both field and laborat­
ory studies shows that humans possess a psychological propensity to pay attention 
to, and attempt to imitate, particularly skilful, successful or prestigious individuals 
(Henrich and Gil-White, 2001; Henrich and McElreath, 2003). This tendency to ori­
ent one's social learning attention towards cultural models creates a selective force in 
cultural transmission that may, under some circumstances, generate cumulative ad­
aption (Henrich, 2004). This allows the so-called 'ratchet effect' (Tomasello, 2000) in 
which cultural artefacts, either material or symbolic, accumulate modifications over 
time1. Enhanced social cognitive capabilities allow individuals to exploit this body of 
adaptive knowledge stored in the learned behavioural repertoire of the population. 
In summary, with increasing population density, made possible only because humans 
were already good at cooperating, there is little doubt that groups with greater internal 
cohesion would prevail over less cooperative groups (Richerson and Boyd, 2005). Re­
cent models of cumulative cultural evolution and diffusion of technological innova­
tions predict that larger pools of interacting social learners will generate more rapid 
cultural change, and will be capable of achieving higher equilibrium levels of skill, 
knowledge, and technological accomplishment compared with small, isolated popu­
lations.
6.4 The Model
As observed before, the simulations presented in Chapter 5 do not incorporate an 
explicit evaluation of cumulative cultural evolution. However, simple mathematical 
models that link population dynamics and cultural evolution can be applied to the 
simulation results in an informative exercise to evaluate the rates at which simple and 
complex cultural artefacts could evolve, considering the different patterns of popula­
tion growth that the simulations produced (see Figure 5.5). To do so, it is assumed 
that the agents are endowed with some cognitive abilities for learning. There are dif­
1 However, the metaphor of 'ratchet effect' that Tomasello uses to describe cumulative cultural evolu­
tion may be misleading, since, as we will see later in this chapter, cultural artefacts and technologies can 
indeed devolve, for cultural processes can produce maladaptive losses of socially acquired skills.
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ferent mathematical models that relate population size and cumulative cultural evol­
ution. Here, Henrich's transmission model (2004) is adopted and explored. This 
model demonstrates that under certain critical conditions, directly biased cultural 
transmission—cultural transmission brought about by individuals imitating just cer­
tain kinds of people—can lead to cumulative adaptation of a culturally inherited skill, 
even when the transmission process is inaccurate. The model assumes that humans 
possess a psychological propensity to imitate skilful, successful and/or prestigious 
individuals, who are known as 'cultural models'.
Henrich's model is formalised as follows. Consider a population of N  individuals 
or social learners who are indexed by i, and i G N > 0. These individuals vary in 
a skill that involves at least some culturally transmittable components, for instance, 
net-manufacturing techniques. The variable Zi gives a measure of this attribute for 
each individual i, and z £ R  Each of the N  individuals is also characterised by a 
variable /  that specifies the relative likelihood that an individual will be chosen as a 
cultural model. If people's social learning attention is drawn towards the most skilful 
individual, h, and larger values of z  lead to more complex skills, then /  and z  will have 
a positive partial regression coefficient (of course, other things can affect f  as well). In 
this model, the pool of individuals could represent the same group of individuals 
(same net-makers, for instance) from one year to the next, or it could be different 
generations or cohorts. Henrich adapted the Price Equation (Gardner, 2008; Price, 
1970,1972) to study the combined effects of selective transmission and inaccuracy on 
continuous representations. This equation is defined as follows
A z  = Cov (fi,Zi) + E  (fi ■ Azi )  (6.1)
where A z  is the change in the average value of z%, that is z, of the N  individuals. If 
Az is positive, then adaptive evolution is taking place because, for example, individu­
als are becoming better net-makers. Cov (fi, z*) is the covariation between fi  and z%, 
and gives the effect of selective cultural forces on Az. In the Price Equation this term 
represents the 'reproductive success' of the character, that is, the change that can be 
ascribed to the action of selection; in this case, it captures the psychological tendency
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to imitate successful or skilful individuals. It is assumed, therefore, that all learners at­
tempt to imitate the most skilled individual. E  (fi • Az*) is the replicability-weighted 
average effect of all the individual intra-psychic transformations on cultural repres­
entations (or inferential processes), which, in the Price Equation, expresses how much 
individuals differ from their models (or the change due to errors in transmission). 
Assuming that everyone imitates the most skilful individual or cultural model, h, so 
fh = 1 and f-,^ = 0, equation (6.1) is reduced to equation (6.2):
Az = Z h ~ z  + Azh  (6.2)
For a population with skills distributed approximately according to the Gumbel distri­
bution (Gumbel, 1954) with mode a (not a) and dispersion (3 , z (=a  + {3-£) represents 
the mean value of z in the current population, and z/* is the expected value of the 
highest values drawn from a sample of size N.  According to the mathematical de­
rivations made by Henrich (2004, Appendix A: Details of the Derivation), z& can be 
approximated by equation (6.3)
Z h~  a + (3(e + Ln (N))  (6.3)
where Ln(N)  is the natural logarithm of N ,  the number of social learners in the pop­
ulation, and the parameter e is the Euler-gamma constant, which % 0.577. To cap­
ture the idea that inferential processes are incomplete or 'noisy', it is assumed that 
the inferential processes that underpin social learning are inaccurate in two senses: 
first, imitators never accurately replicate the z^-value of their cultural models, and 
second, they are biased so that the behaviour acquired by imitators is, on average, 
less skilled than the behaviour of their model. More formally, in Heinrich's model 
each individual who attempts to imitate a cultural model with z-value, z/*, ends up 
with a z-value also drawn from a Gumbel probability distribution with mode Zh — a  
and dispersion /?. Figure 6.4 presents in graphical terms this idea. Typically, imitators 
construct representations that are on average worse than z/, by an amount a, but occa­
sionally—through conscious innovation, lucky guesses or errors—a few individuals
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construct representations that yield z-values higher than their model. To determine 
the size of the individual's imitation error, equation (6.4) can be established:
Azh  =  —o + /3 • £ (6.4)
Finally, replacing equation (6.3) and equation (6.4) in equation (6.2) yields
A z  = —a + /3 (e + L n (N ) )  (6.5)
where the first term, —a, represents the effect of systematic errors and is always neg­
ative—it operates against adaptive evolution. (3, Ln(N)  and £ are all always positive, 
so the second term is always positive and favours adaptive evolution. This means 
that adaptive cultural evolution depends on the relative sizes of the two terms. In­
terestingly as Henrich and Boyd (2002) claimed, in this model the two components, 
systematic bias (measured by a) and random noise (measured by (3), have opposite 
effects on adaptive evolution. Systematic bias operates against adaptive evolution, 
while noise—the tendency of individuals to make different inferences from observing 
the cultural model's behaviour—favours adaptive evolution. The more individuals 
tend to make different inferences, the faster cumulative cultural evolution goes (or the 
more likely it is to be adaptive). Similarly the larger the population of social learners, 
N , the faster adaptive evolution proceeds (or the more likely selective forces will fa­
vour adaptive processes).
The two components in equation (6.5) that represent human inference, a  and /?, arise 
from an interplay between things being learned and human cognitive processes (Hen­
rich and Boyd, 2002). Thus, the ratio of these two components expresses the com­
plexity of some specific cultural trait, that is, the different rates of cultural adaptation. 
As shown in Figure 6.4, a  represents how difficult it is to imitate accurately the cul­
tural model's behaviour and fi represents the dispersion of cognitive inferences in the 
population of learners, that is, whether imitators make the same or different kinds of 
mistakes. Four possible scenarios can be modelled by this ratio: 1) if something is easy 
to imitate and people vary little in the inference they make during the imitation pro­
cess, then both a  and fi are small; 2) if something is hard to imitate, but people tend to
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m ake the sam e m istak es, then  a  w ill be large, w h ils t  (3 w ill  b e sm all; 3) if so m eth in g  is  
difficult to im itate an d  p eo p le  m ake w id e ly  d ifferent in ferences, then  b o th  a  an d  /3 w ill  
b e large; 4) if p eo p le  gen era lly  m ake fairly accurate in ferences in  learn ing  so m eth in g , 
b u t so m etim es d iverge  w id e ly  in  their efforts, then  a  w ill b e sm all and  /3 large.
Model's zh Value
Imitator's z, Value
Figure 6.4: Gumbel probability distribution for imperfect imitation, with mode z/-t -  a  and dispersion
P-
Finally, F leinrich (2004) so lv ed  eq u ation  (6.5) for the co n d itio n s u n d er w h ich  se lec tive  
tran sm ission  w ill d rive ad ap tive  cu ltural ev o lu tio n , or gen erate m a lad ap tive  lo sses , 
estab lish in g  the critical n um ber o f socia l learners. A7"*, n ecessary  to p rod u ce cu m u la t­
iv e  cu ltural ev o lu tio n  for a sp ec ified  set o f in ferential p rocesses (exp ressed  in  the ratio  
o f q  and fi va lu es), w h ich , in  turn, relate to sp ecific sk ills , tech n o log ies, or practices. 
T his relation  sh o w e d  that N *  m u st exceed  a thresh old  d eterm in ed  by the ratio o f a  
an d  fi to p rod u ce cu m u la tive  cu ltural ev o lu tio n . T hus, larger v a lu es o f a  or sm aller  
v a lu es o f P w ill increase the m in im u m  threshold  s ize  o f the p o o l o f social learners. If 
N *  is le ss  than  this threshold , Az w ill be less than  zero, and cu lturally  acquired  sk ills .
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k n o w led g e , and related tech n o log ies  w ill b eg in  to  b e forgotten.
The p o p u la tio n  d yn am ic exh ib ited  b y  the sim u la tion  resu lts can  b e u sed  to inject the  
variab les that th is s im p le  m ath em atica l m o d e l requires. A s already stated , the A BM  
p resen ted  here d o es  n ot in c lu d e  an y cu ltural trait to  b e learned . In order to  com p are  
the k ind  o f cu ltural artefacts that cou ld  e v o lv e  in  the s im u lation s, the sim u la tion s  
d escrib in g  exp on en tia l and stea d y  g row th  w ere an a lysed , settin g  a sid e th ose s im u la ­
tion s that w en t extinct, sin ce, b y  d efin ition , cu ltural artefacts cou ld  n o t e v o lv e  in  th ose  
p op u la tion s. 31 o f the 250 sim u la tion s d escrib ed  exp on en tia l g row th  an d  reached  
the m a x im u m  n um ber o f agen ts (i.e., 2,500), and  27 sim u la tion s d escrib ed  a s tead y  
g row th , a lth ou gh  th ey  d id  n ot reach the m a x im u m  n um ber o f agents. A  com p arison  
o f the reg im es of cu ltural ev o lu tio n  that th ese  s im u la tion s co u ld  exp erien ce, g iv e n  
their p o p u la tio n  s izes , is p resen ted  in  F igure 6.5.
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Rapid adaptation 
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Slow adaptation Simpler ski]
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 E x p o n e n tia l  G ro w th
500 1000 1500 2000  2500
N (effective size of the pool of social m odels)
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Figure 6.5: D iffe re n tia l effec ts o f  th e  p o o l s iz e  o f  so c ia l lea rn ers  ( N )  on  the e v o lu tio n  o f  's im p le ' a n d  
'co m p lex ' c u ltu r a l  a r te fa c ts . G re y  area  re p re sen ts  th e  s ta n d a r d  e rro r  o f  m ean  (9 5 %  con fid en ce ) f o r  the  
p o p u la tio n  s iz e  o f  th e  27 s im u la t io n s  th a t d esc r ib e d  s te a d y  p o p u la tio n  g r o w th .
Since the sim u la tion s that describe exp on en tia l g ro w th  reached the m axim u m  n u m -
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ber of agents before the time limit, the population size for those simulations are rep­
resented by a dashed line over 2,500. On the other hand, simulations that describe 
steady population growth reached the maximum time limit, but the population size 
in these 27 simulations varied widely (population statistics: SG  ±  SE-^q — 436.04, 
192.30, N  = 27). For this reason, both the group mean of these simulations and the 
standard error of mean are represented in Figure 6.5 by a dotted line and a grey area, 
respectively. As can be seen there, two different technologies/skills are associated 
with different values of a  and (3. For the more 'complex skills' (i.e., harder to learn), 
which are represented by the ratio = 8, larger pools of social learners are required to 
achieve cumulative cultural evolution, compared with the pools of social learners re­
quired for 'simple skills' (i.e., easer to learn), which are represented by the ratio § =  6. 
Thus, considering the same timespan, simulations characterised by steady population 
growth can, on average, just achieve slow rates of adaptation for simple skills or tech­
nologies (and that regime persists even when we take account of the sample variance 
around the mean population size) and they cannot achieve a regime of cumulative 
cultural evolution for more complex skills.
Henrich's (2004) model predicts that, for complex skills, simulations describing a steady 
population growth would show a regime of maladaptive loss, which means that these 
artificial societies would lose those complex skills—provided they had been able to 
develop them. This consideration can shed light on the simulation results reported 
here. As discussed in Subsection 5.4.2, the group of simulations identified as 'steady 
population growth' also includes some simulations that exhibited an increase in the 
population over time, almost exponential, but then the population dynamics suddenly 
crashed or stabilised (see second plot in Figure 5.5). It can be argued that, although 
not all the simulations that exhibit steady population growth will reach a regime of 
'skill deterioration', at least for some of them this can be the case, because a period of 
exponential growth can be followed by a period of stabilisation or population decline. 
On the other hand, for those simulations in which the population size grew exponen­
tially the model predicts a rapid adaptation of simple cultural artefacts and a slow 
rate of cultural improvement of more complex skills.
Finally as seen in Figure 6.5, the model does not predict a general process of 'cultural
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devolution' across the entire spectrum of cultural domains in those artificial societ­
ies with smaller population sizes. Simple technologies could evolve and improve, 
but since the pool of learners is small, these societies would not develop complex 
cultural artefacts. Therefore, the level of cultural complexity that it is predicted for 
these two groups of simulations varies greatly: the most complex technologies and 
practices—i.e., those that are more difficult to learn (high values of #)—should be ab­
sent or at least deteriorate in the simulations that exhibit steady population growth, 
whilst these skills should evolve in the simulations that describe exponential popula­
tion growth.
6.5 Summary
To sum up, in this chapter we have described how the simulation results from Chapter 
5 can be analysed using a simple mathematical model of cumulative cultural evolu­
tion. This model allows the identification of the potential regimes of adaptive gains or 
maladaptive losses of complex cultural skills. It has been established that those sim­
ulations that reached exponential growth—a dynamics that is explained by the emer­
gence of male non-reciprocal altruism—can sustain a regime of accumulation and im­
provement in the needed skills to develop complex cultural artefacts. The simulations 
that described a steady population growth cannot reach these regimes, although they 
can develop simpler artefacts. I claim that this model can shed light on the evolution 
of more complex artefacts, such as symbols and languages.
Chapter
Discussions and Conclusions
But if we are to understand the ultimate origins of human 
communication, both phylogenetically and ontogentically, 
we must look outside of communication itself and into hu­
man cooperation more generally.
Michael Tomasello, Origins of Human Communication, 2008
7.1 Introduction
To address the emergence and evolution of symbolic communication as a research 
topic is a difficult task. The recent blossoming of evolutionary linguistics, cognitive 
and neurosciences, developmental psychology and computational linguistics has res­
ulted in a variety of theories and research programmes that attempt to provide sci­
entific explanations and unravel hard topics. Among these stand out topics such as 
the selective scenario for the stabilisation of early language; plausible cognitive mech­
anisms for language acquisition and production; and the artificial manipulation of 
natural languages. In recent decades, symbolic communication has been the object 
of extensive academic study and debate, as well as receiving a great deal of attention 
from the public. Perhaps the enormous interest that elucidating the origins of lan­
guage produces in so many people lies in the fact that our faculty of language and 
symbols is related to fundamental questions about human origins and human nature. 
To understand ourselves we need to understand how and why language works the
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way it works, where it came from, and how it has evolved. Evidently, these kinds 
of questions require an interdisciplinary approach. Paradoxically, the overabundance 
of perspectives and explanations makes many researchers sceptical of such theorising 
(Christiansen and Kirby, 2003b; Szâmadô and Szathmary, 2006). Some scientists still 
claim that a more rigorous approach is needed although, despite justified scepticism, 
there is no agreement about the criteria that should be used to determine the validity 
of the various competing theories. Thus, language and human communication still 
have the paradoxical status of being something we all use and, at the same time, one 
of the most difficult problems in science. For this reason, the field is still full of oppor­
tunities for innovative perspectives and researchers willing to respond to old and new 
questions.
This thesis aimed to bridge computational sociology, social sciences and natural sci­
ences in order to better understand symbolic communication. In the context of exist­
ing work on language evolution, cooperation and cumulative cultural evolution, the 
foundation of this thesis originated in the idea that whilst scientific fields have been 
making impressive progress in the last decades on the study of symbolic communic­
ation, it is valuable to develop a more nuanced understanding of this phenomenon. 
In particular, the thesis sought to fill a gap in the literature concerning the association 
between these scientific domains, proposing a theoretical framework that was tested 
using computational methods.
7.2 Aims and Findings of the Thesis
This concluding Chapter of the thesis revisits the aims and main findings of the work. 
The sections are structured according to the several contributions that the thesis has 
made to the field of the sociology of communication and computational sociology, to 
language evolution, to the evolution of cooperation and cooperative breeding, and 
cultural evolution. The specific findings and contributions of the thesis to the analysis 
and modelling of symbolic communication will be presented, especially the fruitful 
link between Luhmann's communication theory and computational sociology (Sec­
tion 7.2.1). The thesis has also addressed what sociology, and especially Luhmann's 
theory has often omitted: the evolutionary origins of human communication. For this
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reason, in this concluding Chapter we return to the rationale behind, and the evidence 
for, the importance of paternal care, since our model predicts that when the reproduct­
ive costs of females are high, males will tend to cooperate with them in breeding the 
child (Section 7.2.2). Finally, the original aims and progress made in the study of evol­
ution of cooperation is reviewed, relating the mechanism modelled in this thesis with 
those existing in the literature. In addition, it is argued that some of the extant models 
to explain the evolution of cooperation fall short of integrating theoretical and em­
pirical insights from evolutionary anthropology, archeology and life history research 
(Section 7.2.3).
7.2.1 Symbolic Communication
There is an old philosophical puzzle about the origins of language. Addressing this 
issue raises the hypothetical, although logical, situation where neither alter or ego 
share any common sign. Following Quine's famous 'Gavagai!' situation, when we 
try to tackle the origins of language —especially when we try to construct an analyt­
ical model to understand its origins—we confront the problem of the 'indeterminacy 
of meaning' (Quine, 1960). This problem states that when learning the meaning of 
a novel sign, the sign may have an infinite number of possible meanings. From an 
evolutionary point of view, this situation must have been a factual and complicated 
obstacle for any attempt to communicate. The state of affairs worsens when we think 
that any symbol could have been useful only once it was completely in place: a lan­
guage is useless if you are the only one to have evolved the ability to speak it.
This philosophical puzzle resembles the sociological problem of 'double contingency' 
stated by Parsons (Parsons and Shils, 2001; Vanderstraeten, 2002). As discussed in 
Chapter 2, the concept of double contingency implies that ego's gratifications are con­
tingent on alter's selection of action and, in turn, alter's reaction will be contingent 
on ego's selection resulting from a complementary selection on alter's part and so on. 
In this state of affairs, two 'black boxes', try to coordinate their behaviour—for in­
stance, the difficult task of assigning common meanings to similar signs in the absence 
of any common sign. For Luhmann (1996), evolution solved this problem not by the 
establishment of norms and values (as Parsons thought) but by the emergence of a
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new order: symbolic communication. Although it seems to be paradoxical to state that 
the theorem of double contingency makes difficult the emergence of common signs, 
such as language, and at the same time that the solution of this problem requires the 
emergence of communication, it is important to stress the distinction between media, 
as cultural signs and languages, and communication itself. Thus, cultural signs and 
languages are media of communication, but they are not communication itself.
What exactly symbolic communication is and how it can be sociologically defined in 
such a way that it can be informative for computational sociology in general, and 
agent-based models of human communication in particular, were the main topics of 
Chapter 2. In that chapter, it is claimed that (1) the notion of emergence can be ad­
equately grasped by social simulation models, and (2) that Luhmann's communica­
tion theory can lend support to the adequacy of such models, being fundamentally 
consistent with their approach to social life. As explained in that chapter, for Luh­
mann, communication is an emergent order brought about by the situation of double 
contingency immanent in social relations (see Section 2.5 in Chapter 2). Over time, 
the emergence of communication exerts structural limitations on the possibilities of 
individual selections and it differentiates internally into meaningful constellations of 
co-ordinated selectivity (i.e., social systems such as economy, politics, and science). In 
turn, these social systems bring about different properties at the lower level; different 
expectations that might be confirmed or disappointed. The theory of communication 
that Luhmann developed emphasises the dynamic interplay between individuals and 
social structures. Therefore, it might be said that in Luhmann's theory the micro­
macro relation is framed, avant la lettre, as medium downward causation. For these 
reasons, his communication theory can be linked to an emergentist explanation of the 
social order. And consequently, his theory is well positioned to inform computational 
models of social processes.
Nevertheless, the attempt to integrate self-referential social systems theory with the 
concept of emergence must be qualified, for Luhmann underestimates the value of the 
concept in several parts of his work. According to Elder-Vass (2007b), in designat­
ing a system as autopoietic (a concept Luhmann took and adapted from the Chilean 
biologists Maturana and Varela, 1992), the German sociologist is in fact rejecting any
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emergentist view of the social order. Thus, even though a social system requires indi­
viduals, their influence can be ignored for the purpose of explanation, since everything 
that is used by the system in its reproduction is produced by the system itself. In Luh­
mann's own words:
Whether the unity of an element should be explained as emergence 'from 
below' or as constitution 'from above' seems to be a matter of theoretical 
dispute. We opt decisively for the latter. Elements are elements only for 
the system that employs them as units and they are such only through this 
system. This is formulated in the concept of autopoiesis. (Luhmann, 1996,
p. 22)
This claim could prima facie undermine any attempt to link Luhmann's theory to the 
concept of emergence, since the latter recognises the importance of the dynamics that, 
'from the bottom', bring about the macro patterns observed at the system level. For 
Luhmann, instead, it is the system itself that defines in a top-down fashion what is 
possible and what is not within its boundaries. In this perspective, either the system 
exists or does not exist; if it does exist, then it is an autopoietic system describing 
strong downward causation. In synthesis, for Luhmann, any explanation of an emer­
gent order (and his theory recognises three emergent social orders, namely: interac­
tions, organisations, social systems) requires the 'total exclusion' (Totalausschluss) of 
the elements at the lower or micro-level (see Wan, 2011). And yet Luhmann some­
times slips into the excluded zone between being and not being. For instance, it is 
said that "[o]nce art becomes autonomous, the emphasis shifts from hetero-reference 
to self-reference" (Luhmann, 2000, p. 149). Art—as an autopoietic system— is or is 
not) and art—as an evolutionary system—becomes. Therefore, a closer scrutiny of Luh­
mann's work reveals a clear tension between, on the one hand, his binary rhetoric that 
leads him to claim the absolute autonomy of the systems and, on the other, his evolu­
tionary perspective that leads him to recognise that social systems are the result of a 
continuous process of differentiation from their environments.
To explore this issue in more detail is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, as 
Winthrop-Young (2003) claimed, these two logics remain incompatible in Luhmann's
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work. When the autopoiesis of the social systems is stressed, Luhmann commits what 
Archer (1988) identified as a 'downward conflation fallacy': a sociological determin­
ism that elides individual agency in favour of the causal powers of the social sys­
tem. This downward conflation fallacy—brought about by the conceptual strait)acket 
of autopoiesis—is incompatible with the concept of emergence and, in general, with 
the research program of computational sociology. Nevertheless, when Luhmann ad­
dresses the evolutionary differentiation and stabilisation of social structures over time, 
his theory becomes closer to the emergentist view, especially his theoretical under­
standing of symbolic communication.
In scientific research, the quality assessment of a theoretical approach does not come 
from some a priori standard but rests on the way research is actually conducted by the 
scientific community (Ahrweiler and Gilbert, 2005). In this sense, the actual evalu­
ation of a theoretical approach comes from answers to questions such as: do others ac­
cept this particular framework as being coherent with existing knowledge? Do other 
scientists use it to support their findings, inform their models or inspire their own 
investigations? Although still incipient, Luhmann's theory has received increasing in­
terest from the social simulation community during the last few years, with collected 
editions on computer simulations based on this theoretical framework (Kron, 2002); 
ecological models addressing the structural coupling between environment and so­
ciety, specifically, the social constraints on environmental action (Grant et al., 2002); 
simple models to understand economic phenomena such as inequality and scarcity 
(Fleischmann, 2005); trade (Duong and Grefenstette, 2005); and more abstract mod­
els to understand human expectations and anticipatory systems (Leydesdorff, 2005). 
More recently, the ABM developed to study the properties of an emergent communic­
ation system discussed in Chapter 4 was also published (Marchione et al., 2010).
The thesis also provides an agent-based model that confirms this useful link between 
Luhmann's communication theory and computational sociology. The model presen­
ted in Chapter 4 shows that the group of agents able to reach more hearers and less 
prone to changing the topic has the highest likelihood of affecting the shared lexicon. 
In terms of agents' actions, the group manifests a kind of iterative behaviour: these 
agents perform many communicative interactions about the same topic. This beha­
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viour leads these agents to share a strong word-topic association widely. The inter­
action of this group of agents with other groups (with different behaviours) brought 
about another effect: the agents are not particularly aware of the other groups' word- 
topic associations. They move around a small area, and hardly explore the rest of 
the world (i.e., they hardly change their topic). The spreading of their lexicon is car­
ried out by the other groups, particularly those which move more quickly (i.e., they 
frequently change their topic).
The results suggest two issues for further research. Firstly, the hypothesised differ­
ences between group behaviours produce different 'communicative roles'. The sim­
ulated dynamics could produce a kind of social division of labour (Durkheim, 1893), 
in which some clusters of agents are 'in charge' of spreading, whereas others are 'in 
charge' of creating strong relations between topics and words. Thus, in the model, 
agents' heterogeneity produces social homogeneity. Secondly, as stressed in section 
4.4, the analysis indicates that even when a certain group has a higher likelihood of 
spreading its lexicon, its shared cultural signs can actually have a different group ori­
gin. This could happen because there are mixed groups, when for instance an agent 
from the blue group exploits the high overall mutual relation value of the green group 
and spreads its own word in the shared lexicon.
Also, the model results discussed in Chapter 4 indicate that, when the agents confront 
an uncertain situation of double contingency—that is, they never have direct access to 
each others' meanings or ontologies—a shared lexicon can emerge, on the condition 
that a group of agents develops a communicative strategy that favours their mutual 
understanding and allows them to reach more recipients for their utterances. This 
property is consistent with Luhmann's theory (for details, see Chapter 2), since the 
first group of agents that overcomes these two improbabilities of communication (i.e., 
understanding and reaching recipients) is able to spread its own communication sys­
tem. Moreover, as also reported in that chapter, the agents capable of spreading their 
lexicon were 'immune' to external influence, a trait that has been identified in other so­
cial domains by similar computational and analytical methods (Xie et al., 2011). There­
fore, the simulation results presented in Chapter 2 indicate that there are possible and 
fruitful links between Luhmann's communication theory and current research in com­
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putational sociology.
This increasing attention to Luhmann's theory by the social simulation community 
is not hard to understand. His theory shares similar grounds with social simulation, 
such as second-order cybernetics, systems theory and complexity theory (Castellani 
and Rafferty, 2009). But more importantly, as claimed in Chapter 2, in Luhmann's 
theory society emerges from the bottom-up as communication and, over time, it limits 
the possible selections that individuals have. In practice, this conceptualisation is hard 
to distinguish from artificial society models of emergence processes. The communic­
ation theory advanced by Luhmann is coherent with the type of mechanism-based 
explanations that computational sociology translates into artificial societies. Given 
these common grounds and equivalent premises, the interconnections between Luh­
mann's theory and social simulation research are almost natural. Furthermore, his 
theory of communication describes in detail the logic inherent in each social system 
and the process by which social structures emerge.
However, Luhmann's premises still pose some challenges to computational sociology. 
For example, the theory of symbolic media can be considered, in Lakatos's terms, 
as a research programme in its own right (Chemilo, 2002), because it explains the his­
torical processes by which the constellations of co-ordinated selectivity become dif­
ferentiated—therefore, this theory has empirical content and some of this content has 
been verified. However, there are no computational models of these evolutionary pro­
cesses. This is a major topic for computational sociology, because it is accustomed to 
deal with the dynamic stabilisation of simulated social structures.
Whether or not a social property can be reducible to individual properties is an em­
pirical question that can only be resolved through empirical research. The type of 
emergent properties that are inherent in the social realm are likely to result from the 
fact that the participating entities are symbolic agents. Therefore, what is needed to 
carry out such research is a reliable method by which those emergent properties can 
be generated and analysed. In short, social scientists require appropriate tools. Of 
course, this is not a defence of a mathematical or computational imperialism in soci­
ology. Throughout the short life of computational sociology it has been repeated that
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models, either mathematical or computer, should never be allowed to take command 
over sociological theorising (Cederman, 2005; Coleman, 1964). The growing number 
of artificial societies that have been informed by Luhmann's communication theory 
is sufficient to demonstrate the fruitful dialogue between social theory and computa­
tional models of social processes. This thesis reinforces that conclusion.
However, there is an important blind spot in Luhmann's treatment of symbolic com­
munication: the importance of cooperation in general and cooperative intent in par­
ticular. Although his understanding of the situation of double contingency as the con­
dition of possibility for the emergence of communication is interesting, in this frame­
work important questions remain unsolved, specifically, how and why two individu­
als, at the stage 'zero' of social evolution, coordinate their behaviour in such a way that 
arbitrary but commonly available signs end up conveying common meanings. The 
'blindness' of Luhmann's communication theory has been addressed in this thesis, 
by combining current theories and empirical evidence from scientific disciplines such 
as evolutionary biology and anthropology, cognitive sciences and paleoarchaeology. 
It has been proposed that symbolic communication is a threshold phenomenon that 
emerges in the intersection between human cognition, social interactions and human 
biology.
In this thesis, it is argued that cooperative childcare or cooperative breeding provided 
an evolutionary and social context in which the first symbolic interactions could have 
taken place. We are not alone in this claim. For Tomasello (2009) this form of col­
laborative activity might be the evolutionary origin of our high pro-social instincts 
on top of which other more complex forms of cooperation, such as cooperative com­
munication, were evolutionarily possible. Human cooperative communication might 
have evolved first within the bounds of collaborative childcare because these activit­
ies provided the common ground for establishing joint topics, and because they gen­
erated the cooperative motives that are essential if the inferential machinery (already 
in place) is to work appropriately (Knight, 2008). In Chapter 3 it was explained in 
detail the evolutionary conditions that probably triggered the emergence of cooper­
ative breeding, but the arguments discussed there can be summarised as follows: 
the increasing energy demands on human mothers brought about a social structure
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of cooperative breeding that provided a pre-linguistic level of mutual understanding 
which, in turn, made possible the emergence of relevant and conventional signs that 
were stabilised over time.
Thus, the thesis proposed an integrative framework in which Luhmann's theory of 
communication can be related to the major breakthroughs made by various scientific 
disciplines in the last few decades to understand the emergence and evolution of sym­
bolic communication. In so doing, this research have also contributed to the conceptu­
alisation of additional topics, such as the evolution of parental care and the evolution 
of cooperation. The following subsections will describe these new insights.
7.2.2 Evolution of Paternal Care
The simulation results presented in Chapter 5 predict the evolution of a wide variety 
of cooperative strategies, although a couple of general patterns emerge. On the one 
hand, it is predicted that a sizeable proportion of males will cooperate with females 
in breeding their offspring, even when females do not reciprocate, especially when 
MRC < 0.4 x FRC. This behaviour has been called as 'non-reciprocal altruism' or 
'pure altruism' in the previous literature, such as neurological research (Takahashi, 
2007), computational models of the evolution of cooperation (Brinkers and den Dulk, 
1999), and similar computational models on the evolution of parental care (Key, 1999). 
In Chapter 5, it was shown that this evolutionary trait increases population survival 
rates, for females can reproduce at faster rates. In fact, once male non-reciprocal altru­
ism emerges, the population growth becomes exponential. Females defect at higher 
rates, so most of them exploit males' unconditional cooperation. Males can afford to 
receive the 'sucker payoff' since they have lower reproductive costs. Thus, males are 
scarifying their own fitness and, as a consequence, potential mating opportunities in 
favour of the female and her offspring. On the other hand, when reproductive costs 
are high for both sexes, especially when MRC > 0.7 x FRC, conditional or reciprocal 
cooperation is higher for both sexes, although the simulation survival rates are much 
lower. Also, certain flexibility and opportunistic behaviour between sexes was ob­
served in the model. The simulation results indicate that when female cooperation 
evolves and is high (i.e., high female intra-sex cooperation), females will not need to
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exploit males to pay for their high reproductive costs, so their defection levels towards 
males will be lower. In this scenario, however, the simulation survival rates are also 
low. Although intra-sex cooperation is high for male and female agents, it is higher 
in the latter group, so females are, overall, cooperative with other females. All these 
results can be considered within the broader findings on the evolution of cooperative 
breeding in primates and human societies, since the simulation results resemble some 
patterns present in those groups. I will present and discuss such evidence to put in 
context the findings we discussed in Chapter 5.
Paternal care, a suite of behaviours performed by a mature male (the genetic, pu­
tative or social father of the immature young) that he would not perform in the ab­
sence of the immature young, is a rather rare phenomenon among mammals (Woo- 
droffe and Vincent, 1994): direct infant care by males occurs in fewer than 5 percent of 
all mammalian species, and in fact, many mammalian mothers attack males to keep 
them away from their offspring, even possible fathers (van Schaik and Paul, 1996). As 
discussed in Chapter 5, in mammals there is a differential fitness trade-off, so males 
tend to focus their reproductive behaviour on mating effort and away from parental 
care, while most of the parental investment offspring require to survive depends on 
females. However, many species of primates, including humans, deviate from this 
mammalian trend. Adult males of many primate genera do provide care for infants 
and juveniles, including behaviour such as protection from predators and conspecif- 
ics, sharing food, playing, grooming, carrying infants and teaching. The central ques­
tion is to identify the social and ecological conditions that resulted in the evolution of 
this paternal care.
In Callitrichidae, principally marmosets and tamarins, and Callicebus, such as titi mon­
keys (all of them part of the small New World monkeys), adult males reduce female 
reproductive costs by carrying and provisioning the young (Feistner and Price, 1991; 
Tardif, 1994). Some behavioural and social characteristics of these monkeys are worth 
mentioning. Marmosets and tamarins are organised in extended family groups and, 
since immigration and emigration by adults is rather common, these groups are com­
posed largely of unrelated adults of both sexes. Only a single female is usually repro- 
ductively active (although the presence of two female breeders has also been observed.
192 Chapter 7. Discussions and Conclusions
see Digby and Ferrari, 1994). They have low sexual body size dimorphism, so female 
reproductive costs are much higher than male reproductive costs (Goldizen, 1987). 
Despite their high reproduction costs, callitrichid mothers breed unusually fast, pro­
ducing either multiple young (twins or triplets) or sequential, closely spaced offspring 
whose needs exceed their mothers' capacity to provide for them.
According to the simulation results reported in Chapter 5, when female reproductive 
costs are much higher than male reproductive costs, mothers can reproduce at high 
rates provided others cooperate with them in raising their offspring. In callitrichidae 
this pattern is clearly observed: this species has a cooperative breeding system made 
of allomothers; care for the young is provided by all group members. Callitrichid in­
fants spontaneously transfer to allomothers, something that is unusual among prim­
ates and that suggests the existence of a long history of allomatemal care to produce 
selection for this self-transfer by infants (Burkart et al., 2009).
There is an additional breeding trait in this taxon: although several adult members 
take part in breeding the infants, both in captivity and in the wild, adult males are 
the principal caretakers of related and unrelated young (Garber, 1997). Many adult 
males in the same group invest large amounts of time and energy caring for young 
and, after weaning, provisioning. Due to the energetic demands of child care, mar­
moset and tamarin males actually lose weight during these activities and, to get ready 
for fatherhood, they undergo a hormonal transformation, gaining up to 15 percent of 
their body weight when their mates become pregnant (Ziegler et al., 2006). In these 
species, paternal care is so important that field data have shown a direct relationship 
between the number of adult males present in the group and the survival of depend­
ent young (Garber et al., 1984). This helping behaviour comes about with a huge ener­
getic investment by males: research on infant transport among tamarins indicates that 
a single male may account for as much as of 40 to 50 percent of infant carrying, whilst 
mothers account for only 15 to 25 percent of carrying time, and the reminder carrying 
time is made by different siblings, beta females and other male collaborators (Garber, 
1997). Mothers directly benefit from this help, especially in carrying, enhancing their 
fitness; reducing travel costs, increasing opportunities to feed, and ensuring higher 
survival rates for their offspring. Tamarin mothers gain weight from the second week
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after b irth  on w ard s, e sp ecia lly  d u r in g  the p eriovu la tory  p eriod , so  the in fant-carrying  
b eh av iou r  o f fathers and  m ale  h elp ers ten d s to im p rove  the m oth ers' p h y sica l co n d i­
tion  after birth, an d  therefore m a y  su p p ort a co n secu tiv e  p regn an cy  (San ch ez et al., 
1999). R oss (1991) argues that, in  callitrich ids, fem ales can su sta in  h ig h  birth rates, 
litter w e ig h ts  an d  litter grow th  rates o n ly  if m a les a ssist in  in fant transport. Therefore, 
allocare an d  esp ec ia lly  paternal care are im portant soc ia l b reed in g  traits in  th ese  sp e ­
cies. It is tam arin  and  m arm oset m ales' d isp o s itio n  to carry and care for the y o u n g  that 
exp la in s that, as ob served  for in stance in  ca p tiv ity  th ey  'babysit' for other p rim ates' 
in fants sh arin g  their en closure (as sh o w n  in  F igure 7.1).
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
But, w h y  are C allitrichid  m ales so  u n u su a lly  w illin g  to coop erate w ith  fem a les  in  
b reed in g  their offspring? A s in  the reported  sim u la tion  resu lts, fem ale  d efec tion , as 
a reprodu ctive strategy, h as p layed  an im portan t role in  exp la in in g  this ev o lu tio n a ry  
trend. T hus, in  callitrichidae, d u e  to the their lo w  sexual d im orp h ism  in  b o d y  s ize .
194 Chapter 7. Discussions and Conclusions
it is hard for tamarin and marmoset males to exercise much control over their mates, 
so females can copulate with several partners (Garber, 1997; Sussman and Garber, 
1987); a reproductive behaviour known as polyandrous mating. Sexual interactions are 
more flexible when large females can avoid domination by males who might other­
wise constrain their mate choices. Thus, instead of expending energy in a vain effort 
to defend exclusive sexual access to their mates, males compete for paternity by other 
means—for instance, by ejaculating more sperm than a competitor, as in some tamar­
ins (Garber, 1997).
Adittionally, according to Hrdy (1979; 2000), females can gain benefits from mul­
tiple matings, such as reduced infanticide risk or assurance of fertilisation. This is 
mainly due to the complex by-product polyandrous mating brings about: paternal un­
certainty. That is, when a female mates promiscuously with several males, it is almost 
impossible to know who the father is. Females engaging in polyandrous mating can 
take advantage of this paternal uncertainty and build /socio-sexual/ bonds with their 
mates, obtaining in return immediate or future benefits, such as male protection, sup­
port or tolerance for subsequent infants, and more important, reducing one of the most 
toxic effects of sexually selected competition among males: infanticide (Hrdy, 2000). It 
has been long claimed that in many mammals, and very well documented in primates 
such as Hanuman langurs, by resorting to infanticide, a male (usually an immigrant 
one) can induce sexual receptivity in those females whose offspring he killed. Infant­
icide would represent, therefore, an evolved strategy to optimise male reproductive 
success (Borries, 1997; Borries et al., 1999a). Infanticide by males is, for many authors, 
one component of the nearly ubiquitous 'intersexual conflict' in mammals (for a com­
plete review see Schaik and Janson, 2000). But this advantageous male reproductive 
strategy constitutes an important source of female reproductive loss: the reproductive 
female schedule is dramatically disrupted and the pregnancy and lactation costs are 
duplicated. Paternal uncertainty might well be understood within this context, since 
it increases the costs of male infanticidal behaviour: for a male, the potential cost of 
killing his own offspring in cases of uncertain paternity is too high. For this reason 
females are believed to use polyandrous mating as a reproductive strategy to reduce 
the risk of male infanticidal behaviours, by diluting paternity among several males.
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and rendering its assessment more difficult.
Observational and genetical field data has validated this idea: in many species, like 
savanna baboons, barbary macaques, and langurs, in which females solicit and mate 
multiple males, it has been observed that former consorts of the mother appear to look 
out for the well-being of infants and are not only less prone to attack them, but also 
more engaged in infant protection against attacks from other males, enhancing infants' 
survival rates (Borries et al., 1999a; Hestermann et al., 2001; Hrdy, 1997). A number of 
authors have suggested that among adult males in marmosets and tamarins, paternal 
uncertainty is high (Sussman and Garber, 1987), something that is even trickier in the 
callitrichid case because they are among the few mammals in which the same clutch 
or litter can have multiple progenitors: tamarin twins are dizygotic, which means that 
each egg is fertilised independently (Garber, 1997). Therefore, polyandrous mating 
and the consequent paternal uncertainty might explain the fact that many callitrichid 
adult males in the same group invest large amounts of time and energy caring for 
young. A tamarin father, even a 'possible one' (one of several males in the group 
that mated with the breeding female), could care and protect against conspecifics as 
an investment in his direct fitness—survival of his own offspring and opportunity to 
mate with the breeding female.
Also, in tamarins and marmosets, polyandrous mating is facilitated by the absence of 
female sexual swellings—obvious external signs of ovulation such as those present in 
baboons (Dunbar, 1995). Females in these species are part of the primates endowed 
with concealed ovulation, a trait that is believed to affect mating systems. Monogamy 
and polyandry in primate species are linked to the absence of visual cues that might 
give information on the females' reproductive status (Dunbar, 1995; Sillen-Tullberg 
and Moller, 1993). The biological function behind concealed ovulation is clear: if a 
male is unable to detect the period in which copulation can lead to conception, he will 
be forced to mate with his partner during the entire follicular phase in order to increase 
his chance of fathering her next litter. In species that live in multi-male groups, such 
as marmosets and tamarins, this means that adult males will not only mate during 
the peri-ovulatory period, reinforcing both the polyandrous mating system and the
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females' strategy to confuse paternity as a means of reducing the risk of infanticide1. 
Since without paternal care young callitrichid infants are at risk of not surviving, to 
ensure that at least some of their offspring will subsist, males cooperate with their 
mates in providing child care, even if they are not the true sires.
To sum up, the coevolution of low sexual dimorphism in body size, female poly­
androus mating system and the consequent high paternal uncertainty could provide 
strong impetus for the evolution of paternal care in these New World monkeys and in 
other primates. Defecting female reproductive strategies, such as polyandrous mat­
ing, in primates living in multi-male groups, with low sexual dimorphism in body 
size and concealed ovulation, could have evolved because of the benefits they provide 
for mothers2. As Hrdy convincingly stated, (2009, p, 89) "the risk to a male's posterity 
from caring for another male's offspring is outweighed by the still graver risk of dying 
childless". In a nutshell, a strategic female needs to deceive her consorts by provid­
ing them with what in signalling theory is known as 'false signals' (Bliege Bird and 
Smith, 2005): in order to avoid infanticide and elicit parental care, the female should 
lead her mates to make the wrong connection—the child the mother gave birth to was 
sired by them. Since the interests of fathers and mothers are not aligned (they actually 
collide) and the knowledge they have is asymmetrical in favour of females (due to 
concealed ovulation and prolonged sexual receptivity), females are in a good position 
to deceive strategically males about paternity, transforming infanticide into an option
1Even in those species in which females exhibit sexual swellings, mothers might benefit from manip­
ulating information about ovulation. Thus, mangabey females (Cercocebus a tys) show a distinct period 
of swelling near the end of the first trimester of pregnancy; chimpanzee females show variable patterns 
of swelling and copulation during pregnancy; and bonobo females combine elements of both visible 
swellings plus periods of sexual receptivity that last for weeks (Busse, 1985; Hrdy, 1997, 2000). The oc­
currence of these conspicuous ovulation signals outside of periods of fertility and extended oestrus may
also function in deceiving males about paternity in these primates.
2This pattern of extra-pair mate choice produced by female control of fertilisation is also found in
other animals, such as some avian species (where paternal care is the rule rather than the exception). 
By analysing DNA fingerprints in a small and well-localised population of Superb fairy-wrens (M ahirus  
cyaneus), a species in which all males contribute to the feeding and defence of young, Mulder and col­
leagues (Mulder et al., 1994) discovered that 76 percent of their sampled offspring were sired by extra­
group fathers that contributed no care.
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that all those concerned are better off avoiding.
The simulations presented in this thesis are consistent with this evolutionary account; 
the results indicate that, when the reproductive effort required by a male to produce 
an offspring is low in comparison to female reproductive effort, then females are likely 
to defect males, and over evolutionary time elicit in them unconditional cooperation. 
In that scenario, which is by no means a certain one, males will invest in the females 
of the group, enabling females to reproduce more quickly. But are these traits—or 
equivalent ones—also found in humans? If in non-human primates paternal care can 
be elicited by female sexual strategies that involve defection at different levels, could 
we observe similar behavioural patterns in human primates?
Across cultures and within them, human males greatly vary in the manifestation of 
paternal care, ranging from complete absence or aloofness to great intimacy and direct 
care. In a review of 45 studies addressing whether the presence of kin affects child 
survival rates among foraging groups. Sear and Mace (2008) found that the overall 
effect that fathers have on child survival is surprisingly low, with 53 percent of all 
the surveyed studies using appropriate statistical techniques (fifteen studies in total) 
showing no association between the death of the father and the death of the child. 
According to their meta-analysis, even where associations between loss of the father 
and increased child mortality are found, it is not clear that the association is a direct 
result of the loss of parental care, so the precise causal effect of dead fathers and infant 
survival rates might depend on specific socioecological conditions—a conclusion that 
is reinforced by the fact that paternal care has emerged in taxa only distantly related, 
which suggests that it may result from different selective pressures (Femndez-Duque 
et al., 2009).
Hewlett (1993) for instance, showed that among the Aka people, where fathers are 
heavily involved in paternal care (holding them while in camp or hunting, see Figure 
7.2), the number of brothers a man has affects, in part, the amount of direct childcare 
he provides, so fathers with greater kinship resources provide less direct care. Inter­
estingly Meehan (2005) concluded the opposite after studying Aka fathers: according 
to her analysis, fathers are relieved from childcare responsibilities in matrilocal camps
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because of the willingness of female alloparents to offer assistance, although this might 
be explained because fathers living in their spouse's camp are often doing 'brideser- 
vice', and young husbands are hard to find during the day, as they leave early and 
come home late in order to avoid being asked to work by the wife's family. In either 
case, residential patterns might explain this facultative fathering among Aka people 
and other foraging groups.
Parental investment in child survival is not restricted just to parental care. The pres­
ence of an Aché father in the Paraguayan forests heavily affect the young survival 
rates, although these fathers seldom hold or interact with infants and young chil­
dren. Hurtado and Hill's (1992) research established that father absence had a strong 
negative effect on the survival of offspring: at the age of 5, children without fath­
ers experienced a risk of death 2.6 times higher than children with fathers. Again, 
socioecological factors might explain this feature among Aché fathers: most of the an­
nual calories these people consume (87 percent) come from game hunted by males, 
so a fatherless family is at a great disadvantage, especially the youngest. And even 
though Aché people have a communal system of sharing the hunted meat, and wives 
and children of hunters receive no bigger portion of meat than other individuals in the 
band, children between the ages of about 7 and 20 with no resident parents may be 
slighted and receive no share or a very small share, especially if their biological father 
is dead (Hill, 2002). Another extreme example is provided by Arctic hunters like the 
Inuit, in which family members are extremely dependent on hunted food brought to 
camp by men. In the coldest areas, babies and young children could barely survive 
outside for much of the year, so women are dependent on men for almost everything.
This variation in fathering styles across human cultures is not restricted to foraging 
societies. Worldwide, 10 to 40 percent of children grow up in households with no 
father at all. According to a 1994 study by the Children's Defence Fund in the United 
States, men are more likely to default on a child-support payment (49 percent) than 
a used-car payment (3 percent) (statistics quoted in Hrdy, 2007). In the United King­
dom, one-fifth of non-resident fathers never see their children, and this group is also 
least likely to pay any child support (Ermisch, 2006). This individual variability shows 
that nurturing responses in human fathers are situation-dependent, and that parental
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care is exp ressed  o n ly  u n d er certain  so c io eco lo g ica l con d ition s.
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
Figure 7.2: Aka fathers are known throughout the foraging and parental investment literature for  
their high levels o f investment, holding infants while in camp and when both parents go on hunting  
expeditions in the forest, as shown here. However, when paternal investment is examined by residential 
pattern, Aka fathers show a trend o f engaging in high-investment caregiving more in their own camps 
than when residing with their wife's family. (©  Barry Heivlett)
T he exp lan ation  of th is variab ility  in  h u m an s is g iv e n  b y  the fact that, as G eary (2000) 
p o in ted  out, paternal in v estm en t resu lts in  a relative b u t n ot ab so lu te  im p rovem en t  
in  offsp ring  su rv iva l rates, and that the rep rod u ctive b en efits  for m ales  of seek in g  
a d d ition a l m ates d o  n ot a lw a y s o u tw e ig h  the rep rod u ctive b en efits o f paternal in v est­
m en t. It is n ot d ifficu lt to im ag in e therefore that se lec tion  h as favou red  a variety  o f  
m ale strategies, w ith  d ifferent m a les vary in g  in  the d egree o f em p h a sis  either o n  par­
ental effort or m atin g  effort, as w e ll as in d iv id u a l m ales vary in g  in  em p h asis o n  either  
p arenting or m atin g  at d ifferent p o in ts in their life span.
A lth o u g h  the s im u lation  resu lts p resen ted  in  C hapter 5 can n ot be d irectly  related  to  
th is exp lan atory  m echan ism , it is rem arkable that the ev o lu tio n  o f m ale stra teg ies to  
interact w ith  fem ales reprodu ces this b eh av iou ra l d iversity  fou n d  in h um an  so c ie t­
ies. T hus, ev e n  w h e n  fem ales' reprodu ctive costs are m u ch  h igh er than  m ales' repro­
d u ctive  costs, and m ale  u n con d ition a l coop eration  tow ard s fem ales is se lec ted , m a le
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unconditional cooperation alleles represented, on average, just 43 percent of the male 
population in the simulations describing exponential growth. This means that, al­
though male non-reciprocal altruism is observed in almost all the simulations with 
exponential population growth, unconditional cooperative alleles need not be present 
in all or most of the males to accelerate the growth. Of course, the same diversity in 
reproductive strategies can be observed in female agents, although among them the 
selected strategy, defection, is much more widely spread, since this allele is found, on 
average, in 63 percent of female agents.
All in all, this variability in fathering imposes a big challenge for human mothers, who 
give birth to costly infants: they have no reliable way to guarantee paternal support, 
although that is precisely what mothers need the most. The crucial question is what 
human mothers have done to elicit their mates' protection and cooperation in breeding 
the child, or at least to leave it alone, and to avoid, to the extent possible, 'defecting 
fathers' and infanticide. As one way to hedge their bets and get alternatives sources of 
support for their children (especially in societies with unpredictable resources or high 
rates of adult mortality, such as foraging groups), mothers have managed to line up 
an 'extra' father, that is, to incorporate an extra man into the marital unit. This pattern 
resembles the polyandrous mating system found in marmoset and tamarin monkeys 
(among other primates) discussed above.
Anthropological research has shown that, when feasible, human mothers establish 
socio-sexual bonds with several males, either simultaneously or serially. Anthropo­
logists have named this female reproductive strategy as 'polyandrous motherhood' 
(Guyer, 1994; Hrdy, 2000), which captures the discrepancies between the formal mar­
riage or pair-bonding patterns found in most human societies and the actual lives 
of women who raise children fathered by different men, or children whose genetic 
paternity is unclear. According to Hrdy (2009), by consorting with different males, fe­
males are able to manipulate the information available to nearby males about possible 
paternity and to establish socio-sexual bonds which might benefit their children.
Additionally, just like tamarins and marmosets, human mothers can also provide 
males with false signals to confuse paternity and elicit paternal care. This female re­
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productive strategy of polyandrous liaisons is a risky one, considering what a power­
ful emotion sexual jealousy is—male sexual jealousy is the primary cause of violence 
in romantic relationships (Buss, 2000). However, cultural beliefs about partible patern­
ity help to relax this tension. In some cultures, particularly well-documented among 
native South American foraging groups such as the Aché (Hurtado and Hill, 1996) and 
Bari (Beckerman et al., 1998), people believe that more than one man can contribute to 
the formation and development of a foetus, so the young is a composite sired by the 
multiple men the woman has had sex with in the months before birth (the concept of 
^partible paternity' has been qualified by other anthropologists, see for instance Sha­
piro, 2009). In these societies, the woman's official husband accepts this situation, and 
every possible father is welcome to assist—discreetly—in providing care for the child. 
Not surprisingly, children with 'multiple fathers' in these groups are found to be better 
fed and with higher survival rates compared with the children who have only one. All 
in all, beliefs in partible paternity and other customs that facilitate maternal manipula­
tion of information about fatherhood require appropriate socioecological conditions. 
Hrdy (2009) points out that these beliefs are feasible in groups with long-standing mat- 
rilineal traditions—a societal system in which female individuals and their consorts 
live with the female mother's group—where sexual attitudes and childcare favour 
maternal interests.
The hypothesis that females use false signals as a reproductive strategy has been 
placed by some social anthropologists as the inception of symbolic and material arte­
facts and cultural evolution. Knight and his colleagues (2008; 1995) have claimed that 
concealment of ovulation and loss of oestrus with continuous sexual receptivity in 
women, features that could have evolved to deprive males of information about pa­
ternity, still leaves an important sign of female fertility: menstrual bleeding. Once 
ovulation was concealed and oestrus lost in human lineage, menstruation would have 
taken on significance as a cue, giving males positive information about females' re­
productive condition. Therefore, menstruation should make a female attractive to 
philandering males who are mainly trying to maximise their mating and reproductive 
success; the lack of the menstrual signal could have encouraged mate desertion. Ac­
cording to these authors, the logical solution for females to solve the problem of the
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salience of menstrual bleeding as a signal of impeding fertility is to cheat strategic­
ally using that signal. In their opinion (Knight et al., 1995, p., 80), /z[c]onfusing the 
information available to males by displaying the same reproductive signal at the same 
time, females could then retain both the attractions of menstruation as an indicator 
of impending fertility and the advantages of synchrony for maximising male parental 
investment", a strategy they identify as 'sham menstruation'. Since males are only in­
terested in positive cues that inform them that the mate is of the right (same) species, 
of the right (opposite) sex and in her right (fertile) period, females—provided they 
establish a coalition—would have a powerful signal for manipulating males. These 
false signals would allow females, on the one hand, to cooperate preferentially with 
males willing to hunt at a distance and bring meat to camp and, on the other, to de­
velop alliances with other females to sustain these false signals and collectively punish 
uncooperative males by not giving them access to fertile females. These false sig­
nals were transformed in communal rituals and expressed in cultural artefacts such 
as shape-changers, totems and similarly ambivalent entities—which are central to for­
aging societies, such as among the Khoisan and Hadza people in Africa, where gender 
appears mutable and initiation rites reveal a consistent ideology of merging and con­
fusing sexual roles (see Power and Watts, 1997). Therefore, with the emergence of 
these female coalitions and shared use of deceivable signals, symbolic cultural evolu­
tion would have taken off.
Sexual defection and the use of false signals translate to a more direct and pervasive 
behaviour: infidelity. Infidelity seems to have direct effects in human psychology and 
biology. In this sense, although it is usually believed that males are more promiscuous, 
new research is shedding light on the prevalence of female infidelity as well as the con­
sequences of such behaviour. Female infidelity is common in the animal kingdom as 
well as among humans, even in contexts where that behaviour is socially and person­
ally sanctioned. According to an analysis of 280,000 paternity tests conducted in 1999 
by the American Association of Blood Banks, approximately 30 percent of children in the 
sample were fathered by extra-pair copulations (Platek and Shackelford, 2006). Cur­
rent estimates of extra-pair paternity (paternity by someone other than the putative 
and domestic father, or cuckoldry) are between 1 and 30 percent, with the best estimate
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at about 10 percent (Cerda-Flores et al., 1999; Neale et al., 2002): that is perhaps 1 in 10 
children are the product of female infidelity. Because of concealed ovulation, internal 
fertilisation, and the discussed female infidelity, human parental certainty is asymmet­
rical: unlike females, who are always 100 percent certain of maternity, human males 
can never be certain of paternity. It is likely that this asymmetry in parental certainty 
has contributed to the asymmetry in human reproductive costs (with males mainly 
focusing on mating effort and away from paternal care, and females focusing on ma­
ternal care) and facultative fathering, since some researchers argue that paternal cer­
tainty is positively correlated with paternal investment (Bjorklund and Shackelford, 
1999; Geary, 2000). In any case, the risk of cuckoldry and the so called ‘sperm compet­
ition hypothesis—a term used to refer to the competitive process between spermato­
zoa of two different males to fertilise an egg of a lone female (Platek and Shackelford, 
2006)—appears to have driven the evolution of several male anti-cuckoldry tactics in 
humans, such as sexual jealousy (Buss, 2000; Goetz et al., 2005), the human penis mor­
phology, which facilitates semen displacement (Gallup Jr. et al., 2003), and ejaculate 
adjustments by males following periods of separation or in response to allegations of 
female infidelity (Baker, 1993).
In summary, the simulations presented in Chapter 5 predict that when female repro­
ductive investment is higher than male reproductive investment, females can pay for 
their reproductive costs by first promoting the evolution of male unconditional co­
operation and, once this non-reciprocal behaviour evolved in males, exploiting this 
form of cooperation by defecting over males. Defection is thus a dominant strategy 
for females, because it enhances their fitness. Empirical research in evolutionary an­
thropology and comparative psychology validates this prediction in primate species 
and human foraging societies, in which females, in order to elicit paternal investment, 
tend to defect and deceive males in different ways.
7.2.3 Evolution of Cooperation
This thesis implies a number of theoretical consequences for the evolution of cooper­
ation in general and the evolution of altruism in particular. Firstly, the evolutionary 
trajectory described by the strategies presented in Figure 5.8 demonstrate the random
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nature of the process. Starting from the same initial conditions, it can be observed that 
at least three different patterns of population dynamics can be brought about. Previ­
ous research on evolutionary game theory (Nowak and Sigmund, 1993; Nowak et al., 
2010) has established that evolutionary dynamics in finite-sized populations, such as 
the one described in this simulation, are not deterministic but stochastic. Thus, if two 
mutants have exactly the same fitness, eventually one of them will take over, while 
the other will go extinct. An advantageous mutant has a probability to win, but no 
certainty. Sometimes deleterious mutants can prevail, thereby allowing the evolution­
ary process to cross fitness valleys. That is what has been observed in this model, in 
which the likelihood for a simulation to reach the maximum number of agents, in the 
best case scenario, equals 40 percent, whilst the likelihood for a simulation to go ex­
tinct equals 52 percent, results that demonstrate the stochastic nature of the modelled 
evolutionary processes in this simulation.
Secondly, the fact that the conditional cooperation strategy tit-for-tat was weakly se­
lected in some simulations (see upper stacked plot in Subfigure 5.8(a)) cannot be in­
terpreted straightforwardly. As was shown by Axelrod's classic studies on the evol­
ution of cooperation (Axelrod, 1990; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981), tit-for-tat cannot 
be selected unless the agents holding this strategy have a 'good chance' of competing 
against the same opponents more than once during their life. 'Good chance' means 
that competition continues long enough for repeated punishment and forgiveness to 
generate a long-term payoff higher than the possible loss from cooperating initially. 
In the reported simulations, this condition does not always hold, since the population 
of agents varies over time, as do the chances of playing against the same agent. For 
instance, at the beginning of the simulations, the population size is 250 agents. How­
ever, by the end of those simulations describing exponential growth, the population 
size is 2,500 agents. Considering that agents' life span is 40 years, and that each sim­
ulation step represents 0.02 years, at the beginning of the simulation any agent will 
play against any other agent 8 times on average during their lifespan. But when the 
population size has increased by 10 times, the likelihood of playing against the same 
agent is reduced by 10 times. Since tit-for-tat is a strategy that requires a good chance 
of competing against the same agent to evolve, in this simulation, as population size
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increases, tit-for-tat produces lower payoffs and, over time, it should be opposed by 
selection. In a nutshell, with direct reciprocity, the power of retaliation decreases as 
population size increases. Nevertheless, because the reproductive costs of male agents 
are comparatively low, an important proportion of them might hold tit-for-tat strategy 
alleles to play against females even though the total population increases and tit-for- 
tat payoff decreases, so tit-for-tat alleles will not necessarily disappear entirely from 
the male population.
Thirdly, the analysis reveals that unconditional cooperation can evolve in these simu­
lations, specifically male unconditional cooperation. This is an interesting result since 
previous research on evolutionary game theory (although considering fixed size popu­
lations and no sexual differences among players) indicates that pure cooperation can­
not evolve in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) game, played in unstructured 
populations where all individuals are equally likely to interact with each other, be­
cause defectors have a higher average payoff than unconditional cooperators (Delton 
et al., 2011). Therefore, natural selection increases the relative abundance of defectors 
and drives cooperators to extinction. Computational tournaments in which multiple 
strategies play the IPD against each other demonstrated that unconditional cooper­
ators perform poorly against exploitative players such as pure defectors, although 
strategies that conditionally cooperate perform much better (Axelrod, 1990; Axelrod 
and Hamilton, 1981). However, in spatial games in which only fixed-rule uncondi­
tional cooperators and unconditional defectors interact, evolution can still be tempor­
ally twisted away from and back towards defection, so the system describes an oscil­
latory dynamic in the level of cooperation (Nowak and May, 1992). Other simulations, 
in which populations of agents made of unconditional cooperators and defectors are 
modelled in explicit spatial representations such as graphs, lattices or social networks, 
have shown that natural selection can favour cooperation if the ratio of benefit b to 
cost c of the altruistic act exceeds the average number of neighbourhoods k, that is, 
when  ^ & (Ohtsuki et al., 2006).
The simulations reported in this thesis, in which agents reproduce sexually, have dif­
ferent reproductive costs, and the environment is entirely neutral, show that full co­
operation can evolve for one class of agents, since the differences in reproductive costs
206 Chapter 7. Discussions and Conclusions
for one group (i.e., females) are higher than the reproductive costs of the other group 
(i.e., males). When these evolutionary pressures are in place, unconditional coopera­
tion can be selected among males: given their low reproductive costs, male agents can 
afford to receive the sucker payoff, enhancing (defecting) female agents' fitness. For 
this reason, the reported results indicate that in simulations that did not go extinct, an 
important fraction of male agents were behaving altruistically when playing against 
females.
Finally, the simulation results can be related to two different explanatory mechanisms 
for the evolution of cooperation that have become the focus of great interest. The first 
mechanism, dubbed group selection models or multi-level selection models (Johan H., 
1997; Traulsen and Nowak, 2006; Wilson, 2001; Wilson and Sober, 1994), can shed light 
on the evolutionary results observed in these simulations. These models have been 
increasingly used in the last decades and have provided a 'Darwinian' ground for the 
coevolutionary dynamics between genes and culture (Gintis et al., 2003; Richerson and 
Boyd, 2005; Sober and Wilson, 1999). According to this hypothesis, altruistic alleles 
can become fixed or spread within certain groups because of the benefits they bestow 
on those groups as wholes, even when the alleles' effect on the individuals' fitness 
within the group is negative. The groups in which, by chance, altruistic strategies 
(i.e., unconditional cooperators) are selected and spread will be fitter, as groups, and 
they will outcompete other groups made up of self-interested individuals. Several 
authors have claimed that there is no reason to rule out an explanatory connection 
between the evolution of cooperative breeding and multilevel selection models, which 
are well suited to tackling the problem of how the individual fitness of helpers evolve 
to constitute cooperatively breeding groups (Wright, 2007). This connection allows a 
bridge to the findings that behavioural and evolutionary ecologists have made in the 
field of cooperative breeding and the general theory of evolution of cooperation.
The simulation results discussed in this thesis provide, in silico, evidence that this 
connection is plausible. As the reported simulation results show, the ultimate con­
sequence of differences in the reproductive effort of males and females is that a frac­
tion of altruistic males who unconditionally cooperate with females in breeding the 
young will grow, even at individual cost, allowing females to reproduce faster. Ulti­
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mately, provided this non-reciprocal behaviour is selected, the total population will 
rapidly increase (in the case of these simulations, the population will grow exponen­
tially). In contrast, those simulations in which altruistic alleles are not selected among 
males are likely to go extinct. Furthermore, it is likely that group selection mechan­
isms are stronger in species living in small groups, which is indeed the typical con­
dition of hunter-gatherer societies. The simulation results show that the inflection 
point or phase transition between steady and exponential growth is produced when 
the population size is relatively small—around 500 agents (see the first plot in Figure 
5.5).
The second mechanism is referred to as the group augmentation hypothesis. It pro­
poses that individuals can survive and reproduce better in large groups, so individu­
als directly enhance their fitness by increasing the group size by, for instance, caring 
for offspring of others even if they are unrelated (Clutton-Brock, 2002; Kokko et al., 
2001). There might be two different kinds of benefits that group augmentation pro­
duce. 'Passive' benefits depend solely on the presence of other group members rather 
than their behaviour, such as, for instance, when a big group might provide a safer 
place to stay because it reduces the risk of predation. Alternatively, 'active' benefits 
are produced by individual investments; for instance, helpers may cooperate with 
breeders because the offspring they help to raise will later help them (i.e., delayed 
reciprocity). Although this evolutionary mechanism can be compelling, conclusive 
evidence, especially on the existence of active group augmentation, is still lacking. 
The problem for studies of cooperative breeding is that group augmentation provides 
relatively few critical predictions and tends to be invoked post hoc as a theory of last 
resort with little explicit testing (Wright, 2007). In the analysis of cooperative breed­
ing, one of the best empirical studies, conducted by Wright and his colleagues (2010), 
did not confirm the expected results from the group augmentation hypothesis.
The simulation results discussed here do not address or test in a direct way the group 
augmentation hypothesis and its predicted results, but they provide further evidence 
for the relationship between cooperation and group size. Traditional approaches to 
studying the problem of altruism assume constant population sizes, so the ecology of 
interacting individuals is neglected. Instead, the ABM presented in Chapter 5 incor­
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porates some ecological dynamics into evolutionary game dynamics. It is worth men­
tioning in this context the work carried out by Hauert and his colleagues (2006), who 
designed a model that also integrates the evolution of cooperation and population 
dynamics. To do so, the authors linked the population size to an average population 
payoff. The model results show that decreasing population densities reduce the effect­
ive interaction group size in which cooperation can be favoured and, consequently, 
population density can increase. However, in that model, the modelled mechanism 
failed for pairwise prisoner's dilemma interactions and the population was driven to 
extinction. The ABMs presented here qualify those results and reveal the conditions 
under which altruism can evolve in a well-mixed and finite-sized population of agents 
playing the IPD.
Additional comparisons can be established with previous research in the area of evol­
ution of cooperation and evolutionary game theory. Thus, this thesis provides an ex­
planatory mechanism for the evolution of cooperative breeding that does not depend 
on kin selection or intergroup competition; the model presented here, in fact, makes fewer 
assumptions for the evolution of altruism.
Kin selection models or inclusive fitness theory (Hamilton, 1964; Smith, 1964) were es­
tablished as a response to earlier evolutionary theories proposing that altruism was 
the result of natural selection acting on groups or local populations. Instead of refer­
ring to a group of individuals, kin selection models explain the evolution of altruism 
by taking the 'micro level' or genetic view, which accounts all fitness effects back to 
the individual gene and claims that just a gene can be favoured by natural selection, 
by increasing the reproductive success of its bearer and by increasing the reproductive 
success of other individuals that carry the same gene3. According to this explanation,
3However, some authors have claimed that some fundamental principles of the theory of selection 
provide common foundations for both kin selection and group selection models. Thus, these models 
would not be competing hypotheses but rather two different ways of looking at the very same evolution­
ary process. For instance Gardner (2008) shows that kin selection models can be derived using Price's 
equation, which, in turn, can be expanded to encompass multiple levels of selection acting simultan­
eously. Similarly, Lehmann and his colleagues (2007) demonstrated that the multilevel selection model's 
results formalised by Traulsen and Nowak (2006), which explain the evolution of helping behaviours, 
can be obtained by an application of kin selection theory.
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kin selection is biologically adaptive because the individual beneficiaries of this type 
of behaviour—the altruist actor's non-descendent relatives—share some genes with 
the individual who helps them; for this reason, the survival and reproduction of the 
beneficiaries contribute to the propagation of the altruist's genes. In short, kin selec­
tion describes how indirect fitness benefits arise from helping non-descendent relat­
ives reproduce.
For many authors, parental investment is an obvious example of this behaviour (see 
for instance Ashton et al., 1998): an individual risks its safety, delays dispersal, en­
gages in various helping tasks without obvious short-term returns and limits its future 
fecundity by caring for its offspring. Kin selection remained for a long time the the­
oretical explanation for the evolution of cooperative breeding since, in addition to its 
compelling logic, empirical studies indicated that close relatives contribute more to co­
operative activities than do distant relatives or unrelated individuals, so the amount 
of helping seems to co-vary with the genetic relatedness between potential helpers 
and beneficiaries and seems to be more common in species where helping provides 
a greater benefit (Griffin and West, 2003; Reyer, 1984). In the case of paternal care, 
Buchan and his colleagues (2003) established that in wild savannah baboons, who live 
in multi-male groups, males are able to differentiate their offspring from unrelated 
juveniles and selectively support their offspring in agonistic disputes (although the 
actual identification mechanism was not explained). This male kin-discrimination to 
protect the young has been also established in Hanuman langurs (Borries et al., 1999b). 
These findings bore out the assumptions that paternal care can be explained by kin se­
lection models.
Only recently researchers and scholars have started to question whether kin altruism 
alone can maximise the indirect fitness of the recipients and explain cooperative be­
haviour in cooperative breeding species (Bergmüller et al., 2007; Clutton-Brock, 2002; 
Griffin and West, 2002). There are several reasons to question the explanatory power of 
this mechanism. Evidently parental investment does produce pronounced benefits to 
the actor's direct fitness, because it improves the offspring's survival rates. However, 
the indirect benefits of kin selection can be counterbalanced by competition between 
relatives for resources or mating opportunities (West et al., 2002). Furthermore, sev­
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eral species of cooperative breeders have shown that helpers can be unrelated to the 
young they are raising (they may even be from different species) and that unrelated 
helpers invest as heavily as close relatives (Clutton-Brock et alv 2000), a feature that, 
as discussed in the previous subsection, is observed in cooperative breeding monkeys 
such as marmosets and tamarins (Digby and Ferrari, 1994; Sussman and Garber, 1987). 
The origins of cooperation in the case of humans may be related to our ancestral group 
structure, and since humans lived as foragers for 95 percent of our species' history, it 
may be useful to analyse co-residence patterns among present day foraging societies.
Hill and his colleagues (2011) presented statistical analysis of foraging group com­
position based on actual residence and they demonstrated that hunter-gatherers dis­
play a unique social structure in which (1) either sex may disperse or remain in their 
natal group; (2) adult brothers and sisters often co-reside, and (3) most individuals 
in residential groups are genetically unrelated. These patterns produce large inter­
action networks of unrelated adults and suggest that inclusive fitness cannot explain 
extensive cooperation in foraging societies. Consequently, although altruism is un­
doubtedly most common in familial groups (Emlen, 1995), it is by no means restricted 
to groups of closely related members. Also, the estimation of the effects on 'indirect 
fitness' attributed to kin selection has probably been overestimated in many studies. 
These estimations have sometimes included the effects of helping on direct descend­
ants (offspring and grand-offspring) as well as on collateral kin and sometimes they 
have double accounted the kin-selected benefits by including in the same measure­
ment benefits received by helpers from their kin and those they confer on kin (Creel, 
1990). Thus, kin selection provides a viable explanation for the evolution of cooperat­
ive breeding in many vertebrate and invertebrate species, but it does not constitute a 
strong mechanism to explain the evolution of altruism in general, especially in many 
cooperative breeding species in which adult helpers are not related (or just 'possibly' 
related) to the infant they care.
The simulation results presented in this thesis are consistent with some of these criti­
cisms of kin selection models, since male-non reciprocal altruism towards females can 
be selected, even though relatedness does not play any role in the modelled mechan­
isms (actually, it is not implemented at all) and even though the simulated inter-sex
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interactions do not guarantee reproductive access or successful reproduction for the 
male.
Alternative explanatory mechanisms proposed in the literature have completely dis­
regarded cooperative breeding as an evolutionary explanation of altruism, and they 
have focused instead on warfare and group competition as a force for robust group selec­
tion. Among those explanatory models, parochial altruism has gained recent popularity 
among scholars: these models highlight the idea that individuals are altruistic with 
group members and are hostile to individuals not of one's own group (Arrow, 2007; 
Bowles, 2006; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Sâàksvuori et al., 2011). Since internally cooper­
ative groups prevail over less cooperative rival groups, parochial altruism rests on 
the evolutionary belief that violent intergroup conflict played a key role in the dawn 
of human cooperation. Recent evidence seems to be consistent with this hypothesis. 
Gneezy and colleagues demonstrated in controlled cooperative dilemmas with real 
players that violent intergroup conflict led individuals to inflict costs on free-riders 
and bestow benefits on cooperators (Gneezy and Fessier, 2011). Additionally, by cal­
ibrating empirically his model of between-group competition. Bowels (2009) estab­
lished that intergroup conflict can promote the evolution of altruism. More recently, 
Mathew and Boyd (2011) showed that in warfare among nomadic Tukana pastoral- 
ists in East Africa, costly cooperation in combat is sustained through punishment of 
free-riders. From an evolutionary viewpoint, the hypothesis that warfare provided a 
selective pressure that favoured intemally-cooperative groups assumes that, during 
earlier stages of human evolution, exploitation, widespread carnage, and intergroup 
competition for mating opportunities, access to resources and status was the norm 
(Keeley, 2001; Pinker, 2011).
However, such generalisations are unlikely to correctly describe the conditions in 
which our Pleistocene ancestors lived: small bands of hunter-gatherers, numbering 
25 or so individuals, under chronic climate fluctuation, widely dispersed over large 
areas and unable to fall back on staple foods, would have suffered from high mor­
tality rates, particularly child mortality, due to starvation as well as predation and 
disease (Johnson and Earle, 2001). All these socio-ecological features rule out the 
idea that conflict and warfare among groups was a widespread phenomenon. Evid­
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ently, to claim the opposite, that is, to question the idea that persistent intergroup 
conflict—sufficiently common to produce the selection of genetic or even cultural ad­
vantageous traits—during the Pleistocene era does not lead one to endorse the myth 
of the 'noble savage', as some authors have claimed (among them. Pinker, 2003a); it 
means to take into account the socio-ecological conditions of our foraging ancestors 
seriously: those conditions would have precluded foraging individuals from enga­
ging in intergroup mayhem. Thus, far from increasing their fitness by competition 
and conflict, these individuals would have enhanced their chances through improved 
access to resources, mating opportunities or safety by "eschewing efforts to achieve 
inter-community dominance in favour of egalitarian relations of friendship, mutual­
ity, and sharing" (Kelly, 2005, p. 15297), so nearby members of their own species 
would have been more valuable as potential sharing partners.
No doubt our Pleistocene ancestors experienced jealousy, competed for reputation and 
harboured grudges or desires for retribution that occasionally escalated into conflict 
and violence. Homicide among foraging people is a well documented phenomenon, 
but such killings tended to involve individuals who know each other rather than indi­
viduals from adjacent groups. In fact, since warfare probably consisted of small raids 
and ambushes, the distinction between warfare and violence is somewhat problematic 
(Nivette, 2011). And although violence is observed among non-state societies, it seems 
to be a regionally and culturally varying phenomenon which makes universal theor­
ies wanting (Thorpe, 2003). Therefore, the most likely interpretation of intergroup 
conflict in foraging groups relates warfare to interdependent social organisations and 
networks of exchange, which seem to be better predictors of violence among those 
groups (Nivette, 2011). In this sense, intergroup conflict in foraging societies may be 
better described by the 'balance of power hypothesis' (Wiessner, 2006), which estab­
lishes that intergroup conflict in foraging groups was mostly about retaliation rather 
than conquest and predation; a last resort or ultima ratio element, triggered to estab­
lish a balance of power with allies and enemies, so that intergroup social and economic 
exchange could flow.
All in all, the simulations presented here do not model simultaneous competition 
between different groups, but they do offer a more plausible (i.e., they relate to human-
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specific biological traits) and parsimonious (i.e., do not refer to unlikely assumptions 
about the conditions in which early humans lived) explanatory mechanism for the 
evolutionary origins of altruism in human societies. The explanatory mechanism put 
forth in Chapter 5 links altruism and offspring care, the latter being commonly ref­
erenced as the most important influence on men's and women's foraging decisions 
(Codding et al., 2011; Kaplan et al., 2000). Therefore, since the most significant chal­
lenge of early human beings was to keep their costly children alive, cooperative breed­
ing and especially non-reciprocal altruism would have been selected over evolution­
ary time, allowing groups with a bunch of unconditional cooperators to grow and 
expand.
To summarise, group selection models provide a framework to interpret the simula­
tion results: the emergence of male pure altruism (although only a probable outcome, 
subject to stochastic dynamics) drives the population towards exponential growth; 
when male non-reciprocal altruism does not emerge, the likely result is that the popu­
lation goes extinct, or at best, grows slowly (provided inter- and intra-sex cooperation 
evolves). By relating the emergence of non-reciprocal altruism and exponential pop­
ulation growth, the reported simulation results provide a computational example to 
better understand the demographic consequences of altruism in the context of cooper­
ative breeding.
7.3 Limitations of the Study
Symbolic communication is a complex topic. Various perspectives underscore dif­
ferent aspects of it and its evolutionary and sociological origins are hotly contested. 
This thesis draws conclusions about the emergence and evolution of symbolic com­
munication, taking into account some external aspects of symbols, such as spatial 
constraints, the pre-linguistic level of mutual cooperation in which symbolic com­
munication was possible and the population dynamics that sustained its evolution. 
To explore these dimensions, I have relied on computational and mathematical mod­
els, and I have related the simulation results to some theories and empirical evidence 
collected by anthropologists and primatologists. It has not been possible, within the 
scope of this project, to examine direct archeological record and carry out experiments
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with real non-human and human individuals. Most important, the methodological 
strategy I have used implies a compromise, as established in Chapter 1, with syntax, 
but semantics was not addressed. That is, I have proposed formal models to explore 
some hypotheses regarding the origins of symbolic communication, but these models, 
by definition, are expressed in artificial and highly stylised languages, which cannot 
grasp the phenomenological dimension of symbols. As Tomasello (1995, p. 134) claimed, 
"the whole purpose of formal languages is to allow users to manipulate abstract sym­
bols in algorithmic ways without regard for their meaning or interpretation." This 
claim is similar to the made by Searle (1980), in the sense that computers programs 
cannot ^understand' what they process, so we cannot rely on them to have an accurate 
model of our symbolic faculty. The crucial aspect regarding how people experience 
and why they produce cultural signs has not been addressed in this research. My 
project, however, did not focus on these qualitative issues.
The proposed models also present some limitations. In Chapter 4 1 have explored the 
effect of some spatial constraints in the emergence and evolution of symbolic com­
munication. To do so, I have designed a model in which a set of independent agents 
establish communicative interactions within an artificial world, in which there are dif­
ferent objects they have to name. However, in this ABM, the agents can only refer to 
one object in each communicative interaction (or 'chatty game'). What would have 
happened if instead of one, agents could see two or more objects at the same time? 
Previous research have explored this issue (Steels, 1996; Steels and Belpaeme, 2005). 
And although their results are similar to the one presented in this model—they also 
describe asymptotic learning—I did not explore the possibility for errors in meaning 
attribution or understanding (i.e., when the speaker refers to one object but the hearer 
attributes this utterance to another one). This aspect of symbolic communication was 
not implemented in the ABM presented in Chapter 4. It would be interesting to ex­
plore this issue in the future. However, the current model design allows the imple­
mentation of two or more objects (i.e., topics) of communication.
The ABM presented in Chapter 5 did not include ecological constraints which can limit 
population growth. In this chapter, I have demonstrated that the emergence of male 
non-reciprocal altruism brings about exponential growth. Evidently, this population
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growth is highly unrealistic. It is true that human populations can increase rapidly and 
consume their local resources, as the experience of Rapa Nui people, in Easter Island, 
one of the few well-documented ecodisasters (Rainbird, 2002), demonstrates. What 
would it have happened if the model presented in Chapter 5 had considered ecological 
constraints, such as limited resources? It is probable that exponential growth would 
not have been observed. I cannot reply to this important question with certainty. The 
model design allows the implementation of this aspect in a modular way. However, 
my aim was not to produce a detailed model of foraging groups, including all the 
ecological challenges they faced. My interest was to explore the population effects of 
the emergence of pure altruism. In that sense, I think the model fulfils its objective 
and produces illuminating conclusions.
Finally, the mathematical model presented in Chapter 6 is highly abstract and, most 
important, it follows a top-down feature that is the most important limitation of equa­
tion-based modelling. However, my objective was to use existent models to explore 
the regimes of cultural evolution that different population dynamics could sustain. I 
am aware of the limitation of equation-based modelling—in Chapter 1, Section 1.5 I 
have recognised that the bottom-up approach of agent-based modelling is much more 
interesting. But as a benchmarking strategy, the mathematical model I used in Chapter 
6, which allowed me to contrast my results with the ones discussed in the literature, 
proved to be informative. Future modelling efforts should aim to build an ABM in 
which some cultural elements can emerge from the bottom-up. That model should 
relate, at the same time, the emergence of non-reciprocal altruism, population dynam­
ics and cultural evolution. Evidently, such a model is highly complex. I have tried in 
this thesis to explore in detail the simple models I build, in order to understand their 
basic mechanisms. In this sense, I have tried to keep my work close to the old motto 
in social simulation: keep it simple, stupid! (KISS). Although this approach has been 
highly contested in the last years (see Edmonds and Moss, 2005), I believe that, in the 
study of a complex phenomenon, such as symbolic communication, the best alternat­
ive is to produce, explore and analyse rather simple models in order to explore limited 
hypothesis.
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7.4 Final Reflections
Despite Durkheim's methodological warnings, sociology has a long-lasting tradition 
of dialogue with other naturalistic explanations of social behaviour, particularly those 
of cognitive sciences and linguistics. There are many examples of these fruitful dia­
logues. The theoretical project exposed by Habermas in his magnum opus The The­
ory of Communicative Action (Habermas, 1985) was grounded on a general theory of 
communication called 'universal pragmatics', which was a complement of the 'uni­
versal grammar' developed by Chomsky (1969). Habermas also developed a model 
of normative socialisation (in the form of a theory of the acquisition of communicative 
competence) and sketched a theory of social evolution based on Piaget's (1972) and 
Kohlberg's (1984) cognitive research. Unfortunately, Habermas did not continue these 
developments and his social theory did not integrate further progress in the cognitive 
sciences post-Piaget and linguistics post-Chomsky's universal grammar.
Based on a completely different premise, Luhmann built his own sociological theory 
in a similar dialogue. His theoretical project, established in his book Social Systems 
(1996), consisted of an understanding of communication as an autopoietic system, a 
concept that was proposed by the neuroscientists Maturana and Varela (1979). Luh­
mann also developed a model of social differentiation process based on the calculus 
of forms advanced by the mathematician and psychologist Spencer-Brown (1994) and 
a theory of social evolution based on the evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould 
(2002). However, despite these naturalistic bases, his theory devoted little space to the 
cognition embodied in the social realm since, as a sociologist, he was satisfied to ar­
ticulate an account according to which psychic systems are structurally coupled with 
social systems.
In this thesis, I have followed this tradition of joint research and theorisation between 
social and naturalistic approximations to social behaviour. My final conclusion stresses 
the fruitful dialogue between cognitive, biological and social sciences in the explan­
ation of our faculty of language and symbolic communication in general. Sociology 
may contribute to, as well as benefit from, the constructions and research of those dis­
ciplines. For sociologists, this means that they must take an active role in helping to
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characterise theoretically, as well as to investigate empirically, the characteristics of so­
cial behaviour as it is expressed by individuals in interaction and, as well, the relation 
between them and the social structures they generate and modify over time. In this 
dialogue, sociology has plenty to say.
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